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INTRODUCTION 
 
Should antitrust policy do more to promote competition in 
digital platform markets? The claim that antitrust is falling short comes 
from both the left and the right, but it also provokes strong 
disagreement. How much of the call for action is a response to real 
competitive harm—and how much to large firm size, personal animus, 
myopia, perceived political power, or something else—is unclear.  
This is evident in the forty responses to a House Judiciary 
Committee’s request in early 2020 for recommendations concerning 
digital platform monopoly.1 Some believe that everything is fine and 
 
1 See Digital Markets Investigation: Antitrust Investigation of the 
Rise and Use of Market Power Online and the Adequacy of Existing Antitrust 
Laws and Current Enforcement Levels, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=14921 
[https://perma.cc/HM6U-RW47]. For some examples, see Jonathan B. Baker 
et al., Joint Response to the House Judiciary Committee on the State of 
Antitrust Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital 
Markets (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/joint_submission_from_michael_
kades_and_antitrust_expert_coalition.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE78-CHMW]; 
Jonathan M. Barnett et al., Joint Submission of Antitrust Economists, Legal 
Scholars, and Practitioners to the House Judiciary Committee on the State 
of Antitrust Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital 
Markets (May 15, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/joint_submission_from_internatio
nal_center_for_law__economics.pdf [https://perma.cc/62QW-KJ4N; James 
C. Cooper, Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Prepared Statement Before 
the Investigation into the State of Competition in the Digital Marketplace 
(Apr. 17, 2020), 
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we should make few substantive changes.2 Others would drive over 
the industry with a power mower, breaking up the platforms with little 
thought about the impact on output or consumers. 3  One question 
underlying all of this is whether antitrust law’s focused and litigation 
driven approach is sufficient to address competition problems in 
digital platforms? Or are the problems so common and widespread that 
they require more pervasive public control? 
 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_joshua_wright_
james_cooper_and_john_yun.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD4A-AR75]; Thomas 
A. Lambert, Submission (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_thomas_lambert
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PAA-UVQ8]; Robert H. Lande, Submission on 
Competition in the Digital Marketplace (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_robert_lande.pd
f [https://perma.cc/2G8Q-FBFB]; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust House 
Judiciary Committee Antitrust Submcommittee Testimony, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_daniel_sokol.pd
f [https://perma.cc/JVS2-NLMC]; Spencer Weber Waller, Submission (Mar. 
30, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_spencer_waller
_weber.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PYR-4JPS]; see also Thurman Arnold Project 
at Yale, Digital Platforms and Antitrust, YALE SCH. MGMT., 
https://som.yale.edu/faculty-research-centers/centers-initiatives/thurman-
arnold-project-at-yale/digital-platforms-and-antitrust 
[https://perma.cc/L5EZ-EHN3] (collecting resources). For my own response 
see Herbert Hovenkamp, Submission (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_herbert_hovenk
amp.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6Z4-QLSA]. 
2 See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
3 See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR 
FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020); Sophia Lam, 
It’s Time to Break Up Big Tech, GATE (Oct. 20, 2019), 
http://uchicagogate.com/articles/2019/10/20/its-time-break-big-tech 
[https://perma.cc/K48V-GAVR]. Somewhat more sensitive to the 
administrability question is Rory Van Loo, In Defense of Breakups: 
Administering a “Radical” Remedy, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020). 
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Cutting against broad statutory regulation is the fact that digital 
platforms are extremely diverse from one another.  Regulation in an 
industry such as air travel, electric power, or telecommunications 
applies to firms with common technologies and similar market 
relationships.  This is not the case with the four major digital platforms 
that have drawn so much media and political attention – namely, 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google.  They have different inputs.  
While there is some overlap, they sell different products, only some of 
which are digital. They deal with various third parties including 
customers in different ways.  What they have in common is that they 
are very large and that a sizeable portion of their operating technology 
is digital.  To be sure, increased statutory control of individual aspects 
of their business, such as advertising or acquisitions, is a possibility.  
But that would still leave vast amounts of territory to the antitrust laws 
This article argues that sustainable competition in platform 
markets is possible, and that the less intrusive, more focused, and more 
individualized approach of the antitrust laws is better for consumers 
and most other affected interest groups.  It will be less likely to reduce 
product or service quality, limit innovation, or reduce output. As a 
result, in those areas where antitrust law applies statutory regulators 
should give federal judges a chance. 
Antitrust law and scholarship speak to competition problems 
on large digital platforms with various levels of engagement. The 
Chicago School in particular pushed a mindset that saw markets as all 
alike. 4  This leaves regulators toothless when confronted with an 
industry that behaves in unexpected ways. Others are more 
circumspect, appreciating that both markets and firms are institutions 
that can be quite different from one another. As a result, they require 
more specific fact finding rather than overly broad policy 
generalizations. Digital platforms, in this view, are merely one of the 
variations. For example, in Ohio v. American Express Co. (Amex), 
Justice Breyer in dissent was much more comfortable than the Court’s 
 
4  See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020). 
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majority with factual examination of the particular digital market 
before it.5 The majority spoke mainly in generalities, largely ignored 
the record, and drew legal conclusions that are inconsistent with 
fundamental economic principles.6 Antitrust law needs to treat digital 
platform markets for what they are: markets that have some unique 
characteristics, but markets nonetheless. For the most part, 
competition problems in them can be controlled with the antitrust tools 
that we have. 
A digital platform is a website, app, or other digital venue that 
interacts commercially7 with one or more groups of users. A “two-
sided” digital platform is one that facilitates activities involving at least 
two different but interdependent groups of users. 8  In some cases 
(Amazon, eBay, Uber, Amex) transactions between these groups are 
negotiated directly on the website. In other cases (Google Search, 
Facebook, Match.com, and most periodicals and electronic video 
games) users do not make commercial transactions directly with one 
another, but commercial transactions do support the platform as a 
profit center. 
This paper first considers the nature of platform power and the 
extent to which competition is possible or desirable in markets 
dominated by digital platforms, including those that are two-sided. 
Then it discusses the form that remedies for anticompetitive abuses 
should take. One area that may require new legislation or at least a 
change in judicial thinking is platform mergers.9 
Beyond that, there are steps courts could take without new 
legislation. One novel proposal is that intrafirm decision making could 
be restructured in ways that facilitate competition inside a platform, 
 
5 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294-97 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
6 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The 
American Express Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 47. 
7  While not every platform engages in commercial activities, 
antitrust law reaches only those that are in or affect commerce. See PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 260-262 (5th ed. 2020). 
8 See infra Section I.B. 
9 See infra Part III. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
6 Platform Monopoly Nov. 2020 
 
rather than between the platform and other entities. This could be 
induced without breaking up the platforms themselves. Another 
proposal is forced interoperability or pooling, which can make markets 
more efficient by broadening the range of positive network effects. 
Both of these alternatives could enable more competitive performance 
without the significant losses in productivity and consumer value that 
typically result from a breakup. Existing law provides ample precedent 
to support these remedies.10 
 
I. DIGITAL PLATFORM MONOPOLY 
 
A. Assessing Platform Power 
 
Antitrust policy is concerned with exercises of market power, 
which is the power to profit by reducing output below the competitive 
level and increasing prices unreasonably above cost. 11  Alternative 
articulations, such as concern for the “competitive process,” provide 
no content against which results can be evaluated. Further, antitrust has 
no statutory warrant to condemn firms simply because they are very 
large, although that would certainly make the analysis easier. Size and 
market power do not always go hand in hand. 
The power question for digital platforms is complex because each 
platform does business in a variety of products or services and employs 
diverse technologies. Two-sided platforms pose particular problems 
because one cannot estimate power on one side without considering 
effects on the other side. 
 
1. Measuring Power Directly 
 
10 See infra Section II.C.2. 
11 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 501; William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 937, 937 (1981).  
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Traditionally, courts have measured market power “indirectly,” 
as a percentage of a properly defined “relevant market.”12 A market 
consists of a group of products or services that are close substitutes for 
each other.13 That methodology dominated antitrust analysis through 
the twentieth century, but economists have increasingly favored more 
“direct” measures, which rely on empirical measurement of output 
responses to price changes. These methods do not necessarily require 
a market definition, avoiding questions of how broad or narrow to 
define the relevant class of goods or services. Further, direct measures 
are more accurate and permit finer adjustments, provided that the data 
for using them are available. 14  Nearly all transactions in platform 
markets produce a digital record, so the data should generally be 
available. Today, economists use both direct and indirect 
methodologies for assessing power in digital markets. They also urge 
caution, however, that traditional market definition and market share 
measurements can be particularly unreliable in cases involving digital 
 
12 On the methodology, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 
¶¶ 530-571. 
13Id. ¶ 530a (measuring markets by scope of “hypothetical cartel” or 
“hypothetical monopoly”). 
14  Id. ¶ 521 (discussing the economic literature). See also Louis 
Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 438 (2010) 
(arguing that the market-definition approach should be abandoned 
“entirely”).  See also Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1303 (2017) (noting numerous weaknesses in traditional 
market share measures); Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and 
Counterproductive, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (2013) (similar).  On the 
methodologies, see Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic 
Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market 
Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 
2008); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of 
Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 Antitrust L.J. 3 (1992).  At the 
macro level, see Robert E. Hall, Using Empirical Marginal Cost to Measure 
Market Power in the US Economy (NBER Working Paper, Nov., 2018), 
available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25251. 
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platforms.15 In any event, the process is highly data driven and fact-
specific and has become a staple of expert economic testimony.16 
 Notwithstanding its advantages, direct measurement of power 
in antitrust litigation is technical and somewhat novel.  Judicial 
acceptance has been spotty. In merger policy, direct measures without 
the need for a market definition have enjoyed considerable success in 
unilateral effects analysis of horizontal mergers.17 The Supreme Court 
 
15  See, e.g., David S. Evans, Multisided Platforms, Dynamic 
Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for Internet-Based Firms 
29-32 (Univ. of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute, Working Paper No. 753, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746095 [https://perma.cc/B5LH-P5ZK] 
(urging caution when using market-share data). 
16 See, e.g., Elena Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market 
Power in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of Newspapers, 22 J. APPLIED 
ECONOMETRICS 1247 (2007); Eric Emch & T. Scott Thompson, Market 
Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks, 5 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 45, 45 (2006); Minjae Song, Estimating Platform Market Power in 
Two-Sided Markets with an Application to Magazine Advertising (Simon 
Sch. Working Paper No. FR 11-22, 2011), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908621 [https://perma.cc/BM7F-KREG]; Chris 
Pike, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, OECD (Apr. 6, 
2018), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-
multi-sided-platforms-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANS4-BHFN] (comparing 
the methodologies and pointing out strengths and difficulties with each). 
Some lawyers continue to rely mainly on traditional indirect methods, 
although with qualifications. See, e.g. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, 
Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1063 (2017). 
17“Unilateral effects” merger analysis considers whether a merger of 
two relatively proximate firms in a product differentiated market will give 
the post-merger firm a higher profit maximizing price than prior to the 
merger. See, e.g., United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 84 
n.35 (D.D.C. 2011) (“As a matter of applied economics, evaluation of 
unilateral effects does not require a market definition . . . .”) (quoting 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 913). For a good discussion 
expressing doubt about conventional market-share measurement in high-tech 
markets, see Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (2014). 
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has also approved more direct measures in some cases involving 
horizontal restraints.18 
For vertical agreements, however, the Supreme Court in Amex 
held that a relevant market must be defined in a vertical restraints case 
even where the plaintiffs had provided direct proof of market power.19 
The Court’s rationale is difficult to understand,20 and the effect at this 
writing is still unclear. However, a high percentage of antitrust 
challenges to platforms are likely to be vertical because they involve 
contracts between a platform as seller or purchaser and the various 
product suppliers, advertisers, and even customers with whom it deals. 
These could include most-favored-nation clauses, exclusive dealing or 
tying, or other types of exclusionary vertical agreements.21 
There is a workaround, however. Merger analysis has also been 
hampered by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Brown Shoe nearly 
sixty years ago that the antitrust merger provision, section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, requires a market definition.22 One can neutralize this 
 
18 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 157 
(2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-461 
(1986). 
19 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). 
20 The issue was not briefed, and the Court’s entire discussion was in 
a footnote, which read: 
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the relevant market in 
this case because they have offered actual evidence of adverse effects 
on competition—namely, increased merchant fees. We disagree. The 
cases that the plaintiffs cite for this proposition evaluated whether 
horizontal restraints had an adverse effect on competition. Given that 
horizontal restraints involve agreements between competitors not to 
compete in some way, this Court concluded that it did not need to 
precisely define the relevant market to conclude that these 
agreements were anticompetitive. Vertical restraints often pose no 
risk to competition unless the entity imposing them has market 
power, which cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines the 
relevant market. 
Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (citations omitted). 
21 See infra notes 194-196 and accompanying text. 
22 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-17 (1962) 
(interpreting the Clayton Act’s “section of the country” and “line of 
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requirement by using direct evidence to establish that a firm or group 
of firms has the requisite power over price, and then use that fact to 
support the conclusion that this particular firm or grouping is a relevant 
market. After all, a relevant market is a grouping of sales for which an 
unjustified price increase is profitable. 23  Once direct econometric 
analysis has told us that a firm or group of firms has sufficient power 
to charge a noncompetitive price, we can express that conclusion by 
saying that this grouping constitutes a relevant market. 
 Traditional market definition measures also produce one 
difficulty that can be particularly relevant to platform markets. If a 
market is product-differentiated, any conclusion about market 
definition is wrong.24 Market definition is necessarily binary. It can 
count something as inside or outside a market but cannot meter 
anything in between. 
For example, consider whether “digital advertising” is a 
relevant market. That question is highly relevant to any issue that 
involves the practices of such firms as Google or Facebook in 
advertising markets. If we decide that digital advertising is a relevant 
market, however, we have effectively concluded that digital 
advertising and other more traditional forms of advertising do not 
compete with each other, which is clearly incorrect. By contrast, if we 
group all forms of advertising into a single “advertising” market, that 
implies that all forms are perfect competitors such that people do not 
distinguish among them. That is also incorrect. By contrast, direct 
measures are able to examine factors such as the rate at which firms 
change their purchases in response to a price change that effects one 
type of advertising but not the other. 
 Two-sidedness affects measurements of market power to the 
extent that there are offsetting increases and decreases across the two 
 
commerce” language as requiring a geographic market and a product market, 
respectively). 
23 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1 (6th ed. 2020) [hereinafter 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY]. 
24 On the impact of product differentiation, see infra Section I.C.4. 
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sides.25 For example, viewed in isolation, a price increase on one side 
of the platform may look like an exercise of power, but it may be offset 
by a cost increase or an increase in services on the other side. This is 
particularly important for measurements of price-cost relationships.  
For example, it would be incorrect to conclude that Google provides 
search services below cost because the price to users is zero. Google 
obtains all its revenue from advertisers or paid search engine 
placement. In credit card markets the price to customers is often less 
than zero, because card companies offer rewards for card usage that 
exceed customer fees. The revenue for the card issuer comes almost 
entirely from merchants.26 
 For both indirect and direct methodologies, power assessment 
on two-sided platforms requires consideration of reactions that occur 
on the opposite side. One cannot avoid the need to consider the other 
side simply by defining a relevant market.  For example, Uber charges 
higher “surge” prices during rush hour. Are these an assertion of 
market power over passengers? After all, the price goes up and costs 
are not obviously higher. Or is surge pricing simply an exercise in 
participation balancing intended to ration scarce drivers during a 
period of high demand? 27  These are testable propositions, but 
determining them requires data from both sides of the market. 
  Market power requirements also vary with the antitrust offense. 
For example, proof of unlawful contractual restraints, such as tying or 
exclusive dealing, requires a smaller market share than does 
monopolization.  For contractual practices the defendant need not be 
 
25 On the definition of two-sided markets, see infra Section I.B. 
26 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2281-82 (2018); 
John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 49, 80 (2016). 
27 The issue is currently being litigated. See, e.g., SC Innovations, 
Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-07440-JCS, 2020 WL 2097611, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (refusing to dismiss a complaint alleging that Uber 
surge pricing constituted unlawful monopolistic price discrimination); see 
also Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2020 WL 4482095, (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 3, 2020) (sustaining arbitrator’s conclusion that Uber’s surge pricing 
did not violate the antitrust laws). 
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dominant in its market.28 No court has found sufficient market power 
to condemn a firm of single-firm monopolization in the absence of a 
market definition.29 At one time the Ninth Circuit had held that a 
relevant market need not be defined in a case alleging attempt to 
monopolize, but the Supreme Court decisively rejected that view.30 
The use of indirect proof in monopolization cases unquestionably 
distorts results. For example, in a very significant digital monopoly 
case, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,31 the government proceeded by 
indirect evidence of market share in a relevant market. The court 
accepted a market definition that excluded the Apple operating system 
used on Macintosh computers.32 That approach runs straight into the 
problem noted above. Including Windows and the Mac OS in the same 
market would have treated them as perfect competitors, which would 
be incorrect. But excluding the Mac OS treated them as if they did not 
compete at all, which was also incorrect. 
Where data are available, direct measurement of power produces 
better results. Questions about market power are highly fact intensive. 
This indicates another fundamental problem with the Supreme Court’s 
 
28  HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 23, 
§ 10.3a (minimum market share for tying is about 30%); id. § 10.9e 
(minimum share for exclusive dealing is similar). 
29 There are some dicta in Microsoft to the effect that direct evidence 
might be sufficient in a section 2 case, but the court relied on a dominant 
share of a relevant market. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34, 51, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also id. at 57-58 (stating that conduct 
indicated power, even though it had already been established on the basis of 
market share). 
30  Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 452-453 (1993) 
(reversing the Ninth Circuit and overruling earlier cases such as Lessig v. 
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
31 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For a critique of the Court’s indirect 
methodology for proving market power in that case, see Crane, supra note 
17, at 70-72. 
32  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 53; see also European Commission 
Decision on AT.40099—Google Android of 18 July 2018, C(2018) 4761, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_999
3_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP2B-LD3Y] (excluding Apple iPhone OS from 
the relevant market for Android OS). 
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Amex decision. When the Court concluded that evaluation of vertical 
restraints requires a market definition, it took a question that is 
properly (and was, until Amex, uniformly) understood to be one of fact, 
and turned it into a question of law. The issue was not briefed, but the 
record became irrelevant because the plaintiff had relied entirely on 
direct evidence of power. 
 
2. “Cluster” Markets 
 There is substantial antitrust precedent for recognizing 
“cluster” market definitions, which are markets for noncompeting 
goods or services sold from a common plant or platform.  One example 
is the aggregation of hospital services measured by the number of 
patient admissions, even though the various medical procedures that 
patients require do not compete with one another.33 Another is the 
collection of noncompeting products sold by office supply stores, such 
as paper clips, staplers, and pencils. 34  The Supreme Court has 
confirmed lower court conclusions that the diverse services performed 
by a bank, such as checking accounts and loans, can be clustered into 
a single market.35 It also agreed to a single-market definition that 
covered alarm services for burglary, fire, and smoke.36 
Clustering noncompeting products for purposes of market 
power analysis requires more than the simple observation that the 
products are sold in the same store. For example, Walmart sells both 
toasters and chainsaws, but that fact alone does not justify defining a 
toaster-chainsaw market. Rather, a cluster market is proper when 
 
33 E.g., Promedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 
559 (6th Cir. 2014) (clustering medical services that use similar facilities and 
assets). 
34E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Staples, Inc, 190 F.Supp.3d 100, 117 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(“cluster markets allow items that are not substitutes for each other to be clustered 
together in one antitrust market for analytical convenience.”). 
35  See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 
(1963) (stating that a banking market included deposits as well as loans, and 
both commercial and household services); see also United States v. Conn. 
Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660-66 (1974) (similar); United States v. 
Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 399 U.S. 350, 379-83 (1970) (similar). 
36 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-75 (1966). 
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clustering yields cost savings or transactional advantages and these 
advantages are difficult to duplicate.  As a result, the firm is able to 
profit by raising its prices higher than its costs. These are sometimes 
referred to as “economies of joint provision.” 37  In effect, while 
traditional markets are groups of substitutes, the concept of cluster 
markets additionally recognizes that combining complements can 
sometimes produce market power. 
Clustering has been used in the case law only for purposes of 
market definition, and thus applies to indirect proof.  The approach that 
it takes, however, is actually more susceptible to direct measurement 
because it requires an assessment of transaction costs savings that 
result from clustering.38  While diverse products cannot be aggregated, 
price-cost margins can be. 
 Cluster market analysis is one way of addressing the question 
whether firms such as Amazon have market power in its array of 
products, even though most of them individually are sold in 
competitive markets and Amazon’s market share in each may be small. 
A fact finding that a single product, such as “tires,” is the relevant 
market leads to the conclusion that Amazon has little market power. 
But if the relevant question is Amazon’s dominance in retailing then 
we should be querying whether its platform sales as whole enable it 
profitably to increase price-cost margins above competitive levels. 
In some cases, such as Google, the diverse products and 
services are not even provided on the same website. There is no case 
law precedent for lumping together diverse noncompeting products 
that are not even produced or sold together simply because the same 
seller offers them.  If the relevant question is transaction cost savings, 
 
37 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, ¶ 565c. 
38 See Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 
114-115 (1985) (cluster markets defined in terms of economies of scope 
and transactional complementarities).  Accord Gregory J. Werden, The 
History of antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQUETTE L. REV. 123, 166 
(1992) (also noting the inconsistent rationales that courts have used for 
clustering).  See also Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: an Analytical 
Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007) (arguing against the use of 
clustering to support traditional market definitions). 
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however, then the question whether two products are sold on different 
platforms is less important. 
 
B. Identifying Two-Sided Platforms 
 
A two-sided market is one that intermediates between at least two 
interdependent groups, such as internet searchers and advertisers, 
rideshare users and drivers, or credit card customers and merchants. 
The fact that business is conducted on a digital platform is not 
sufficient to establish the existence of a two-sided market. For 
example, some digital platforms may be nothing more than venues for 
merchants to sell their own merchandise. Tesla manufactures its own 
vehicles and sells them principally online through its own digital 
platform.39 
In Amex the Supreme Court defined two-sided platforms 
idiosyncratically but narrowly. First, it concluded that “[a] market 
should be treated as one sided when the impacts of indirect network 
effects and relative pricing in that market are minor.”40 The Court gave 
the example of “[n]ewspapers that sell advertisements,” which are 
“arguably . . . two-sided platform[s],” but for which the effects of two-
sidedness are small. 41  That conclusion would surprise many 
economists and other experts who write about two-sided markets. 
Periodicals supported by both reader subscriptions and advertisers are 
commonly given as examples of businesses operating in two-sided 
markets.42 
 
39  See TESLA, https://www.tesla.com [https://perma.cc/Z28A-
GMTK]. However, Tesla has had some disputes with states whose law 
require the presence of a car dealer. See Jon Fingas, Tesla May Open 
‘Centers’ to Get Around Pro-Dealership Laws, ENDGADGET (Oct. 12, 2019), 
https://www.engadget.com/2019-10-12-tesla-centers-leak.html 
[https://perma.cc/9WQR-UL6N]. 
40 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). 
41 Id. 
42E..g, Ulrich Kaiser & Julian Wright, Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: 
Evidence from the Magazine Industry, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1 (2006); Elena 
Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: 
the Case of Newspapers, 22 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 1247 (2007). 
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With that, the Court limited its definition of two-sided platforms 
to those that “facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between 
participants.” 43  That, of course, included the credit-card platforms 
involved in that case. It would very likely also include firms such as 
Uber or Airbnb, where transactions between suppliers and customers 
occur directly on the platform. The platform debits the purchaser’s 
credit card and compensates the supplier after taking out its fee. 
The Court’s definition of two-sidedness would not include Google 
Search, which is supported by advertising but without individual 
simultaneous transactions between consumers and advertisers. For the 
same reason, Facebook and other social-networking sites would not be 
included. There are not simultaneous one-to-one transactions between 
users and advertisers who provide revenue. Nor would the Court’s 
definition include media streamers such as Netflix or Spotify whose 
owners pay a fixed fee that does not vary with use and, in any event, 
does not go straight to the licensors. The Supreme Court’s definition 
would also not include dating services such as Match or OKCupid. In 
those cases, each side pays the platform a subscription fee,44 but there 
is no simultaneous one-to-one exchange of a purchase price between 
the two sides. 
A definition that regards every digital sales platform as a two-
sided market is inaccurate and unhelpful. But so is the Supreme 
Court’s definition that limits the scope of two-sided markets to 
platforms that facilitate a simultaneous one-to-one transaction between 
the parties. A better definition is that a two-sided market is a platform 
that interacts between at least two groups of interdependent users and 
that profits by determining both the optimal price and the optimal 
distribution of prices or benefits between the groups. “Interdependent” 
means that size or volume of business on one side is affected by 
activity on the other side. As observed by a leading academic whom 
 
43Amex., id. at 2286. 
44 Some dating sites offer a free service with more limited features 
than the version they charge for. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 17 
 
both the Amex majority45 and dissent46 cited, a two-sided market is 
“one in which the volume of transactions between end-users depends 
on the structure and not only on the overall level of the fees charged 
by the platform.”47 
The focus of this article is on digital-platform monopoly and ways 
of controlling it. The question of two-sidedness will often be relevant, 
but not always. For example, Google Search would not satisfy the 
Amex Court’s definition of a two-sided platform because it involves no 
simultaneous one-to-one transactions between parties on the two sides. 
Nevertheless, search markets are clearly two-sided under the criteria 
that economists generally use to evaluate such markets.  Clearly the 
question of Google’s power requires an examination of both user and 
advertiser activity. 
 
C. Are Platform Markets Winner-Take-All? 
 
A “winner-take-all” market is one in which the equilibrium 
number of sellers at any time is one.  Other markets accommodate two 
or more firms and a single firm can maintain a monopoly position only 
by engaging in exclusionary practices.  Notwithstanding 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the market for digital 
platforms is often said to be winner-take-all.48 This is rarely true. Even 
 
45 138 S. Ct. at 2281. 
46 Id. at 2300 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
47  Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 646 (2006). 
48 See, e.g., Daniel A. Hanley, A Topology of Multisided Digital 
Platforms, 19 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 289-90 (2020); Thomas Noe & 
Geoffrey Parker, Winner Take All: Competition, Strategy, and the Structure 
of Returns in the Internet Economy, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 141, 
141-43 (2005) (although excluding companies that sell products with a 
positive marginal cost, such as Amazon, and those “whose value clearly 
depends upon network externalities,” like eBay); Thomas R. Eisenmann, 
Winner-Take-All in Networked Markets, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Sept. 11, 2007) 
(discussing online auction sites). Others are careful to limit the statement to 
markets subject to indirect network effects. See, e.g., Patrick Barwise, Nine 
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assuming that some platforms are winner-take-all, however, the policy 
consequences are unclear. Winner-take-all status may entail less 
antitrust enforcement because the market is a natural monopoly, and 
thus should be served by a single firm. Several older antitrust decisions 
embraced this view by recognizing a “natural monopoly defense” to 
antitrust actions.49 Under this reasoning, natural monopoly status may 
 
Reasons Why Tech Markets are Winner-Take-All, 29 LONDON BUS. SCH. 
REV. 54, 54-56 (2018); David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the 
Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1987, 2003 
(2008) (arguing that platforms in markets subject to indirect network effects 
are “competing in winner take all or a few winners take all markets”); Rob 
Frieden, The Internet of Platforms and Two-Sided Markets: Implications for 
Competition and Consumers, 63 VILL. L. REV. 269, 271 (2018); K. Sabeel 
Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the 
Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1641-42 
(2018); K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: 
Internet Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234, 
240-41 (2018). In the more popular literature, see SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE 
FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND GOOGLE 
(2017); JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW 
FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND 
UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY 3-6 (2017); and Zeynep Tufekci, Google Buzz: 
The Corporation of Social Commons, TECHNOSOCIOLOGY (Feb. 17, 2010), 
https://technosociology.org/?p=102 [https://perma.cc/48XM-6QXR]; see also 
Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185-87 (2016) (describing certain businesses’ 
dominant control of data); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 
U. PA. L. REV. 665, 666-67 (2018) (describing the phenomenon of private 
companies amassing as much power as governments have); Ryan Grim, 
Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google Regulated Like Utilities, THE 
INTERCEPT (July 27, 2017, 12:31 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/07/27/steve-bannon-wants-facebook-and-google-
regulated-like-utilities [https://perma.cc/NMJ5-B788]. For pushback, see 
David R. Keith & Hazhir Rahmandad, Are On-Demand Platforms Winner-
take-All Markets?, 2019 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 1-2. 
49 See, e.g., Greenville Publ’g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 
391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that if the defendant is a natural monopoly, 
then driving rivals out of the market cannot be unlawful under the antitrust 
laws); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 
582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (partially recognizing the defense); City of 
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indicate a need for utility-style regulation, but not the competition-
preferring tools of antitrust enforcement.  Others believe natural 
monopoly status augers for increased antitrust enforcement, because 
the market itself will not discipline dominant platforms.50 
Few platforms are natural monopolies.  If the market contains 
room for competition among multiple incumbent firms, regulation is 
usually a poor alternative.51 The position argued here is that if the 
antitrust laws are properly applied, antitrust will be superior in most 
cases to broad legislative regulation.  Regulation rarely comes close to 
mimicking competitive behavior.  It necessarily generalizes and 
applies the same rules to several firms in an area, while antitrust 
requires inquiry into specific facts about each firm.  This is particularly 
important if the firms in question are themselves quite diverse from 
one another. 
Regulation also entrenches existing technologies, making 
turnover less likely. For example, the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) longstanding willingness to protect AT&T’s 
dominant position from all rivals very likely held back innovation in 
telecommunications for decades.52 Of course, proper regulatory design 
 
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1306, 1314-15 
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (recognizing the defense). For a good discussion rejecting 
the idea of an automatic natural-monopoly defense, see Einer Elhauge, 
Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN L. REV. 253, 325-27 
(2003); see also Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 
21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 586-587 (1969) (discussing natural monopoly as a 
merger defense). 
50 Hanley, supra note 48, at 274-75; Joint Response to the House 
Judiciary Committee on the State of Antitrust Law and Implications for 
Protecting Competition in Digital Markets, CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 
4 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Joint-Response-to-the-House-Judiciary-
Committee-on-the-State-of-Antitrust-Law-and-Implications-for-Protecting-
Competition-in-Digital-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/P32V-ZENK]. 
51 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191-197 
(1982). 
52 See discussion infra note 217 and accompanying text; and see 
Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New 
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might partially mitigate this. But if viable and robust competitive 
alternatives are available, regulation usually is not the best answer. 
While we sometimes use the term “natural monopoly” to 
describe a firm or a market, natural monopoly status actually applies 
to particular inputs or technologies. For example, an electric utility is 
said to be a natural monopoly because of a particular technology—
namely, it transmits power down wires that are installed and operated 
most efficiently if a single wire goes to each customer. However, the 
electric company also generates power, and generation can be 
structured competitively. It may produce its own fuel through coal 
mines, oil fields or wind farms, all of which can be produced 
competitively. 
Even if a digital platform is determined to dominate a winner-
take-all, or natural monopoly, market, it is important to distinguish the 
particular assets and operations that are in fact natural monopolies 
from those that are not. For example, whether or not Amazon is a 
natural monopoly, most of the things that it sells are not. A well-
designed policy will limit the monopoly characterization to those 
particular inputs to which it applies, leaving other portions of 
production to competition. To a considerable extent, deregulation has 
accomplished that task in some markets, but the same approach also 
applies to platforms.53 
If a platform is not a natural monopoly, competition should be 
both feasible and desirable. It will very likely emerge in the absence 
of exclusionary practices that can be addressed under the antitrust 
laws. 
The fact that the platforms are not natural monopolies also 
justifies heightened concern with platform acquisitions of nascent 
 
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. REG. 55 (2007).  
Classic sources include MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 120-24 (1986); Harvey 
Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
53  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great 
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 
1324-29 (1998). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 21 
 
firms. New entry should be making these markets more competitive, 
but systematic acquisition of recent entrants blunts competitive 
pressure.54 
By contrast, if a platform is a natural monopoly, it will be able 
to maintain its position simply by charging a price that is not 
excessively above its costs. Even here, however, there are important 
qualifications. First, competition might exist for the status of being the 
natural monopolist, and antitrust policy can encourage such 
competition. 55  Second, natural monopoly status is not necessarily 
permanent. Its duration depends on technology and market size, both 
of which can change. 
Five interrelated factors determine the existence of a natural 
monopoly, with whatever competition policy choices that entails. 
Many of these are exogenous, applying mainly to the market in which 
a firm operates or to consumer behavior. Some, such as declining 
costs, are endogenous characteristics of the firm’s own choices. The 
factors are: 
 
1. lack of stable competition or multi-homing among incumbent 
firms;  
2. durability of a dominant position and the ability to 
accommodate or resist technological change;  
3. declining costs or network effects;  
4. lack of significant product differentiation; and  
5. lack of interoperability or data sharing. 
 
1. Stable Competition Among Incumbent Firms: Single- vs. 
Multi-Homing 
 
Most digital platforms have competitors in at least some of the 
markets in which they operate. Today online sellers of all sizes appear 
 
54 See infra Part III. 
55 E.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (even 
if only one firm can ultimately be the seller, they can bid against one another for 
that privilege, driving prices to the competitive level). 
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everywhere, ranging from single outlet restaurants to small grocers to 
online sellers of flowers and to numerous newspapers, magazines, and 
other periodicals. Online firms such as Carvana.com compete 
nationally in the sales of used cars with thousands of small brick-and-
mortar dealers, many of whom have an internet presence themselves.56 
Among the largest online sellers, some also have an even larger brick-
and-mortar presence, and typically in highly competitive markets. As 
of 2020 this was true of seven out of the top ten online sellers of 
merchandise, including Walmart, Home Depot, Best Buy, Target, and 
Costco.57 
Competitive markets change all the time and the market shares 
of individual firms in them fluctuate. Further, markets for new 
technologies may go through lengthy periods in which multiple 
technologies compete with one another until a single winner emerges. 
One well known example is recordable analog video tape. Sony’s 
Betamax format survived in the market for roughly 25 years until it 
finally lost a standards battle with VHS tape.58 The competition among 
high-definition digital optical formats, HD DVD and Blu-ray, was 
much briefer, lasting from 2006 to 2008 until Blu-ray triumphed.59 For 
decades there has been a battle between the dominant architectures of 
personal computers, Apple Macintosh OS and Microsoft Windows. 
 
56  CARVANA, https://www.carvana.com [https://perma.cc/97RR-
PXQD]. 
57  See Top 10 E-Commerce Retailers in the U.S. in 2020, 
MARKETING CHARTS (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.marketingcharts.com/charts/top-10-e-commerce-retailers-in-
the-us-in-2020/attachment/emarketer-top-10-e-commerce-retailers-in-the-
us-in-2020-mar2020 [https://perma.cc/9ZUQ-ADX2] (listing the ten largest 
e-commerce retailers in the United States in 2020, in descending order, as 
Amazon, Walmart, eBay, Apple, Home Depot, Wayfair, Best Buy, Target, 
Costco, and Macy’s). 
58 Dave Owen, The Betamax vs. VHS Format War, MEDIA C. (Jan. 
8, 2008), https://www.mediacollege.com/video/format/compare/betamax-vhs.html 
[https://perma.cc/QN3U-8TWX]. 
59 See Ben Drawbaugh, Two Years of Battle Between HD DVD and 
Blu-ray: A Retrospective, ENDGADGET (Feb. 20, 2008), 
https://www.engadget.com/2008-02-20-two-years-of-battle-between-hd-
dvd-and-blu-ray-a-retrospective.html [https://perma.cc/3YR6-LHQX]. 
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For several years Apple’s iPhone operating system has competed with 
the Android OS for the smartphone device market.60 
Some markets go from less to more competitive as a result of 
technological change. One good example is the telephone industry, 
discussed below.61 Digital computing hardware is another example. 
During the heyday of mainframe computers, IBM was the 
acknowledged leader, with dominant market shares that were 
sufficient to provoke a high profile monopolization case. 62  IBM’s 
market share fell precipitously, however, and the industry became 
much more diverse and competitive. That was not the result of an 
antitrust decree; the U.S. case against IBM was dropped.63 Rather, it 
was a consequence of technological changes that IBM itself initiated 
 
60 See Jignesh Padhiyar, iPhone vs Android: A Look at Competitive 
Past and Future, GEEKSBLOG (July 21, 2020), 
https://www.igeeksblog.com/iphone-vs-android [https://perma.cc/9J76-
DDN4]. The U.S. market is about evenly split between Android and iOS, but 
the worldwide market is 87% Android; S. O’Dea, U.S. Smartphone 
Subscriber Share by Operating Platform 2012-2020, by Month, STATISTA 
(AUG. 17, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-
held-by-smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/Y3DX-
5EBY]. On worldwide market share, see 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272307/market-share-forecast-for-
smartphone-operating-
systems/#:~:text=Smartphones%20running%20the%20Android%20operati
ng,percent%20share%20of%20the%20market. 
61 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
62 See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. 
Supp. 965, 981 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (calculating the average IBM market share 
at more than 57% between 1969-1975); cf. Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the 
Transformation of the Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587, 599 (1982) (noting that 
IBM’s market share was 75% in 1964 and 70% in 1971). 
63  Edward T. Pound, Why Baxter Dropped the I.B.M. Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/09/business/why-
baxter-dropped-the-ibm-suit.html [https://perma.cc/3KUL-N2YB].  
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by adopting an open architecture that involved liberal licensing to 
others.64 
Markets that produce a single winner are generally ones where 
economies of scale, network effects, or the need for interoperability 
favor a single format and that format is controlled by a single private 
entity. That situation is not common. In the video-recording-standards 
battles referenced above, a single standard emerged because 
interoperability is essential and the costs of maintaining two different 
formats were too high. However, the technology for those formats 
came to be widely shared under agreed-upon technological 
standards.65 The same thing is true of the cellphone market, which is 
also subject to significant network effects. While the network is 
unitary, most of the technology is produced by competing firms 
operating under shared technological standards.66  A variation of this 
structure can also be made to work for unitary platforms such as 
Amazon.67  The result can be robust competition while yet preserving 
all of the economies of scale and scope that an integrated platform can 
offer. 
Features that make the emergence or maintenance of a single 
technology winner less likely are interoperability or pooling of 
 
64  See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical 
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust 
and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 93 (2003); 
Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Regulation, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 59; Michael Miller, Why the IBM PC Had an Open 
Architecture, PCMAG UK (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:59 AM), 
https://uk.pcmag.com/opinion/111663/why-the-ibm-pc-had-an-open-
architecture [https://perma.cc/EW3D-JZRR]. 
65  See List of Optical Disc Manufacturers, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_optical_disc_manufacturers 
[https://perma.cc/TV7S-BKNB]. 
66 See Hans van der Veer & Anthony Wiles, Achieving Technical 
Interoperability—The ETSI Approach, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST. 
(Apr. 2008), 
https://portal.etsi.org/CTI/Downloads/ETSIApproach/IOP%20whitepaper%
20Edition%203%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/33JD-TZBN]; ETSI, etsi.org 
[https://perma.cc/SH4F-754D]. 
67 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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essential information or data. 68  Android, Apple and other cellular 
phones interconnect, enabling users to engage in a full range of 
communications with one another.69 The major wireless carriers all 
sell and support both Apple and Android phones interchangeably. 
Most retailers who are not owned by or have exclusive dealing 
agreements with a particular brand sell both.70 In video games, many 
are sold in multiple formats that can be played by people with different 
game consoles. 71  Whether a winner-take-all standard even exists 
depends on limitations on the ability of buyers to switch back and forth 
between standards or sellers to supply goods that satisfy multiple 
standards. 
One reason a single victor might emerge in a standards battle 
is that the market favors single-homing. Single-homing occurs when 
users of a certain technology make one personal choice to the 
exclusion of others. This occurs because the marginal cost of using two 
competing products is greater than the benefits. For example, a person 
might carry one cellphone but multiple credit cards. Carrying a second 
working cellphone is costly and the benefits are minor or perhaps even 
negative. By contrast, the marginal cost to most people of carrying an 
additional credit card is close to zero, and different cards provide 
different benefits or are accepted by different stores. Further, multiple 
 
68 On using antitrust to compel interoperability, see infra notes 324-
331 and accompanying text. 
69  There are a few exceptions. For example, Apple’s iMessage 
functionality is available only on Apple devices, such as iPhones, Macs, and 
Apple Watches. See Use Messages with Your Mac, APPLE (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202549 [https://perma.cc/658H-BJHE] 
(“With Messages for Mac, you can send unlimited messages to any Mac, 
iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch that uses iMessage, Apple’s secure-messaging 
service.”). 
70  See, e.g., All Smartphones, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
https://www.verizon.com/smartphones [https://perma.cc/WL6D-C766] 
(offering a wide variety of both Apple and Android phones on the same 
wireless plans). 
71 See Vardit Landsman & Stefan Stremersch, Multihoming in Two-
Sided Markets: An Empirical Inquiry in the Video Game Console Industry, 
75 J. MARKETING 39, 40 (2011). 
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cards enable people to carry more debt or stagger out their payments. 
That is, the cards function as both complements and substitutes. People 
might also download apps for both Uber and Lyft, competing ride-
hailing services. The marginal cost of installing and maintaining an 
app on one’s phone is zero, and at any given time a driver may be more 
readily available on one of them or may have a more favorable price. 
Alternatively, some cities may have greater availability of one 
provider than the other. Consumer preference for multi-homing tends 
to permit more competition. 
Some customers also engage in multi-homing between a digital 
platform and a traditional market. For example, many people who 
carry multiple credit cards might sometimes use cash or write a check 
to make a purchase. Or their smartphones might contain apps for both 
Uber and Lyft, but they will also sometimes hail a traditional cab. That 
is also true of customers who sometimes purchase groceries on the 
Amazon/Whole Foods digital platform, but other times visit a 
traditional grocery store. The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Amex—
offered with no factual support—that digital platforms and other 
markets do not compete with one another as a matter of law simply 
ignored these realities. 72   If taken seriously it could make factual 
analysis of market power in digital platform markets impossible. 
 VHS in analog video media and Blu-ray in digital ended up as 
dominant platforms because most users single-homed. They did not 
want to deal with two different formats simultaneously.73 Importantly, 
single homing does not dictate that competition cannot work in a 
market, but only that competitors must vie with one another to be a 
particular user’s exclusive choice. Single-homing can be sequential, as 
when someone picks a single technology for one time period, but then 
 
72 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) (“Only 
other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for 
transactions.”).  
73  See Consumers More Aware of HD-DVD over Blu-ray Disc, 
CHAIN STORE AGE (Sept. 20, 2007), 
https://chainstoreage.com/news/consumers-more-aware-hd-dvd-over-blu-
ray-disc [https://perma.cc/7Q4U-9724]; Drawbaugh, supra note 59.  
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switches to another later on. For example, when a customer’s iPhone 
breaks she might switch to an Android phone, or vice-versa. However, 
within periods of ownership she is likely to use one at a time. 
Finally, some single-homing may result from contractual 
restraints that prevent multi-homing. One contributor to the end of the 
Blu-ray/HD DVD battle was the practice of hardware manufacturers 
to pay studios for movies to be released exclusively in a single format. 
Both sides made such payments, but Sony was ultimately more 
successful in buying exclusivity for its Blu-ray format.74 Video-game-
console makers and others have also used exclusivity agreements to 
induce single-homing.75 The payments themselves could be subject to 
antitrust rules governing exclusive dealing, which condemn 
anticompetitive agreements that involve the payment of money for 
exclusive rights. 76   For example, the Government’s 2020 antitrust 
complaint against Google alleges that Google paid Apple large sums 
to make Google Search the default search engine on iPhones.77 An 
alternative equilibrium could be more like the one for cell phones, 
where customers typically single-home but carriers multi-home, 
permitting and even providing devices from multiple manufacturers.78 
 
74 See Brooks Barnes, Warner Backs Blu-ray, Tilting DVD Battle, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/technology/05disc.html 
[https://perma.cc/9TQV-QS72]. For a recounting of the battle over 
exclusivity payments, see Kevin L. Spark, Format War, Antitrust Casualties: 
The Sherman Act and the Blu-ray - HD DVD Format War, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
173, 175-79 (2009). 
75 See Robin S. Lee, Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform 
and Two-Sided Markets, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2960, 2965 (2013); see also 
Elias Carroni, Leonardo Madio & Shiva Shekhar, Superstars in Two-Sided 
Markets: Exclusives or Not? 3, 8-9 (July 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243777 [https://perma.cc/Q5TQ-QVD2] 
(discussing and providing tables of exclusivity agreements in video games 
and other platforms). 
76 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1800.  
77 Cplt., United States v. Google, LLC (1:20-cv-03010, D.D.C., Oct. 20, 2020).  
78 For example, Verizon offers 45 Android devices and 20 iPhones 
from ten different manufacturers. See VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 70. 
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While widespread availability of multi-homing makes natural-
monopoly status less likely, it does not rule it out. Google Search is 
one example of a technology that has maintained dominance even 
though multi-homing of search engines is almost universally 
available.79 Users of desktop computers, laptops, and mobile devices 
are all able to install multiple free search engines and switch quickly 
among them. Yet Google retains a dominant market share.80 
 
2. Durable Dominant Positions: Entry Barriers, No-Fault 
Monopoly, and Exclusionary Practices 
 
There is little empirical support for the proposition that digital-
platform markets as a group are winner-take-all. Rather, the landscape 
for digital markets resembles the one for markets generally. Some of 
them are more conducive to single-firm dominance than others. Some 
resemble markets with a dominant firm plus a competitive fringe.81 
Others enjoy competition among more evenly sized rivals.  One 
question that is central is the prospects for new entry. 
Determining the existence, extent, and relevance of entry 
barriers in an antitrust case has always been a highly factual inquiry.82 
In per se cases such as price fixing, entry barriers are largely irrelevant. 
At the other extreme, in cases involving unilateral pricing conduct, 
they are usually central. For digital platforms, several factors point in 
different directions, making categorical treatment impossible. On the 
one hand, network effects can be a substantial entry barrier. 
Particularly in markets where significant product differentiation is 
impossible, a large base on one or both sides of a platform can be a 
powerful entry deterrent. The same thing can be said of accumulation 
of large amounts of consumer data or large intellectual property 
 
79 See United States v. Google, cplt, supra note __, ¶93 (alleging that Google’s 
search market share is around 90%). 
80 See infra notes 120-134 and accompanying text. 
81  See DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J. JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 190-210 (5th ed. 2019) (describing 
such markets). 
82 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 420-423. 
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portfolios. Offsetting this, low consumer switching costs and 
widespread multi-homing, which are common in platform markets, 
encourage new entry. Product differentiation is also an avenue for new 
entry, as is high technological turnover. 83  Which of these various 
characteristics dominates is an empirical question depending on the 
facts of each situation. 
The concerns about entry are similar for merger policy, where 
the Government has given policy guidance. The 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines employed by the antitrust enforcement agencies 
indicate that a facially anticompetitive merger may not be worth 
pursing if new entry would be sufficiently rapid so as to make 
anticompetitive effects from the merger unlikely.84 The evidence must 
show that new entry would keep prices sufficiently low that consumers 
would not be significantly harmed by the merger.85 Older versions of 
the Merger Guidelines were more explicit about the time frame. For 
example, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines concluded that the 
agencies would not challenge a merger if new entry sufficient to return 
prices to pre-merger levels would be likely to occur within two years.86 
 In addition to requiring high entry barriers, U.S. antitrust law 
refuses to condemn a dominant firm except on proof of one or more 
anticompetitive practices. We do not condemn monopoly “without 
 
83 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big 
Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 350-367 (2017) (arguing that entry barriers into 
platforms characterized by collection or use of big data are high). But see D. 
Daniel Sokol & Jingyuan (Mary) Ma, Understanding Online Markets and 
Antitrust Analysis, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 48-50 (2017) 
(arguing that entry barriers are low in most online markets). In the middle is 
Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, 61 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 755, 778-79 (2020) (arguing that it is difficult to “categorically 
characterize the competitive effects of big data as either procompetitive or 
anticompetitive”). 
84 U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 9.1 (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/2XCU-K5RK].  
85 Id. 
86  U.S. DEP’T JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4W8E-PRGK]. 
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fault.” Writing in 1978, Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner concluded 
that persistent monopoly was a serious problem. They would have 
permitted the government (but not private parties) to bring equitable 
challenges to break up monopolies without proof of fault, provided that 
the monopoly had persisted for at least five years.87 
One explanation for durable monopoly is that the market is 
winner-take-all, which means that we would naturally expect it to be 
controlled by a single firm. As a result, a defense that a market is a 
natural monopoly would be necessary in a regime that condemned 
monopoly without fault. Otherwise the antitrust laws might needlessly 
break up dominant firms in markets that are unable to achieve a 
multiform competitive equilibrium. That would lead to costly price 
wars or collusion because competition in natural monopoly markets is 
not sustainable. 
By contrast, if a market is not a natural monopoly, then the 
emergence of a dominant firm requires exclusionary practices, 
superior management, good luck (or bad luck for rivals), or collusion. 
As the Supreme Court put it more than a century ago in Standard Oil 
 
87 See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 620-623 (1978) (proposing a no-fault monopolization rule). Areeda and 
Turner relied on Turner’s own earlier work, plus work by Oliver E. 
Williamson. See Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other 
Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1225 (1969) (“[T]he 
Sherman Act §2 [should] apply to monopoly power that has been persistently 
maintained over a substantial period of time, except where based solely on 
economies of scale or where it arose out of and still depends upon the same 
unexpired patents.”); Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the 
Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Consideration, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 
1527 (1972) (arguing that a duration of five years should be long enough to 
suggest that a monopoly is not the result of luck or chance). For commentary, 
see generally Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, The Sherman Act is a 
No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, 70 AM. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020); and Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform 
Monopolization, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 755 (2020). EU law and that of 
many other jurisdictions require “abuse” of a dominant position, apparently 
ruling out no fault monopoly claims. The current edition of Antitrust Law 
preserves Areeda and Turner’s no-fault monopoly proposal intact, along with 
my own critique. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 630-38. 
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Co. v. United States, “monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no 
extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make 
unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted.”88 
In a stable natural monopoly market, a dominant firm need do 
no more than charge a competitive price in order to exclude rivals, or 
perhaps occasionally defend itself against an attack from someone 
else.89 If no exclusionary practices are proven, then the monopolist 
will be left alone and the market will determine how many firms the 
market will contain. As a result, a requirement of exclusionary 
practices makes it unnecessary to decide whether a market is a natural 
monopoly. 
We could take different approaches to the problem of long-held 
monopoly. First, we could condemn a relatively durable monopoly 
without proof of fault, but then permit a defense that the market is in 
fact a natural monopoly. Or perhaps we could state a presumption that 
if a monopoly has prevailed in a market for a certain number of years, 
then it warrants condemnation. The defendant could defeat the 
presumption by showing natural monopoly or other factors that forced 
the defendant to be a monopolist. 90  This was the gist of Judge 
Wyzanski’s famous mid-twentieth-century discussion of Judge Hand’s 
position in the Alcoa case.91 Finally, we could take the approach that 
we actually do, which is to require proof of exclusionary practices and 
condemn the monopoly without determining whether the market in 
question contains room for only one efficient firm. 
Our insistence on exclusionary practices rests in part on the fact 
that often we do not know why a particular market has a dominant 
firm. Perhaps it naturally gravitates toward natural monopoly or 
perhaps dominance is a result of exclusionary practices or some 
 
88 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). 
89 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 
F.2d 582, 587 (1st Cir. 1960) (“We do not think the fact that competition is 
in a natural monopoly climate can limit a defendant’s right to defend itself.”). 
90 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 
416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[M]onopoly may have been thrust upon it.”). 
91 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 
341-42 (D. Mass. 1953) (discussing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427). 
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fortuity that is likely to go away. In any event, even natural monopoly 
status does not excuse exclusionary practices. The telephone industry 
is a good example of a market that went from natural monopoly to 
competitively structured as long lines were displaced by wireless 
alternatives—a technological development that had nothing to do with 
antitrust law. The breakup occurred when AT&T employed 
exclusionary practices in order to maintain its monopoly even after 
competition had become sustainable.92 
 Historically, most firms eventually lose their dominant status. 
The federal courts confronted the issue of monopoly duration already 
in the early history of antitrust in United States v. American Can Co. 
The defendant’s market share was already rapidly declining by the 
time of the decision. Having acquired what it thought to be a dominant 
position, American Can raised its prices so much that it induced new 
entry by many firms, even those with obsolete technology.93 
During the Great Depression, the monopoly that captured 
Congress’s attention and prompted the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act94 was the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P), 
a large chain store that put many small grocers out of business. Chain 
stores famously provoked the wrath of Justice Brandeis.95 For decades 
A&P was the largest grocer in the United States.96 In 1929, it was by 
far the largest American retailer of any kind, two and a half times larger 
 
92 See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
93  See United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 879 (1916) 
(“[P]rices were put up to a point which made it apparently profitable for 
outsiders to start making cans with any antiquated or crude machinery they 
could find in old lumber rooms . . . .”). 
94 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
95 See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541-80 (1933) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part); see also LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, 
AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND 
THE “NEW COMPETITION,” 1890-1940, at 119-35 (2018) (describing Justice 
Brandeis’s views on competition law reform). 
96 See MARC LEVINSON, THE GREAT A&P AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 69, 112-14 (2011).  
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than Sears, the second largest. 97  Today, the leader is Walmart, 
followed by Kroger. A&P went bankrupt in 2015 and sold most of its 
stores to other grocers. Sears filed for bankruptcy in 2018. None of the 
top ten firms in the United States in 1929 is in the top ten today, and 
many no longer exist.98 
Why firms lose dominance is a complex question, and there is 
no single answer. Some losses are the result of nothing more 
complicated than the expiration of market-dominating patents. This 
was largely the story of Xerox, which came into existence through the 
acquisition of a patent portfolio that covered plain paper copying, and 
then gradually lost its position when the patents expired.99 
A few losses of dominance were the result of antitrust decrees. 
Likely examples are Standard Oil, Alcoa, and United Shoe Machinery 
(USM). The antitrust decree in Standard Oil broke that company into 
thirty-four smaller firms.100 Alcoa was never broken up, but part of the 
antitrust decree against it was that the firm was forbidden from bidding 
on two very large government owned aluminum plants that were sold 
 
97 Id. at 113 (ranking the ten largest retailers in 1929, in descending 
order, as A&P, Sears, F.W. Woolworth, Montgomery Ward, Kroger, 
Safeway, J.C. Penney, S.S. Kresge, American Stores, and Gimbel Brothers). 
98  See The Top 10, FORTUNE 500 (2019), 
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019 [https://perma.cc/62EP-XQ58].  
99 Xerox’s strategy is recounted in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 
F. Supp. 983, 986-87 (D. Conn. 1978) (describing Xerox’s strategy of buying 
up all patents relevant to plain paper copying); and SCM Corp. v. Xerox 
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1981) (same). See also R. Cross & A. 
Iqbal, The Rank Xerox Experience: Benchmarking Ten Years On, in 
BENCHMARKING—THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Asbørn Rolstadås ed., 1995) 
(describing the difficulties Xerox experienced vis-à-vis its Japanese 
competitors when its patents expired).  
100  See William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for 
Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1295 n.46 (1999); 
Briscoe Cent. for American History, ExxonMobil Historical Collection, 
1790-2014, U. TEX., https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utcah/00352/cah-
00352.html [https://perma.cc/NCS5-BWTQ ] (“In May 1911, after years of 
legal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court declared Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey an ‘unreasonable’ monopoly and ordered it to 
dissolve, resulting in 34 distinct and separate companies.”). 
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after World War II. The winning bidders, Kaiser and Reynolds, 
emerged as significant competitors.101 In the prolonged United Shoe 
Machinery litigation, which stretched from the 1910s to the 1960s,102 
the district court initially condemned the defendant of monopolization 
but refused to break it up, largely because it operated out of a single 
plant. 103  A decade and a half later, however, the Supreme Court 
ordered a partial divestiture.104 In 1949, USM held roughly 90% of the 
market for shoe-making machinery.105 Subsequently, the market for 
stitched leather shoes went into sharp decline, and USM lost more than 
a third of its market share.106  
Durable monopolies are sometimes brought to an end by 
technological change. One of the saddest examples is Kodak, a storied 
monopolist for nearly a century. First condemned in the 1910s,107 it 
was described by the Second Circuit in 1979 as a “titan in its field.”108 
 
101  See 2 SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 97-98 (1958); Spencer Weber Waller, 
The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 11, 16-17 (2009). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co, 247 U.S. 32 
(1918); United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913). The earliest 
decisions were in the state courts. E.g., United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Kimball, 
79 N.E. 790, 791-92 (Mass. 1907) (enforcing an exclusive dealing contract 
as a reasonable restraint). 
103 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 351 
(D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see CARL KAYSEN, UNITED 
STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 272-75 (1956). 
104 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 391 U.S. 244, 251 
(1968). 
105 See KAYSEN, supra note 103, at 52-53. 
106 See Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States Versus 
United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33, 66-
67 (1993). 
107 See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1910) 
(sustaining antitrust complaint); United States v. Eastman Kodak, 226 F. 62 
(W.D.N.Y. 1915) (condemning multiple mergers of small firms, as well as 
quasi-exclusive dealing). 
108 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 271 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
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For the preceding twenty-seven years its market share in the film 
market had never been less than 82%.109  Its share of amateur still 
cameras ranged from 61% in the 1950s to as high as 90% in the mid-
sixties. In 2012, however, it declared bankruptcy, for reasons that had 
little to do with antitrust law. Rather, the problem was massive 
technological change and excessive path dependence. The new 
technology was digital photography, which was radically different 
from chemical-film technology in nearly every way. Ironically, Kodak 
had been a pioneer in digital photography and developed many of the 
early patents. However, it had far too much invested in the older 
technology and failed to foresee digital technology’s promise. As a 
result, it put too many resources into shoring up film photography, a 
dying enterprise, and entered the digital era with too little, too late.110 
The story of Microsoft and the rise of the consumer internet is 
vaguely similar, although Microsoft managed to prosper.111 Thanks to 
IBM’s open-source model, most aspects of the hardware market had 
become competitive, and software was increasingly competitive as 
well. In the middle, however, was the operating system. Under Bill 
Gates, Microsoft had developed a computer architecture in which the 
operating system, Microsoft Windows, resided on each computer and 
acted as a gateway through which all applications and traffic had to 
pass.112 At the same time, however, Microsoft contemplated a model 
in which processing and data were largely local and communication 
was merely an add-on. 
 
109 Id. at 269- 270. 
110  See Elliot Brown, Ben Hattenbach & Ian Washburn, From 
Camera Obscura to Camera Futura: How Patents Shaped Two Centuries of 
Photographic Innovation and Competition, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 406, 436 (2016). 
111 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).  
112 For good analysis, see generally ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY 
FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014); and WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. 
LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND 
CONSUMER WELFARE (2007). 
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Netscape’s internet-centric approach was a serious threat to 
this model. As Gates wrote in a famous email to his employees entitled 
“The Internet Tidal Wave,” Netscape was in the process of developing 
a “multi-platform strategy” of moving the operating system functions 
into the diverse applications themselves and thus “commoditiz[ing] the 
underlying operating system.”113 Microsoft then undertook a number 
of actions intended to suppress Netscape and perpetuate Windows’ 
dominance. 
Gates’s purpose was to protect the Windows operating system, 
and monopoly maintenance of Windows was the core of the 
government’s case. But the real threat came from the internet browser. 
In fact, it was the browser, not the operating system, that subsequently 
became commoditized. While Microsoft continues to hold a large 
share of the differentiated operating-system (OS) market, depending 
on how it is defined, it has largely been relegated to bit player in the 
browser market.114 In part that was a result of the Microsoft decree, 
which enjoined several exclusive agreements that favored Internet 
Explorer over Netscape. In part it resulted from the dramatic rise of 
broadband and the emergence of high quality, free alternatives, 
including Mozilla and later Chrome. 
Overall, the history of digital platform monopolies is not 
distinctive from that of other industries. While the dataset is smaller, 
the evidence suggests that the life of a digital monopoly is no longer 
than the life of more traditional manufacturing monopolies and is very 
likely shorter. Here, as in traditional markets, the accounts vary from 
one firm to another. Microsoft, founded in 1975, lost much of a 
government brought antitrust challenge to monopoly maintenance in 
the Windows operating system, where it was dominant.115 At the time, 
 
113 Email from Bill Gates, CEO, Microsoft Corp., to Executive Staff 
& Direct Reports (May 26, 1995) https://lettersofnote.com/2011/07/22/the-
internet-tidal-wave [https://perma.cc/D85V-WTHX]. The email was part of 
the record in Microsoft, 253 F.3d. 34. 
114  See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-126 and 
accompanying text. 
115 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 117-19. 
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Microsoft’s Windows operating system had a market share of greater 
than 95% for Intel-based (“IBM-compatible”) computers. 116  The 
Apple OS, which was not Intel-based, was excluded from that market 
definition. Today Microsoft’s market share is about 76% in a market 
that includes the Apple OS. 117  One explanation for the change in 
market definition was that in 2001, Microsoft Windows ran mainly on 
Intel processing chips or lookalikes, while Apple machines ran on 
Motorola chips. In 2006, Apple switched to Intel chips as well, giving 
the two systems a more similar architecture, thus more readily enabling 
software to run on both.118 If Apple’s operating system is subtracted, 
Microsoft’s market share today would still be about 97%, roughly the 
same as it was during the litigation. Microsoft’s operating-system 
business must be counted as one of the most durable of platform 
technologies. Whether it is a natural monopoly is doubtful. More 
likely, it is simply one alternative in a product-differentiated OS 
market that includes the Apple OS, the Chrome OS, and systems for 
small devices.  Indeed, at this writing Apple is once again switching 
chips, this time to ones that it manufactures itself.119 
The story for Microsoft’s internet browser is very different. 
Interestingly, the Microsoft antitrust litigation was aimed at dominance 
of the operating-system market, and the government won the most 
important claims. While these claims involved Windows as a fulcrum, 
many involved conduct that was intended by Microsoft to give 
commercial advantages to its web browser, Internet Explorer. 
 
116 Id. at 51. 
117  See Desktop Operating System Market Share Worldwide, 
STATCOUNTER, https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-
share/desktop/worldwide [https://perma.cc/F47B-RT5B]. 
118  See Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple to Use Intel 
Microprocessors Beginning in 2006 (June 6, 2005), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2005/06/06Apple-to-Use-Intel-
Microprocessors-Beginning-in-2006 [https://perma.cc/ZCN2-M6YC].  
119See Brian Heater, Apple is building its Own Processors for Future Macs, 
Techcrunch, June 22, 2020, available at 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/22/apple-is-building-its-own-processors-
for-future-macs/. 
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Microsoft “tied” Windows and Internet Explorer by requiring 
purchasers of Windows to take the browser as well.120 A little later it 
comingled Internet Explorer’s code into the Windows operating-
system code, where it resides to this day.121 It also imposed various 
restrictions on both original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and 
application writers requiring them to favor Internet Explorer or use it 
exclusively.122 One result of this conduct was that Microsoft’s browser 
market share during the litigation period rose from about 5% to about 
50%, most of it at Netscape’s expense.123 That number was too small 
to support a monopolization claim, but the government did bring a 
claim of attempt to monopolize the browser market. The D.C. Circuit 
dismissed the attempt claim, however, after finding that the browser 
market was too ambiguously defined.124 
Today, Google Chrome is the clear leader, with some 69% of 
user market share, followed by Mozilla Firefox.125 Microsoft has two 
browsers in play: Edge, its current browser, and Internet Explorer 
which still runs on older machines.  Together they have a small market 
share, although Edge has recently experienced a surge in popularity.  
Today Microsoft’s two browsers now account for about 15% of 
 
120 Herbert Hovenkamp, IP Ties and Microsoft’s Rule of Reason, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 376 (2002). 
121 Id. at 411. In 2015 Microsoft switched to Edge, a browser based 
on the Chromium engine developed by Google. On the D.C. Circuit’s 
treatment of the technically complex comingling issue, see Microsoft, 253 
F.3d at 65-68. 
122 Windows 98 launched Internet Explorer in certain situations, even 
if Netscape Navigator was set as the computer’s default browser. Microsoft 
prohibited OEMs from modifying the Windows boot sequence, thus making 
it difficult for OEMs to promote Netscape products over the prominent 
Internet Explorer features. Microsoft also prevented OEMs from removing 
programs from the Start menu. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 9, 62-64 (D.D.C. 1999). 
123 See id. at 101-02. 
124 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 82-84. 
125  Usage Share of Web Browsers, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of_web_browsers 
[https://perma.cc/B8GX-M79R]  See also Cplt., United States v. Google, 
supra note __, ¶49 (alleging that Chrome has a 60% market share). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 39 
 
browser usage.126 Chrome and Edge are based on the same open source 
Chromium engine, which is a Google project, and Edge’s recent 
growth seems to be coming from Chrome.127 
So ironically, Microsoft very largely retained its market 
position in the OS market (where it lost the antitrust litigation), but it 
has declined sharply in the browser market (where it won). Part of the 
reason for Microsoft’s browser share loss may have been injunctive 
relief from the various exclusionary contracts that the Microsoft 
decision condemned. But very likely, the bigger reasons were the 
expanding availability of broadband and the rapid expansion of free 
open source alternatives Chrome and Mozilla, as well as Apple’s own 
entry in 2003 with Safari. The most likely explanation for these shifts 
in market share is consumer preference. Browsers are free and new 
ones can be installed in a matter of minutes. They are also readily 
susceptible to multi-homing, enabling users to have multiple browsers 
installed on both computers and smartphones. 
The story for social networking platforms differs in many 
respects. MySpace had launched in 2003, and by 2007 writers were 
expressing concern that MySpace was destined to become a permanent 
natural monopoly.128 That literature largely ignored Facebook, which 
had launched in 2004. By 2008, Facebook had overtaken MySpace in 
 
126  See https://9to5google.com/2020/11/02/microsoft-edge-market-
share-2020-gain/#more-387510 (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 
127 See Techradar Pro, available at https://global.techradar.com/en-za/news/watch-
out-chrome-microsoft-edge-just-hit-an-important-
landmark#:~:text=The%20latest%20figures%20from%20NetMarketShare,all%20u
sers%20in%20September%202020.  
128  Victor Keegan, Will MySpace Ever Lose its Monopoly?, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2007, 7:41 AM EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/feb/08/business.comment 
[https://perma.cc/479P-USX4] (not mentioning Facebook); see also John 
Barrett, MySpace is a Natural Monopoly, TECHNEWSWORLD (Jan. 17, 2007, 
4:00 AM PT), https://www.technewsworld.com/story/55185.html 
[https://perma.cc/89YB-9N6A] (predicting that MySpace would likely be the 
“only [social network] site of significance” and competitors would be 
“condemned to niche markets and subsets”). 
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popularity. 129  Today, Facebook occupies some 75% of a highly 
differentiated and poorly defined market for social media sites. 130 
MySpace is no longer counted among the top ten.131 At this writing, 
Facebook is facing increasing competition from TikTok, whose 
possible partial acquisition by Oracle132 may give Facebook a serious 
rival for many of its functions. 
The digital search market is similar. AltaVista was established 
in 1995 and became a leading search engine until it began losing 
ground to Google Search. As of 2000, however, AltaVista had a 17.7% 
market share to Google’s 7%.133 In 2003, Yahoo purchased AltaVista 
 
129 See Evan Tarver, 3 Social Media Networks Before Facebook, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/081315/3-social-media-
networks-facebook.asp [https://perma.cc/9SQ9-PBAG]. 
130  See Social Media Stats Worldwide, STATCOUNTER, 
https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats [https://perma.cc/8PSE-
VAAM]. Other sites indicate that Facebook has been losing market share as 
the market for social media websites has become more numerous and diverse. 
Priit Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share Statistics 
[2020], DREAMGROW (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-
social-networking-sites-market-share-of-visits [https://perma.cc/J9AK-
JVHT]. 
131 J. Clement, U.S. Market Share of Leading Social Media Websites 
2020, STATISTA (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-of-the-most-
popular-social-media-websites-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/M44F-JQG5]; 
see also Elise Moreau, Is Myspace Dead?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 30, 2020) 
https://www.lifewire.com/is-myspace-dead-3486012 
[https://perma.cc/ZC52-E4FB]. 
132 The merger remains speculative at the time of this writing. See 
Georgia Wells & Aaron Tilley, Oracle Wins Bid for TikTok in U.S., Beating 
Microsoft, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2020, 9:40 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-drops-out-of-bidding-for-tiktoks-u-s-
operations-11600039821 [https://perma.cc/89BT-AU85]. 
133 See Don’t Count AltaVista Out Yet, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2000, 5:09 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/2000/10/20/1020alta.html 
[https://perma.cc/FB5R-T86H]. 
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and incorporated parts of its technology into its own search engine. 
AltaVista was shut down as an independent search engine in 2013.134 
While these data give only a partial picture of a complex 
history, there does not seem to be any evidence that durability of a 
dominant position is a more prominent feature of digital platform 
markets than for markets generally. Even among digital markets, entry 
and exit continuously occur, shares change, and dominance comes and 
goes.135  While large intellectual property (IP) portfolios can make 
entry more difficult, widespread licensing can actually facilitate new 
entry. IBM, AT&T, and Xerox all initially acquired dominance based 
in part on large patent portfolios. All subsequently lost their positions, 
and these industries are now much more competitive. Further, markets 
subject to widespread multi-homing are very likely easier to enter than 
markets in which everyone single-homes.136 The one significant threat 
to this continuous turnover is platform acquisitions of the firms that 
are most likely to emerge as competitors.137 
 
 
134 See Danny Sullivan, A Eulogy for AltaVista, the Google of its 
Time, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 28, 2013, 6:53 PM), 
https://searchengineland.com/altavista-eulogy-165366 
[https://perma.cc/GGE9-CZTE]. 
135 For good writing on the durability of monopolies, from a variety 
of perspectives, see YALE BROZEN & GEORGE BITTLINGMEYER, 
CONCENTRATION, MERGERS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19-43 (1982) (detailing 
how concentration is neither as bad nor as harmful as predicted); Timothy F. 
Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011, 1051-53 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); David Encaoua, Paul Geroski & 
Alexis Jacquemin, Strategic Competition and the Persistence of Dominant 
Firms: A Survey, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET 
STRUCTURE 55, 61-73 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986) 
(describing the effect of strategic investments on market structure); Paul A. 
Geroski & Alexis Jacquemin, Dominant Firms and their Alleged Decline, 2 
INT’L J. IND. ORG. 1, 13-19 (1984). On the comparative durability of 
platforms, see Jonathan A. Knee, Why Some Platforms Are Better than 
Others, 59 MIT SLOAN MGM’T REV. 18, 19-20 (2018). 
136 On the significance of multi-homing, see supra Section I.C.1. 
137 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
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3. Declining Costs, Network Effects, and the Extent of the Market 
 
 If a natural monopolist is charging a competitive price, then no 
rival with the same product, costs, and technology will be able to 
compete successfully, even if the monopolist does not engage in any 
exclusionary practices. This natural monopoly position occurs when a 
firm’s costs decline continuously to the point that sales are at least one 
half of the market at the competitive price. At that point, this firm 
would have lower costs than any rival making the same product with 
the same technology and costs. The usual explanation for this 
phenomenon is very high fixed costs, coupled with plant capacity to 
serve the entire market. 
 For example, suppose a firm with high fixed costs produces a 
commodity and experiences declining costs as it increases output. 
Costs bottom out at an output level of 1000 units per time period. If it 
sells that output at the competitive price, which we assume is $1, the 
market will clear at 1800 units. As a result, any rival producing under 
the same conditions would be making 800 units or fewer, so its costs 
would be higher and it would not be able to earn a profit at the $1 
price.138  Assuming that the natural monopolist’s costs do not start 
going back up, the socially optimal outcome would be for it to satisfy 
the entire market by producing 1800 units and selling them at $1 per 
unit. However, as an unregulated monopolist it will maximize its 
profits, which could occur at a price significantly higher than $1. Thus 
the case for price regulation of natural monopolies.139 
 Three qualifiers are important. First, if the firm charges more 
than its costs there might be room for other firms in the market. 
Second, the firm must have the capacity to satisfy the entire market. 
Third, a rival with lower costs might survive and even displace the 
 
138 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 23, 
§ 1.4b (6th ed. 2020). 
139 On strengths and weaknesses of the neoclassical case for price regulation of 
natural monopoly, see Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly 1227, 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds. 2007). 
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original firm. For now we ignore the possibility of product 
differentiation, which throws the entire model into disarray.140 
 When a firm charges more than its costs it creates a price 
umbrella under which rival firms may be able to profit. Historically 
this has given dominant firms with declining costs a strategic choice: 
either charge a very low price now, which will keep rivals out; or else 
charge a higher price, which will earn greater immediate profits but 
enable rivals to enter the market. Which strategy a firm chooses 
depends on several factors, including the degree of uncertainty about 
future demand or the position of rivals, the need for short-run profits, 
or fear of antitrust litigation. For example, U.S. Steel followed the 
latter strategy for many years, setting a price that permitted a fringe of 
firms to operate but limiting their growth.141 
 Second, a firm with continuously declining costs must also be 
able to meet market demand at its chosen price. The classic situation 
where this is not true is the passenger airplane flying a designated 
route. A single plane’s per-passenger costs decline as it fills the plane, 
all the way up to capacity. Most of the costs are fixed over that range. 
The airplane itself is a fixed cost that does not materially change with 
the number of passengers. Even the pilot does not cost more money as 
the plane fills. While fuel costs might be higher as a passenger is 
added, the amount is small. 
Nevertheless, the plane will not be a natural monopoly if the 
number of people who want to fly a particular route at a certain time is 
greater than the plane’s capacity. In that case a second plane will be 
necessary, and it could be provided by either the same firm or a 
different firm.142 In the latter case we would have competition. Large 
capacity suggests why many public utilities such as electric companies 
 
140 See infra notes 162-182 and accompanying text. 
141 Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. 
Steel’s Pricing, Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 593, 600 (1989). 
142  The market might still be a natural monopoly if there are 
economies of scale to the operation of multiple planes. That is, the incumbent 
firm might be able to provide a second flight at a lower cost than a different 
firm could provide it. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
44 Platform Monopoly Nov. 2020 
 
are natural monopolies, at least at retail. Once the line is in place the 
incremental cost of additional usage is very small, and a single set of 
lines is usually adequate to take care of all demand. The story for 
airline routes is more variable. For large routes, such as Chicago to Los 
Angeles, many planes will be needed to meet each day’s demand and 
there will be room for multiple carriers. However, a much smaller 
route, such as Kalamazoo, Michigan to South Bend, Indiana, is likely 
to have room for only one plane. 
Digital platforms that sell purely digital content do not 
typically have serious capacity constraints on their products. For 
example, there is no limit on how many times a YouTube video can be 
viewed or a Spotify song can be streamed. As a result, the problem of 
capacity to serve the entire market typically does not show up, 
assuming they have the technical capacity to satisfy demand. Physical 
products such as those sold by Amazon are another matter, and for 
them there is no reason to think that the capacity problem is 
significantly different than it is for any seller. 
 Third, and finally, even a natural monopoly can be displaced 
by a different technology or a firm with lower costs. For example, 
railroads had a natural monopoly advantage in many markets for years, 
but they were eventually displaced by long-distance trucking.143 The 
AT&T telephone system was very likely a natural monopoly during 
the many decades in which all calls were hard wired between the 
calling parties. The rise of wireless communication and the emergence 
of firms that took advantage of these technologies, such as MCI and 
Sprint, changed that. Now most parts of the highly differentiated 
industry are competitively structured. 144  Newspapers that were 
thought to be dominant in their service areas had to fight off emergent 
 
143 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 128-32 (1961) (recounting the conflict); see also Note, Appeals 
to the Electorate by Private Businesses: Injury to Competitors and the Right 
to Petition, 70 YALE L.J. 135, 135-136 (1960) (describing rise of the trucking 
industry in competition with railroads). 
144  See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! 
Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
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radio stations for advertising revenue,145 and today they are battling 
against the internet.146 In sum, the question whether a market is a 
natural monopoly is technology dependent—and thus, time dependent. 
In digital markets in particular, technology can change quickly. 
 The fact that a platform is digital does not mean that all of its 
output is digital. At one extreme, platforms such as Facebook, Google 
Search, Spotify, and Netflix produce digital content almost 
exclusively. Facebook transacts in messages, digital photos and 
videos, all of which are digital. Spotify licenses streamed music, 
podcasts, or other programming which is entirely digital. Netflix does 
the same thing with movies and TV shows, although it retains a small 
but shrinking portion of its business for the rental of physical DVD or 
Blu-ray discs.147 
Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb are all very different. They sell 
physical products and services, rides, and short-term lodging, 
respectively. For most of these, each sale encounters additional 
variable costs. Further, the goods or services in question are rivalrous, 
which means that a purchase of one unit depletes what is left over and 
there can be limitations on the number that any firm can produce. 
 For example, Amazon is a very large digital platform. Among 
its product offerings is some purely digital content, including Amazon 
Music, Prime Video, ebooks, and downloadable computer software. 
But the bulk of Amazon’s sales are for things like toasters, power tools, 
luggage, food, and so on. Each sale of a Samsonite bag on Amazon 
displaces a bag, whether made by Samsonite or someone else, that 
could have been purchased from a different venue. Further, those 
 
145  E.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 143 
(1951) (ruling against a newspaper for refusing to deal with anyone who was 
purchasing advertising on a competing radio station). 
146 See Hamza Shaban, Digital Advertising to Surpass Print and TV 
for the First Time, Report Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2019, 9:53 AM EST), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/20/digital-
advertising-surpass-print-tv-first-time-report-says [https://perma.cc/E7NZ-
YEVC]. 
147  Netflix, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2020) 
(showing DVD subscription revenues declining since 2017). 
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venues could include other digital platforms, as well as traditional 
brick and mortar stores of various kinds. A Consumer Reports article 
from late 2019 found that luggage was being sold by a wide array of 
both online digital platforms and traditional brick-and-mortar stores, 
and some sellers who owned both. As of that date, two-thirds of buyers 
purchased their luggage from a physical store rather than online. 
Among the highest rated online sellers were Luggage Pros, Away, and 
Amazon. The brick-and-mortar stores included Walmart, Sears, 
Target, and Costco.148 For a product such as a Samsonsite bag, it is not 
clear that Amazon has a significant advantage over rivals.  It is 
certainly not clear that a monopoly seller will ever emerge, even within 
this single brand. 
 Networked technologies such as 4G & 5G cellphones are 
characterized by very considerable economies of scale, significant 
intellectual property rights, network infrastructure, and digital 
elements such as operating systems. But they also experience more 
conventional economies in the manufacture and distribution of 
devices. Here, an important factor making natural monopoly less likely 
is the high degree of interoperability.149 This is simply a later version 
of the story of AT&T, where changes in technology facilitated the 
emergence of competition, but an antitrust consent decree and later 
federal legislation were needed to further and protect interoperability. 
Interconnection is virtually seamless for digital phones, even though 
the Apple iPhone technology is different from the technology used by 
the numerous Android manufacturers. Indeed, in spite of the need to 
coordinate many manufacturers, the Android system has grown more 
 
148 Best Luggage Stores: Online or Walk-In?, CONSUMER REP. (Dec. 
17, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/luggage-stores/best-luggage-
stores-online-or-walk-in [https://perma.cc/P35T-4QJY]. 
149  On interoperability as a remedy, see infra notes 324-331 and 
accompanying text. 
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rapidly than the unitary Apple system and is now dominant in many 
parts of the world.150 
 Both declining costs on the production side and increasing 
value on the consumer side can favor larger firms. This is where 
network effects come in. Network effects occur when customer value 
increases as volume increases. For example, the telephone system is 
worth more to each user as the number of users increases, whether or 
not costs decline. All else equal, a larger network will be more 
desirable than a smaller one. Indeed, the optimal phone system would 
be one in which every person can talk to everyone else. In a population 
of 1000, a single system covering all 1000 would be more valuable 
than two systems that each served 500 but were unable to interconnect. 
If a network must be owned by a single firm, the advantage is clearly 
with larger firms. If the network can be offered jointly by multiple 
firms, however, that need not be the case. 
Standard setting often reflects the force of direct network 
effects, helping to explain such things as why markets tend to coalesce 
around a single fuel for automobiles, a single digital format for video 
discs, and so on.151 By contrast, low-cost, high-quality interconnection 
tends to mitigate these effects.152 The reason standards battles over 
analog or digital video technologies such as VHS or Blu-ray led to 
single winners was because, at least at the consumer end, the two 
technologies were not able to interconnect seamlessly. If Android and 
Apple phones were not able to interconnect, making communication 
 
150 On relative growth rates since 2007, see Vlad Savov, The Entire 
History of iPhone vs. Android Summed Up in Two Charts, VERGE (June 1, 
2016, 11:18 PM EDT), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/1/11836816/iphone-vs-android-history-
charts [https://perma.cc/3UNV-68QY]; see also Mark McDonald, iOS 10 vs 
Android Nougat: What Should You Pick?, MEDIUM (June 5, 2017), 
https://medium.com/swlh/ios-10-vs-android-nougat-what-should-you-pick-
45fe80d319cf [https://perma.cc/9TDJ-MYV8] (discussing Android’s 
growing market share). 
151  Such markets are sometimes described as experiencing 
economies in consumption.  See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New 
Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 926 (2001). 
152 See infra Section II.C.2.b 
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between them impossible, the market would very likely move to 
adoption of one of them or the other. 
Network effects can be either “direct” or “indirect.” A direct 
network effect occurs when a network becomes more valuable as the 
number of users or volume of usage on a single side increases, as in 
the example of the telephone. By contrast, an “indirect” network effect 
applies to complements that operate on the other side of a two-sided 
platform.153 For example, an increasing number of riders on Uber will 
make it more valuable to drivers, increasing their number as well. As 
the number of drivers increases, so too the number of riders, because 
availability increases and wait time decreases. Likewise, as the number 
of users of a particular credit card increases, that card becomes more 
valuable to merchants. At the same time, as the number of merchants 
who take a card increases, the card becomes more valuable to 
cardholders.  
In a two-sided market, the platform or venue intermediates 
between the two distinct but interdependent groups of participants in 
order to yield the optimal mixture of participation and price. In 
equilibrium this will be the mixture that maximizes the platform’s 
profits. For example, a printed periodical may deal with subscribers on 
one side and advertisers on the other side, obtaining revenue from both. 
Higher revenue from advertisers permits the magazine to charge lower 
subscription prices, and vice-versa. However, revenue will decline if 
one side gets out of kilter. Excessive advertising might make the 
periodical less attractive to customers. Some will cancel their 
subscriptions, making the platform less valuable to advertisers. On the 
other side, too little advertising revenue will force the publisher to hike 
subscription prices. The trick for the publisher is to find not only the 
right price level for each side, but also to find the correct “participation 
 
153 See Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Network Effects, Software 
Provision, and Standardization, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 85, 85-87 (1992) 
(making the same argument for computers and software); see also Matthew 
T. Clements, Direct and Indirect Network Effects: Are They Equivalent?, 22 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 633, 634 (2004) (comparing direct and indirect network 
effects). 
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level,” or balance between subscribers and advertisers.154  A direct 
transaction two-sided market such as Uber, where the platform acts as 
broker or deal maker between the two sides, provides another good 
example. Higher fares will encourage more drivers but discourage 
riders; lower fares do the opposite. Further, the relative availability and 
demand changes throughout the day. The platform operator must find 
the price that will optimize participation between the two at any given 
moment. 
 Even a two-sided platform with both direct and indirect 
network effects is not necessarily a natural monopoly, and most 
probably are not. If competition is possible between two-sided 
platforms, then antitrust has a role to play in maintaining it. For 
example, Uber, which operates on a two-sided platform, competes 
with Lyft, another two-sided platform, but it also competes with 
traditional taxicab companies,155 and perhaps even with other modes 
of transportation. 
A natural monopoly requires not only a plant that is big enough 
to serve the market, as the airplane example above illustrates,156 but 
also a market that is sufficiently limited in the range of competitive 
choices. For example, AmazonBasics carry-on luggage competes with 
other luggage manufacturers, such as Samsonite or TravelPro, and 
these sell at least some of their bags through traditional stores. In its 
Amex decision the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded as a matter of 
law that “[o]nly other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-
sided platform for transactions.” 157  That statement represented a 
 
154 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 715, 
722-24 (2019). 
155 See Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 
2018) (antitrust case brought by traditional taxicab association against Uber). 
156 See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text. 
157 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018); see also 
United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 136-38 (D. Del. 2020) 
(relying on this statement to conclude that a merger between two 
computerized airline reservation systems could not be a merger of 
competitors because one was two-sided and the other was not), vacated on 
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triumph of ideology over science. The question of which firms 
compete with which other firms is one of market behavior and 
distinctly a question of fact.158 Further, as a matter of fact the Court’s 
statement is clearly wrong. 
In any event, the Supreme Court’s statement about lack of 
competition between two-sided and more traditional markets was 
dicta. The only relevant competing entities in Amex (Visa, MasterCard, 
and Discover) were all two-sided platforms.159 In Amex, no one denied 
that Amex and other two-sided credit card platforms competed with 
one another. Indeed, there would not have been any point to Amex’s 
anti-steering rule if they did not compete. The rule was intended to 
forbid merchants from steering the user of a high priced Amex card to 
a less costly credit card rival. 
The Amex Court was unclear about how it could be that two-
sided platforms and traditional markets cannot compete. Certainly it is 
not the case that a two-sided platform such as Uber cannot take sales 
away from a traditional taxicab company, or vice versa,160 or that cash 
transactions cannot compete with credit-card transactions—all 
questions of fact. People switch back and forth between these things 
all the time. 
 More technically, we would say that the two compete if one is 
in a position to force the other’s prices down to its cost. That would be 
the proper question for market definition under the antitrust laws. For 
example, a traditional taxicab company would be regarded as a 
competitor with Uber if competition from the cab company was 
sufficiently robust to prevent Uber from charging a price significantly 
 
other grounds, No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020) 
(vacating the order as moot after the parties abandoned the transaction). 
158 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508832 
[https://perma.cc/A4CK-BBXA]. 
159 See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2283 (indicating there was no issue of 
competition between Amex and alternatives such as cash because the anti-
steering rule did not apply to them). 
160 See generally Phila. Taxi, 886 F.3d 332 (providing an example of 
monopolization suit brought by traditional taxicab companies against Uber). 
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higher than its costs.161 In setting its price Uber must consider not only 
demand and participation balancing between its own drivers and 
riders, but also competition with Lyft, as well as with conventional 
taxicab companies. Further, all participants engage in multi-homing. 
Customers can switch among Uber, Lyft, and taxicabs, taking 
whichever is most favorable at the moment. Some drivers do the same 
thing.162 This makes the competition question intensely factual, and 
with the likelihood of different outcomes for different situations. 
Finally, it is no answer that in a long run equilibrium only the 
platform will dominate. It may or may not be the case that eventually 
Uber and Lyft will drive traditional taxis out of the market. More 
likely, taxicab companies will adopt technologies that make them more 
competitive with multi-homing customers. But antitrust policy 
necessarily looks at shorter or middle runs, so what counts is the extent 
of substitution now and in the near term.163 In all cases, however, the 
question whether a particular two-sided platform competes with a 
more traditional market is one of fact, not of law. 
 
4. Product Differentiation and Winner-Take-All 
 
Even if costs decline continuously as output increases or 
network effects are large, a digital platform is still not necessarily a 
natural monopoly. Another pervasive reason for interplatform 
competition is product differentiation. While a natural monopoly can 
exclude a rival with an identical product simply by charging a 
competitive price, the differentiated entrant faces a different demand 
 
161 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 530-31, 536-38. 
162 See Jason Laughlin, From Cab to Uber to Cab, Drivers Try to 
Find a Way to Make a Living, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 17, 2018, 12:12 PM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/transportation/uber-lyft-cab-
drivers-competition-philadelphia-20180517.html [https://perma.cc/2SVB-
G4TH] (profiling drivers who drive for both Uber and a Philadelphia taxicab 
company). 
163See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 
45 J. CORP. L. 65, 67 (2019); Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust 
Analysis 66 Antitrust L.J. 363, 372-372 (1998) (speaking of “intermediate run”). 
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curve. As a result, there can be room for new entry even against a much 
larger firm. 
The inroads into monopoly typically come from entrants whose 
product is different from that of the incumbent. For example, the 
railroads encountered significant competition from trucking,164  and 
AT&T’s competition for its traditional land lines came from wireless 
technology. 165  Facebook displaced MySpace, not by simply going 
head-to-head with a substantially identical product, but rather by 
offering a set of intermember communication services that MySpace 
lacked.166 
Consider internet dating platforms, which are two-sided digital 
platforms that have significant indirect network effects and almost 
exclusively digital output. Dating sites match people who want to pair 
up with a complementary partner. They become more valuable to one 
set of participants (say, men seeking women) as the number of a 
complementary set of participants (women seeking men) is larger; or 
vice versa. That logic would lead to the conclusion that the market for 
dating sites is a natural monopoly, because a site with more 
participants would always have an advantage over a smaller site. 
Seekers would always prefer sites with a larger number of sought, and 
vice versa, until the full population of dating site users was exhausted.  
So why don’t we have a single dating site that collects all 
participants into one place? One possibility of course is that the market 
for dating sites has not yet reached an equilibrium and eventually this 
will happen. However, online dating platforms have been around for 
some twenty-five years and their number and revenues are still 
growing.167 
 
164 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
166 See Adam Hartung, How Facebook Beat MySpace, FORBES (Jan. 
14, 2011, 12:36 AM EST), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2011/01/14/why-facebook-beat-
myspace [https://perma.cc/HY9C-9ZMA]. 
167  See Timeline of Online Dating Services, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_online_dating_services 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 53 
 
The dating industry has also been subject to a fair amount of 
consolidation, mainly by merger. Today it is best described as having 
a dominant firm aggregating several sites (Match Group) with a 
competitive fringe.168 Significantly, when a large firm such as Match 
acquires sites such as Tinder or OKCupid it does not blend them all 
into the same site but maintains them with separate identities and 
membership. That also indicates that the sites are not natural 
monopolies. If they were, then as they came under the control of a 
single owner they would be blended into one in order to take advantage 
of network effects. For example, if the same firm came to acquire two 
substantially identical telephone networks with five hundred 
subscribers on each, merging the two would create very considerable 
value. The economic theory of the firm indicates that the firm would 
merge them.169 
Product differentiation in dating sites results mainly from 
reduced search costs in a world of diverse user preferences. Dating 
sites range from the fairly staid and traditional, such as Match.com; to 
the much more risqué, such as AdultFriendFinder.com; to more 
focused sites such as Grindr for gays and lesbians, OurTime for older 
adults, J-Date for Jewish people, Christian Mingle for Christian 
evangelicals, Shaadi for Indians, EliteSingles for people with higher 
 
[https://perma.cc/57EV-56BG] (noting that Kiss.com, founded in 1994, was 
a digital predecessor to Match.com, which was launched in 1995). Since that 
time the industry has grown steadily. As of May 2020, there were 2394 firms, 
some of whom owned multiple sites, and continuing growth. See John 
Madigan, Dating Services Industry in the US, IBISWORLD (May 2020), 
https://my.ibisworld.com/us/en/industry/81299a/industry-at-a-glance 
[https://perma.cc/4J3X-8SNX ]. 
168 Match Group owns Match, Tinder; they merged in 2017. As for 
OKCupid, Match Group acquired it in 2011 and Hinge in 2019. It has 
acquired many other smaller sites and was estimated in 2019 to have a total 
market share of 66% across its assets. eHarmony, which also owns some 
smaller sites, has a market share of 10.8%. No other firm exceeds an 8% 
market share. See Evan Michael Gilbert, Antitrust and Commitment Issues: 
Monopolization of the Dating App Industry, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 862, 876 tbl.2 
(2019). 
169 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 396-
98 (1937). 
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education levels, PURRsonals for cat lovers, Hotsaucepassions for 
lovers of spicy food, and many more. As long as this product 
differentiation is both durable and desired, dating sites will not be 
winner-take-all platforms. 
The same thing is true of a variety of other two-sided platforms 
that have significant network externalities. One widely studied 
example is video games, which operate on two-sided platforms but are 
differentiated in both hardware formats and in the games themselves170 
In addition, many periodicals that depend on advertising have both 
readership and advertising rates that become more attractive as 
numbers rise. But they are also significantly differentiated from one 
another. Two magazines of roughly the same size, Teen Vogue (#74 
nationally by circulation) and Field & Stream (#73 nationally) are 
unlikely to merge into one. Nor is one likely to drive the other out of 
existence and become dominant.171 Even if the two came to be owned 
by the same parent, it is unlikely that the owner would blend the two 
into one. They appeal to very different audiences. This is why any 
 
170  For the large and diverse literature on single-homing, multi-
homing, and product differentiation in video games, see, for example, 
Carmelo Cennamo, Hakan Ozalp & Tobias Kretschmer, Platform 
Architecture and Quality Trade-offs of Multihoming Complements, 29 INFO. 
SYS. RES. 461 (2018); Matthew T. Clements & Hiroshi Ohashi, Indirect 
Network Effects and the Product Cycle: Video Games in the U.S., 1994-2002, 
53 J. INDUS. ECON. 515 (2005); Myriam Davidovici-Nora & Marc Bourreau, 
Two-Sided Markets in the Video Game Industry, 173-174 RÉSEAUX 97 
(2012); Venkatesh Shankar & Barry L. Bayus, Network Effects and 
Competition: An Empirical Analysis of the Home Video Game Industry, 24 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 375 (2003); Haeyop Song, Jaemin Jung & Daegon 
Cho, Platform Competition in the Video Game Console Industry: Impacts of 
Software Quality and Exclusivity on Market Share, 30 J. MEDIA ECON. 99 
(2017); and Thomas Teeter & Ryan Lunsford, Electronic Arts: Strategic 
Differentiation in the Global Video Gaming Industry (Aug. 20, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459606 
[https://perma.cc/WL7H-H2VG]. 
171 See List of Magazines by Circulation: United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_magazines_by_circulation#United_States 
[https://perma.cc/3RKZ-AVW8]. 
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claim that two-sided markets are winner-take-all or even winner-take-
most is simply wrong.  That statement is very likely true only of 
undifferentiated products that sellers are unable to distinguish from 
their competitors. 
The same thing is true of more traditional markets.  For 
example, a copyrighted digital book, such as an economics or legal 
text, experiences continuously declining costs as more copies are 
produced, which is characteristic of natural monopolies.172  So why 
don’t we have a single text for each subject, which would be much 
cheaper than producing and maintaining the number we actually do.  
The answer once again is product differentiation.  As long as different 
economics texts appeal to different audiences there will be room for 
multiple competitors.173 
For a few products, such as internet search engines, product 
differentiation has been less successful, and natural monopoly 
becomes a more realistic possibility. There are in fact differences 
among search engines in page formats, the way results are displayed, 
the amount and nature of the information that they preserve, and the 
algorithms used to produce search results. None of these differences 
has significantly balanced out the competition, even though multi-
homing is readily possible and common. Worldwide search data from 
2020 shows Google with a market share in the neighborhood of 92%, 
Bing (Microsoft) with 2.8%, and no one else with greater than 2%.174 
What accounts for these lopsided numbers in the search engine 
market is not entirely clear. Decisions such as the European Union 
 
172 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
173On the role of product differentiation in creating competition among 
books and other copyrighted works, which typically have continuously 
declining costs, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 NYU L. REV. 212, 237-238 (2008). 
174  See Search Engine Market Share Worldwide, STATCOUNTER 
(Sept., 2020), https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share 
[https://perma.cc/EL2C-9RMG]. The share in the United States is a bit 
lower—about 88%. See Search Engine Market Share in 2020, OBERLO, 
https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/search-engine-market-share 
[https://perma.cc/6XDV-Y7EH]. 
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(EU) case against Google Search were based on the premise that 
Google biases search results to favor paid supporters or else its own 
assets, such as YouTube. 175  While search biases might increase 
Google’s revenue, however, they should serve to decrease rather than 
increase its share of the search market. As long as switching among 
search engines is easy, biased results should lead users to substitute 
away. 
One possibility is that Google obtains a market share advantage 
for search because it is tied to other assets. For example, Google search 
has traditionally been the default search engine on Android 
smartphones, at least until an EU decision in 2018.176  Further, it pays 
Apple billions of dollars annually in order to be the default search 
engine on the iPhone – a practice that is currently challenged in the 
government’s antitrust complaint.177 
These “ties” are only defaults, however.  To the extent 
searchers are disappointed by search bias they can almost always  
switch to a different search engine.178 Anyone with a desktop, laptop, 
or handheld can have multiple search engines and switch among them 
on a whim. While search is subject to economies of scale, users do not 
pay the cost, so there are no cost advantages associated with doing a 
search on Google or switching to an alternative. More likely, 
 
175  See Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.p
df [https://perma.cc/C8ZY-6VZX]. 
176  See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! 
Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
177 Cplt, United States v. Google, supra note __, ¶¶45 119 (alleging that Google 
pays Apple “billions” of dollars each year for this). 
178  Other possibilities are explored in Fiona M. Scott Morton & 
David C. Dinielli, Roadmap for a Digital Advertising Monopolization Case 
Against Google, OMIDYAR NETWORK (May 17, 2020), 
https://omidyar.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Roadmap-for-a-Case-
Against-Google.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9QN-5L28].  
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economies of scale show up in higher quality results.179 If that case is 
made, Google Search might turn out to be a natural monopoly, but one 
that data pooling might fix.180 
What still needs to be answered is whether Google Search’s 
dominance results from design choices that others could duplicate, or 
whether it results from advantages that accrue to its larger size.  In any 
event, if Google Search is a natural monopoly then a court order 
divesting Google Search would not break it down; it would simply 
assign the monopoly to a different owner.  Pulling the other way, 
however, is the fact of Google’s large payment to Apple to be the 
iPhone default search engine.  If Google Search were in fact a natural 
monopoly, such a payment would be unnecessary.  More likely,  
Google Search is not a natural monopoly and the payment should be 
treated as an exclusionary practice. 
Finally, the ability of firms to differentiate their products or 
services at least partly explains the dominant platform strategy of 
buying up nascent digital firms, discussed later. 181  Most of these 
acquisitions are not purely horizontal but rather fall into the category 
of “product extension” mergers,182 or acquisitions intended to broaden 
the range of products or services that the acquiring firm offers. They 
may be an effort either to obtain product differentiation or to cut off 
efforts by others to develop differentiated alternatives. Here, antitrust 
policy concerning startup acquisitions becomes relevant. Large 
platforms such as Facebook, Amazon, or Google may have been able 
 
179  See David R. Keith & Hazhir Rahmandad, Are On-Demand 
Platforms Winner-Take-All Markets?, 2019 ACAD. MGMT PROC., 
https://journals.aom.org/doi/pdf/10.5465/AMBPP.2019.150 
[https://perma.cc/73G5-T2LF].   The Government also alleges significant 
scale economies in its antitrust complaint.  See Cplt, United States v. Google, 
supra note __, ¶¶35-38. 
180 See infra notes 338-339 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 355-359 and accompanying text. 
182  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1131b, 1144d 
(discussing product extension mergers); see also C. Scott Hemphill & Tim 
Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 UNIV. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) , 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624058 [https://perma.cc/2VFL-VBJR] 
(discussing the importance of protecting nascent competitors). 
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to maintain their positions by buying up all of the prospective 
challengers before they can ripen into more formidable rivals. 
 
II. ANTITRUST REMEDIES AGAINST DOMINANT 
PLATFORMS 
 
A. Against Platform Exceptionalism 
 
In Amex, the Supreme Court disregarded the most basic of all 
properties of markets, which is that they consist of close substitutes.183 
Instead, it lumped production complements into the same market. In 
the process it made coherent economic analysis of the problem 
impossible. 
Second, it ignored an important distinction between fact and 
law: disputes about market boundaries involve questions of fact. 
Nevertheless, the majority wrote—as a matter of law—that two-sided 
platforms compete exclusively with other two-sided platforms. This 
dicta has already produced mischief in lower-court decisions. It led 
one court to conclude that a merger between a two-sided online flight-
reservation system and a more traditional system could not be a merger 
of competitors.184 
Third, without argument or evidence, the Court required 
litigants to show market power indirectly in vertical restraints cases by 
 
183 See Hovenkamp, supra note 158, at 14-15. 
184 United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 136 (D. Del. 
2020) (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) (“Only 
other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for 
transactions.”)), vacated, No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824, at *1 (3d Cir. July 
20, 2020).  While Sabre facilitates interconnections on a two-sided platform, 
Farelogix provides scheduling and routing services to the airlines, which then 
sell the services on their own websites or through travel agents.  See Laura-
Lucia Richter, Analysis: The Sabre/Farelogix Transaction and Why Platform 
Economics Will Matter (Nera, 2019), available at 
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2019/PUB_SabreFare
logix%20platforms.pdf.  
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reference to a relevant market, even though superior techniques are 
available. Direct measures are particularly useful in digital markets, 
where the necessary data are easy to obtain. 185  This was another 
confusion between fact and law. 
Fourth, the Court completely butchered the economics of free 
riding by ignoring the fact that when a firm is able to recover the value 
of its investments through its own transactions, free riding is not a 
problem.  
Fifth, the Court failed to perform the kind of transaction-
specific factual analysis that has become critical to economically 
responsible antitrust law. Rather, it simply assumed, without 
examining the actual transactions before it, that losses on one side of a 
two-sided market are inherently offset by gains on the other side.186 
Amex’s anti-steering rule produced immediate losses for both the 
affected cardholder and the affected merchant. The only beneficiary 
was the operator of a platform able to shelter itself from competition 
that would have benefitted both cardholders and merchants. 
Markets differ from one another. 187  This is why we apply 
mainly antitrust law to some, regulation to others, and some mixture 
of the two to yet others. It is also why antitrust is so fact intensive, 
particularly on issues pertaining to market power or competitive 
effects. Indeed, the biggest advantage that antitrust has over legislative 
regulation is its fact-driven methodology. Antitrust courts do and 
should avoid speaking categorically about market situations that are 
not immediately before them and that have not been made subject to 
adequate fact finding. Within this framework there is no reason to 
think that digital platforms are unicorns whose rules as a class differ 
from those governing other firms. Every market has its distinct 
features, but the ordinary rules of antitrust analysis are adequate to 
consider them. The Amex decision is a cautionary tale about what can 
 
185 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
186 See Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, supra note 154, at 745-47. 
187  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist 
Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455, 492-95 (2019). 
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happen when a court is so overwhelmed by a market’s idiosyncrasies 
that it abandons well-established rules for analyzing markets. 
Most digital platforms are not structural winner-take-all 
markets. In most cases dominant platforms cannot maintain a 
dominant position simply by setting a price at or a little above the 
competitive level. Just as other dominant firms, if they wish to 
maintain their power, they must behave strategically. Further, the 
general case for regulating them is weak, at least if the goal of 
regulation is the ordinary neoclassical one of approximating 
competitive rates of output.188 Empirically, of course, the purposes of 
regulation are much broader and more diverse than the range of 
rationales for antitrust. 189  For example, regulatory goals could be 
dictated by telecommunications policy, national security, privacy, 
decency, political balance, equality, protection of particular interest 
groups, or other values. If the goal of regulation is something other 
than maintaining competitive levels of output, it will have to be 
implemented by means other than the antitrust laws. 
Just as the digital platform is not a unicorn, it is also no 
monolith: platforms differ substantially from one another. One 
important difference lies in the nature of the products. Some platforms 
have inputs and outputs that are composed primarily of intellectual 
property rights or other digital content that is both nonrivalrous and 
inexhaustible. Others deal in more tactile goods and services where the 
power to exclude varies from one situation to another. For some 
technologies, product differentiation serves to make natural monopoly 
highly unlikely. Some platforms compete intensely with more 
traditional markets, while others do not. 
As a result, antitrust litigation against platforms requires 
individualized fact finding, an assessment of competitive harms, and 
relief appropriately tailored for the circumstances. Under the antitrust 
laws, a properly defined exclusionary practice is one that unreasonably 
creates or maintains monopoly status. The courts often speak of 
 
188  For a statement of this view, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 11-12 (1988). 
189 See BREYER, supra note 51, at 15-25 (1982). 
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“monopoly maintenance” as the offense.190 If such a practice succeeds, 
it will serve to prolong the duration of the monopoly in fending off 
market forces that might otherwise operate to weaken or destroy it.191 
 
B.  Anticompetitive Conduct 
  
This very brief discussion is not intended to make a case for 
antitrust enforcement against any particular platform.192 Setting aside 
mergers,193 the conduct most likely to provoke a complaint is vertical 
contracting, such as exclusive or quasi-exclusive dealing, most-
favored-nation clauses, 194  or loyalty practices. 195  Also likely are 
challenges to tying, such as deals that link usage on two or more 
different products or platforms, including default rules.196 
 
190  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) 
(requiring “willful acquisition or maintenance” of monopoly power for 
liability); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 43 (2013) (same); 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 811 (1988) 
(same); McWane, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 783 F.3d 814, 832 (11th Cir. 
2015) (recognizing liability for exclusive dealing as a monopoly maintenance 
offense). As of October 11, 2020, Westlaw identifies 1411 judicial decisions 
that employ the “willful acquisition or maintenance” formulation. 
191  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 501 (noting the 
importance of durability). 
192 For good evaluations of two possibilities, see Fiona M. Scott 
Morton & David C. Dinielli, Roadmap for an Antitrust Case Against 
Facebook, OMIDYAR NETWORK 11, 15 (2020), 
https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/Roadmap%20for%20an%20A
ntitrust%20Case%20Against%20Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V2N-
CCGS]; and Scott Morton & Dinielli, Roadmap for a Digital Advertising 
Monopolization Case Against Google, supra note 178, at 13, 15. For more 
general coverage, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, passim. 
193 See infra Part III (discussing platform acquisitions). 
194 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 768a, 1807b. 
195 Id., ¶¶ 749, 1821a. 
196 Id., ¶¶ 1700-83. 
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Anticompetitive horizontal agreements are possible but less 
likely.197  For example, Apple and Amazon might fix the price of 
digital books, which they both sell. Uber has been fighting off claims 
of driver price fixing.198 Or Facebook and Google’s YouTube might 
divide the market for posted videos. But these highly visible 
companies are less likely to try these obviously illegal agreements. 
More likely, two or more of the platforms might participate in a joint 
venture or standard-setting organization that may also involve claims 
of anticompetitive conduct.  They might also agree anticompetitively 
not to hire one another’s employees.199 
Both unilateral exclusionary conduct and vertical agreements are 
market-power offenses addressed under the rule of reason, with one 
idiosyncratic exception for tying arrangements.200 As a result, per se 
violations are less likely. Unfortunately, the federal courts have made 
the rule of reason unnecessarily harsh on plaintiffs by requiring too 
much as part of the prima facie case.201 In large part, this results from 
a lingering anti-enforcement bias held by the judiciary even though 
this normative baseline no longer reflects the economic consensus.202 
 Finally, networking that requires cooperative product 
development and distribution both heightens the costs of 
 
197 Google’s payment to Apple to make Google Search the iPhone default (see note 
__, supra) could be characterized as horizontal if interpreted as involving Apple’s 
commitment to refrain from developing or acquiring its own search engine.  It 
could also be characterized as a vertical license.  Some speculate that Apple may be 
about to launch or acquire a search engine of its own.  See 
https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/08/27/apple-may-launch-its-own-web-based-
search-engine (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
198  See, e.g., Meyer v. Kalanick, 2020 WL 4482095, at *2-4 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020 Aug. 3, 2020) (refusing to set aside the arbitrator’s decision 
for the defendant); Meyer v. Kalanick, 291 F. Supp. 3d 526, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (acknowledging the price-fixing claim and granting the motion to 
compel arbitration); The Yellow Cab Co. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2015 WL 
4987653, at *5-6 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2015) (refusing to dismiss the claim of 
driver price fixing under state antitrust law). 
199E.g., California v. eBay, 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (labor 
anti-poaching  agreement between eBay and Intuit). 
200 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1720. 
201 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 23, § 2.2c. 
202 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 4, at 8. 
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anticompetitive behavior and increases the opportunities for engaging 
in it.203  For example, refusals to deal are inherently more problematic 
in networked industries where cooperation produces value than in 
standalone markets where each firm ordinarily supplies its own inputs 
and finds it own sales.  The Ninth Circuit lost sight of this in its 
Qualcomm decision where it ignored the FRAND patent cross 
licensing system and treated each firm as a standalone competitor.204 
To be sure, breach of a FRAND obligation is not itself an antitrust 
violation.  But antitrust takes markets as it finds them.  One cannot 
address competition problems without appreciating the system of rules 
and regulations that a market has put into place.  That has consistently 
been true in Supreme Court rule of reason cases.  For example, in 
Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Brandeis explained how a rule that 
nominally constituted price-fixing actually made competition work 
better in that market.205  In NCAA the Court condemned a horizontal 
restriction on televised games only after concluding that the restriction 
was not needed to further the kind of competition that organized 
collegiate football required.206 
 
C. Designing Appropriate Antitrust Remedies 
 
The equitable relief provisions of the antitrust laws are 
extremely broad, with no explicit restriction on the nature of the relief.  
Indeed, the statute authorizing the government to seek equitable relief 
does even contain the common limitation that the relief be “in 
 
203See Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, __ CORN. L. REV. __ (2020).  
See also 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶772 
(4th ed. 2016) (advocating heightened dealing obligations in network industries). 
204Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
205 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (explaining 
functions of the challenged pricing rule). 
206 NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-105 (1984) 
(explaining how NCAA restriction on televised games was unnecessary for proper 
operation of NCAA football and was a naked restraint). 
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accordance with the principles of equity….”207  A simple injunction, a 
radical breakup of a large firm into small pieces, or many other kinds 
of relief are all legally possible.  Nevertheless, there are limits.  
Numerous times the Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of an 
equitable antitrust remedy is to “restore competitive conditions.208  
Broad as the equity statute is, it should not be interpreted as justifying 
every conceivable remedy.  Once a violation is found, however, a 
remedy is appropriate even though it may “curtail the exercise of 
liberties that the [defendant] might otherwise enjoy.”209 
Antitrust remedies against monopoly are appropriate when 
consumer and other benefits from antitrust enforcement exceed the 
social costs of the monopoly.  One important ingredient in that 
determination is duration and harm caused by the monopoly.  Another 
is the costs and benefits of the remedy itself. 
The more durable the monopoly, the more costly to society. 
Most single-firm monopolies that last only a year are probably not 
worth pursuing for purposes of obtaining structural relief, because the 
cost of antitrust enforcement is high and its wheels turn slowly. As a 
result, antitrust challenges to firm dominance require a showing of 
entry barriers, which assesses whether monopoly is likely to be 
dissipated by new entry and, if so, how long that process will take.210 
A well designed breakup can increase competition, perhaps 
significantly, as in the AT&T case.211  A bad one can deprive firms of 
scale economies, harming consumers, or can even ruin a firm.  If the 
 
207 15 U.S.C. §25 (authorizing the government “to prevent and restrain” antitrust 
violations)  Cf. the provision for private equitable relief, 15 U.S.C. §26, which 
authorizes equitable relief “when and under the same conditions and principles as 
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is 
granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings….”). 
208 United States v. Int’l Harverster Co., 274 U.S. 693, 698-706 (1927).  See also 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (“The 
key to the whole question of an antitrust remedy is of course the discovery of 
measures effective to restore competition”).  See also United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C.Cir. 2001) (describing government’s request for “relief 
as is necessary and appropriate to restore competition conditions”). 
209 Nat’l Soc’y of Professional Eng’r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978). 
210 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 420-23. 
211 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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contemplated remedy is a breakup, the court should insist on additional 
evidence about effectiveness and costs.  The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft 
vacated the district court’s remedy judgment because of its failure to 
hold a hearing.212  The social cost of a bad breakup is almost certainly 
much greater than the social cost of an unnecessary prohibitory 
injunction.213 
In any event, an essential limitation is that the goal of an 
antitrust remedy is restoration of competition.  It should be 
evaluated by its success in increasing output, decreasing prices, 
improving product quality, or spurring innovation – that is, by the 
same criteria that we generally adopt as goals for the antitrust 
laws.  It is not antitrust’s purpose to make firms smaller,  
unprofitable, or less efficient, nor to harm consumers by causing 
higher prices or reduced quantity or quality. Concerns about 
privacy, political power, or social and economic equality are of 
course relevant to legal policy generally, but they are not antitrust 
problems unless they also threaten to reduce output, raise prices, 
or restrain innovation. 
At the same time, the purpose of an antitrust decree is not to 
turn markets into regulated industries.  Unlike command-and-
control regulation, antitrust generally begins with the premise 
that markets should tend to themselves. It intervenes only when 
competition is threatened, and “restore competition” means what 
it says. 
This Section considers how antitrust tribunals can further digital 
platform competition without causing consumer harm or becoming 
excessively involved in the ongoing supervision of business conduct. 
 
1. Structural Relief, Limits on Defaults, and Other Injunctions 
 
a. Breakups for Sherman Act Violations 
 
 
212See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 106-107 (D. C. Cir. 2001). 
213 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶303c. 
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Most antitrust relief outside of merger enforcement is 
nonstructural. For example, in a rule-of-reason case the remedy is 
usually an injunction against the challenged practice, although more 
pervasive violations or troublesome structures might require a 
divestiture. If the requested remedy is an injunction, the appropriate 
question is whether the restraint reduces output and raise prices of the 
affected transactions, not whether it increases the defendant’s overall 
prices. That proposition would seem to be obvious. In the Amex 
decision, however, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts 
assumed that condemnation of the defendant’s rule (which prohibited 
a merchant from steering a customer to a less costly card) required a 
showing that overall prices increased as a result.214 In fact, however, 
each and every transaction affected by the anti-steering rule resulted in 
both a higher price for the affected consumer and reduced profit for 
the affected merchant.215 
For most antitrust problems that do not involve acquisitions, 
structural breakup is not a promising way to remedy anticompetitive 
behavior. The history of deconcentration measures in American 
monopolization cases is not pretty.216 Requiring integrated firms to 
spin off specific plants or products will make them less attractive to 
consumers but will not inherently serve to dissipate market power in 
any particular product or service. 
One notable exception is the successful AT&T breakup, which 
resulted from a 1982 antitrust consent decree.217 The AT&T network 
 
214  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) 
(discussing whether prices “on the two-sided credit-card market as a whole” 
were higher); id. at 2292 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing there was not record 
evidence of higher prices overall). 
215 See Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, supra note 154, at 741-42. 
216  See generally William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The 
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for 
Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1105 & n.4 (1989) (“To most 
students of antitrust, the history of Sherman Act deconcentration endeavors 
is largely a chronicle of costly defeats and inconsequential victories.”). 
217 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142 & 
n.42 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
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had been presumed to be a natural monopoly, but it lost that status as 
technological changes facilitated the growth of wireless 
communication. The breakup left the incumbent local exchange 
carriers intact for local service because they still depended on wired 
connections to each customer. However, long-distance service and the 
production of instruments were divested and turned over to 
competition. The AT&T breakup carries some important lessons for 
anyone considering structural relief against a monopoly: identify those 
markets and assets where competition can be made to work well and 
devise the remedy accordingly. 
The structural breakup problem is more severe for digital firms, 
which are often highly integrated. To be sure, a multidivisional firm 
such as Alphabet probably can be broken into separate parts that follow 
its corporate lines—perhaps one firm for the Android operating 
system, another for application services such as Gmail, and others for 
YouTube, Google Nest home products, and Waymo autonomous-
driving technology. 
But breaking apart noncompeting units does not necessarily 
increase the amount of competition. If a manufacturer makes 80% of 
the world’s toasters and 75% of the world’s blenders, compelling 
divestiture of one will yield one firm that makes 80% of the world’s 
toasters and a second firm that makes 75% of the world’s blenders. 
Because the two divisions are not competitors to begin with, we have 
done nothing to increase the amount of competition.  
To do that, we need to break into the production of each 
product. We might force divestiture of half of the firm’s toaster 
 
(1983). For more history and also a regulatory perspective, see generally 
GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: 
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); and Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, 
Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005 
(1987) (also providing early commentary on the role of antitrust). For a lively 
but less technical account, see generally STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE 
CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1986). For a more panoramic history of 
the telecommunications network, including the breakup, see generally 
RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2010). 
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business and half of its blender business, spinning them off to other 
firms. This can be a much more difficult thing to accomplish. The more 
integrated the primary company, the greater the difficulties. For 
example, if the firm makes its toasters in one plant with an integrated 
production line and blenders in a different plant, a divesture that 
actually increases competition would require dismantling or 
restructuring the plants themselves. 
Breaking up any platform subject to significant scale 
economies would be socially costly. It would force inefficiencies on 
all post-breakup constituents as well as cause consumer harm.  For 
example, Amazon has roughly 67% of the market for e-books.218 We 
might divest Amazon’s e-book business and give it to a different firm. 
Currently, a user can call up a book title on Amazon and select from 
available formats, whether hardback, paperback, Kindle (e-book), or 
audio. Forcing a divestiture of Kindle would require a customer who 
wanted the e-book version to go to a different firm’s website. E-books 
are sold by other resellers, including many of the publishers 
themselves. The principal impact of such a divestiture would be to 
make it less convenient for readers to select a book format. That is not 
likely to be a consumer-welfare improvement. 
In cases of significant economies of scale or network 
externalities, more promising remedies are compelled interoperability 
and information pooling. These could permit the emergence of more 
evenly competitive firms without depriving anyone of scale 
economies. 219 
 
b. Addressing Defaults 
 
Another possible nonstructural remedy is removal of defaults, 
which are presumptive product choices that a user can change. As the 
Government’s 2020 antitrust complaint against Google notes, Google 
Search is the default search engine on both iPhones and Android 
 
218https://about.ebooks.com/ebook-industry-news-feed/ (last visited Oct 26, 2020). 
219 See discussion infra Section II.C.2.b. 
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phones sold in the United States.220  To be sure, the user can readily 
and at no cost switch away from the default and install any one of 
several alternatives. One problem with defaults, however, is that the 
person making the choice is typically not the person who is harmed. 
For example, the collective effect of individual users’ low-impact 
decisions to accept a particular default search engine might be the 
costly exclusion of rivals. 
Further, not all defaults are equally effective. 221  The 
Government’s antitrust complaint against Google alleges that defaults 
on mobile devices are “especially sticky.”222  By contrast, Windows 
10 for laptops and desktops comes with Microsoft Edge as the default 
browser and Bing as the default search engine. Nevertheless, usage 
data suggests that a very significant number of Windows 10 users swap 
away from Bing in favor of Google Search. While Windows enjoys 
about 35% of the global operating system (OS) market (across all 
devices and operating systems), its preinstalled search engine Bing has 
 
220 Cplt., United States v. Google, supra note __, ¶¶45-47.  On Europe, see 
Benjamin Edelman & Damien Geradin, Android and Competition Law: 
Exploring and Assessing Google’s Practices in Mobile, 12 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 159, 165-66 (2016); Alexandre de Cornière & Greg 
Taylor, On the Economics of the Google Android Case, VOXEU (Aug. 15, 
2018), https://voxeu.org/article/economics-google-android-case 
[https://perma.cc/8ZW2-CNJ4]. 
221 For a good and quite general study showing a wide variety of 
outcomes, see Jon M. Jachimowicz, Shannon Duncan, Elke U. Weber & Eric 
J. Johnson, When and Why Defaults Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of 
Default Effects, 3 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 159 (2019). By contrast, default 
privacy settings in social-network sites have a strong effect on ultimate 
consumer choice. See generally Hichang Cho, Sungjong Roh & Byungho 
Park, Of Promoting Networking and Protecting Privacy: Effects of Defaults 
and Regulatory Focus on Social Media Users’ Preference Settings, 101 
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2019) (finding defaults significantly affect 
users’ privacy-preference settings when examining default setting as a 
contextual factor and regulatory focus as an individual-difference factor—
specifically, “users choose the defaults or alternatives proximal to them”). 
222 Cplt., United States v. Google, supra note __, ¶3. 
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a less than 3% market share.223 So as many as 90% of those who 
acquire a Windows 10 device reject the default search engine in favor 
of Google Search. 
United States antitrust law respecting defaults is very 
conservative.  The closest analogue is the law of tying arrangements, 
which as historically interpreted requires proof of absolute 
conditioning. Simply offering two products together without actually 
forcing the buyer to take both is not a tie.224 The Supreme Court has 
described ties with terms such as “forcing” or “coercion.”225 
On this issue, the antitrust statutes are partially helpful. Section 
3 of the Clayton Act appears to avoid condemning defaults.  It requires 
a “condition, agreement, or understanding” that the buyer not deal with 
a rival. 226  The language of the Sherman Act does not assess this 
conditioning requirement. Section 1 reaches conduct that 
“restrain[s] . . .trade,”227  which refers to reduced output and higher 
prices. Section 2 prohibits those who “monopolize,” which requires 
unreasonable exclusion but does not specify the mechanisms. 228 
 
223 See Search Engine Market Share Worldwide—September 2020, 
STATCOUNTER, https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share 
[https://perma.cc/KF48-VDY5]. For other data, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419, 436 & n.114-
16, 437 & n.117-18 (2016) (reporting data from Tech Times, ZD Net, and 
Computerworld) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information 
Technologies]. 
224 It’s My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc., 811 F.3d 676, 685 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (concert promoter did not tie its venue to its promotion services; 
artists were not forced to use the venue and only 14% of those who used the 
defendant’s promotion services also rented its venue); see also AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1752 (discussing the requirement of coercion, 
or conditioning). 
225 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 
(1984) (describing ties as “forcing”); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (describing ties as “coerc[ion]”). 
226 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (codifying section 3). 
227 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (codifying section 1). 
228 Id § 2; cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966) (condemning “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”). 
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Whether a default satisfies either of the Sherman Act requirements 
presents a question of fact. In any event, there is a solid tradition of 
being less strict about tying or exclusive-dealing law’s categorical 
requirements when raised as part of a section 2 case against a 
monopolist.229 The ultimate question is not whether there is literal 
coercion, but whether the practice serves to exclude competition 
unreasonably.  In that case, Google’s high market share in search 
makes the claim more plausible. 
 
c. Platform Segregation 
 
Another proposal, which received some discussion during the 
2020 presidential campaign, is an injunction prohibiting Amazon 
“from owning both the platform utility and any participants on that 
platform.” 230  Amazon would either have to transfer its in-house 
products, such as its AmazonBasics brand, to a different website or 
else stop selling them. Underlying the proposal is the argument that 
Amazon sometimes copies third-party products that it is selling and 
develops its own in-house versions, which it typically sells at lower 
prices.231 One specific example is a laptop stand that Amazon sold for 
a small third-party seller, Rain Design, at a price of around $40.232 
Amazon subsequently designed its own competing stand, which it sold 
 
229 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 777. 
230  Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break up Big Tech, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-
can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/WP5N-F6YP]. 
231 See Spencer Soper, Got a Hot Seller on Amazon? Prepare for E-
Tailer to Make One Too, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016, 7:00 AM EDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-seller-on-
amazon-prepare-for-e-tailer-to-make-one-too [https://perma.cc/W577-
JA88].  
232 See Rain Design 10032 mStand Laptop Stand, Silver (Patented), 
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Rain-Design-mStand-Laptop-
Patented/dp/B000OOYECC [ https://perma.cc/J2MX-TEJ5]. 
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for about half that price. 233  Variations of this proposal could 
conceivably be applied to any platform that provided both its own 
products and those of rivals in competition with one another. 
Both the problem and the antitrust remedy raise troublesome 
issues. Even if the rival laptop stand had been sold on someone else’s 
website, Amazon or some other seller could still copy it. The story 
indicates that the Rain Design stand was not effectively protected by 
intellectual property rights. Otherwise Amazon would have been 
guilty of infringement. Further, the margins on the Rain Design 
product were so high that Amazon was able to make and sell a similar 
product at half the price.234  In fact, a large number of sellers sell 
competing stands on Amazon, mostly at prices lower than Rain 
Design’s.235 This particular antitrust remedy appears to be a naked 
preference for a smaller vendor’s wish for high margins over 
consumers’ desires for lower prices and increased variety that 
competition would offer. 
The biggest impact of Amazon’s own product sales in 
competition with third-party sellers is not on niche products such as 
laptop stands. Rather, Amazon has developed house brands that 
compete with large manufacturers’ well-established consumer labels 
that sell at high margins. For example, AmazonBasics batteries 
compete with Duracell (owned by Berkshire Hathaway), Energizer, 
and Ray-O-Vac. Its AmazonBasics small appliances compete with 
those produced by Black & Decker, its AmazonBasics office supplies 
compete with 3M, and its AmazonBasics travel luggage competes with 
Samsonite. 236  These are all very large firms. The only real 
accomplishment of own-product separation would be to segregate 
 
233 See AmazonBasics Laptop Desk Stand for PC and Macbook—
Silver, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/AmazonBasics-DSN-01750-SL-
Laptop-Stand-Silver/dp/B00WRDS0AU [ https://perma.cc/8LFX-8P9J]. 
234 Alternatively, Rain Design could have extremely high costs. 
235 One Amazon search for “laptop stand” revealed more than two 
thousand stands of various designs. See 1-48 of over 2,000 results for 
“Laptop Stand,” AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/s?k=“laptop+stand” 
[https://perma.cc/46V7-6JX9] (last accessed Oct. 22, 2020). 
236 Hovenkamp, supra note 158, at 61.  
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aggressively priced, low-margin house brands from high-margin 
premium brands. Customers would end up paying more. The 
underlying problem is no different than the one that has caused many 
larger retailers such as grocers to offer house brands, sold in the same 
stores but at lower margins than the premium brands charge.237 
A related danger is that the owner of a monopoly asset might 
bundle it with other assets in order to leverage sales. This was a well-
understood problem in patent law even before the antitrust laws were 
passed.  Cases concerning patent owners’ attempts to bundle their 
patented products with complements stretch back to the nineteenth 
century.  The courts commonly addressed this problem simply by 
refusing to permit the patentee to tie, under a variety of doctrines.238 
 
d. The Comparative Advantage of  Injunctions 
 
While not every antitrust injunction furthers antitrust goals, they 
are more narrowly focused than divestiture and the results are typically 
easier to predict.  By contrast, determining harms and benefits from 
judicially mandated restructuring of firms is difficult. The point is 
not that structural remedies are categorically bad, but that no 
divestiture should be compelled without a relatively clear 
understanding of the likely effects. As with all antitrust remedies, 
the goal should be to increase post-relief output. Higher output 
will benefit consumers as well as labor and suppliers.  Too often, 
 
237  See NIRMALYA KUMAR & JAN-BENEDICT E.M. STEENKAMP, 
PRIVATE LABEL STRATEGY: HOW TO MEET THE STORE BRAND CHALLENGE 
14-15 (2007). 
238  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of 
Production, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1155, 1176-1180 (2018) (tracing the law of 
patent tying back to the mid-nineteenth century).  See, e.g., Wilson v. 
Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850) (refusing to enforce requirement of seller of 
patented wood planning machine that purchasers use its cutting knives); 
Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper co., 152 U.S. 
425 (1894) (refusing to require purchaser of patentee’s toilet paper dispenser 
to use its toilet paper); Aiken v. Manchester Print Works, 1 F.Cas. 245 
(D.N.H. 1864) (patentee of mechanical knitting machine could not require 
purchasers to use its knitting needles). 
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well-intended divestitures or structural separations end up doing 
precisely the opposite.239 
A properly designed injunction can have more predictable 
effects and sometimes can accomplish more than divestiture would. 
For example, a remedy against Google’s practice of preinstalling 
Google Search on Android need not require asset divestiture. It could 
also be remedied by an injunction that simply halted the practice and 
directly provided purchasers of new Android devices a startup menu 
to select from competing search engines.240 This was the result of the 
EU’s July 2018 Android decision.241 Under that remedy, upon initial 
startup of a new device the Android screen lists a number of alternative 
general search engines, and the customer can select one. Placement on 
the list is determined by competitive bid. Android’s own information 
 
239See Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act 
Monopolization Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109, 197 (2001) (most divestitures in 
monopolization cases have failed to improve competition or consumer welfare).  
One commonly given example is the Standard Oil decree, which broke that 
company into 34 firms.  United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 173 F. 177, 
198-99 (E.D. Mo. 1909); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, 37 n.1 (1911) (listing Standard’s assets).  Soon after the price of 
gasoline rose increase, although whether the increase was caused by the 
breakup has not been established.  See FED TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON 
THE PRICE OF GASOLINE IN 1915, at 1 (1917). 
240 The proposal was made in Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information 
Technologies, supra note 223, at 436-37. 
241 See Case AT.40099, Google Android, C(2018) 4761, at 274, 314 
(July 18, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1
_40099 [https://perma.cc/2DNH-BYK6]. In particular, see id. ¶ 1214, at 274, 
which notes that pre-installation of competing search engines would have 
created more competition in search traffic and which includes testimony that 
installing a single search engine as a default increased that search engine’s 
traffic by a factor of two to three. In addition, Google was willing to pay large 
sums to be the default search engine on some devices). See Katie Collins, 
Google Won’t be Default Search Engine for Android Users in EU Next Year, 
CNET (Aug. 2, 2019, 3:35 AM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-to-
prompt-eu-android-users-to-choose-a-search-engine-within-chrome 
[https://perma.cc/WK82-HVE7]. 
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page on this process shows a screen giving new users a choice among 
four search engines: Yahoo, DuckDuckGo, Google, and Bing.242 
A divestiture in this case may not guarantee the desired result 
but only structural separation of the components. For example, Apple 
and Google Android are distinct and competing firms. Nevertheless, 
Google Search has also been the preinstalled default search engine on 
most Apple devices as well243 -- mainly because Google pays heavily 
for that privilege, as the Government’s antitrust complaint against 
Google alleges.244 The practice of making such payments could also 
be enjoined. In contrast to divestiture, the injunctive remedy can 
confront the practice directly and give the default choice to 
consumers.245 
Divestiture is a blunt instrument. A firm or subsidiary is 
economically a bundle of contracts operating under state-imposed 
structural rules of corporate law. 246  One problem with divestiture 
along firm or divisional lines is that it defers to corporate forms to 
separate the entire bundle, even though only one or a few contracts in 
the bundle might be harmful. As the EU remedy in the Android/search 
case suggests, one can accomplish the segregation of the operating 
system and search in more focused ways. The injunction solution 
addresses the competitive problem at hand in a more focused way. 
 
242  See About the Choice Screen, ANDROID, 
https://www.android.com/choicescreen [https://perma.cc/YW42-KUC5]. 
243 See Pinar Akman, A Preliminary Assessment of the European 
Commission’s Google Android Decision, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
ANTITRUST CHRON. (Dec. 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310223 
[https://perma.cc/T7AM-499F]. 
244 See Cplt., United States v. Google, supra note __, ¶119.  In 
addition, Google paid Mozilla $1 billion in 2011 to be the default search 
engine on Firefox.  See Daniel A. Hanley, A Topology of Multisided Digital 
Platforms, 19 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 298-99 (2020). 
245 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
246 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 17 (1985); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-
11 (1976). 
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When it works properly, antitrust’s rule of reason enables 
courts to provide relief that focuses more narrowly on the specific 
practices harming competition. Consider the NCAA case, which was a 
challenge to an NCAA rule that limited the number of nationally 
televised games that any single team could play.247 Once the Supreme 
Court found that limitation unlawful, it could have dissolved the 
NCAA. It took that approach a century earlier in Trans-Missouri 
Freight, breaking up a joint venture that was efficient in many other 
respects in order to discipline the venture’s price fixing. 248  But a 
breakup of the NCAA would also have brought to an end all of the 
good things—like organizing the market for intercollegiate sports—
that the NCAA was able to accomplish through joint action. In this 
case, the harm was much more effectively addressed by a focused 
decree enjoining the limitation on games. After that, the member 
schools could compete for televised game contracts. Post-decree, the 
number of annually televised games immediately more than doubled, 
from 89 to more than 200.249 
 
e. Administrability 
 
An advantage traditionally asserted for structural remedies is 
that they permit competition to emerge without the need for ongoing 
judicial administration. By contrast, one of the downsides of 
 
247 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88-90 (1984). 
248 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290, 
308, 343 (1897) (granting government’s request to dissolve a joint venture 
because the venture fixed freight rates). On the efficiency of the Trans-
Missouri venture, which had led both the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and the Eighth Circuit below to approve it, see HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 23, § 5.2(a)(1). 
249  See College Football on Television, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/College_football_on_television 
[https://perma.cc/8P3K-BA4H]. For more detail about the decree’s effects 
see BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR 
LESS COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 75-
77 (2012). 
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injunctions is that they may require ongoing court supervision. While 
this critique is valid for some injunctive remedies, it is not for others. 
The task for the court is to design remedies that will permit the market 
rather than continued judicial supervision to determine post-relief 
competition. In a case such as NCAA, this is relatively easy. Given a 
very large number of colleges in the NCAA, plus the fact that televised 
games can readily be observed (making a surreptitious agreement 
impossible), a simple injunction should be sufficient to let competition 
do its work. Each school can then decide for itself how many games to 
broadcast.  In general, injunctions work well for collaborative activity 
where competition can be expected to emerge in the post-injunction 
market, as it did in NCAA. 
Injunctive remedies for single-firm conduct can be more 
difficult to devise and enforce. For example, a court might attempt to 
remedy an unlawful refusal to deal by issuing an injunction compelling 
dealing. However, it would then have to determine the scope and terms 
of any forced dealing and almost certainly be called on later when 
disputes arose.250 In so doing, the court would effectively become a 
regulator. In that case, a stronger argument can be made for a structural 
decree that makes the market more competitive. 
In other cases, an effective mechanism may already be in place 
for administering duties to deal. For example, an antitrust dealing order 
was deemed unnecessary in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLC, in part because dealing orders were 
already being enforced by regulatory agencies acting under the 
Telecommunications Act.251 Similarly, in cases involving violations of 
prior commitments to license patents out on fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms, district courts either make these 
 
250 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 771b (developing 
these objections to essential-facilities claims). 
251 540 U.S. 398, 413 (2004) (calling the New York Public Service 
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission “effective 
steward[s] of the antitrust function” in the heavily regulated 
telecommunications sphere). 
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determinations or, in some cases, the FRAND agreement specifies 
arbitration procedures to resolve disputes.252 
By taking away antitrust law as an enforcement tool, even in 
cases involving competitive harm and higher prices, the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decision in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. threatens this 
fragile system.253 Qualcomm, a dominant firm, had reneged on its 
FRAND obligations in numerous ways that also seemed to be clear 
antitrust violations, rejecting a well-supported district court’s 
conclusions.254 Until now, the private FRAND contract enforcement 
system had proven incapable of restraining such conduct.255 Wisely, 
the FTC did not seek to break up the FRAND collaborative system, 
but only enjoin particular abuses. Without an antitrust remedy, a likely 
result is that other firms will do the same thing. The system of 
voluntary innovation-sharing that the FRAND network licensing 
system contemplates will fall apart. If that happens, Congress will have 
to step in. 
 
2. More Creative Alternatives 
 
252 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1037-
39 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a challenge to a district court’s ability to 
determine FRAND royalties where the challenging party had earlier 
consented to the court’s making such a determination); HTC Corp. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2018 WL 5831289, at *11-12 (E.D. Tex. 
Nov. 7, 2018) (submitting to arbitration a FRAND royalty dispute); see 
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420925 
[https://perma.cc/358L-9RXS] (discussing the intersection between FRAND 
commitments and antitrust). 
253 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 
2020), rev’ing 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
254 Id. at 986-88, 997-1003. For an antitrust analysis of Qualcomm, 
see Hovenkamp, supra note 252, at 103-113. 
255 For example, in an amicus brief, former FTC Chair Timothy J. 
Muris documented the extent to which Qualcomm had been able to evade 
FRAND royalty requirements and charge significantly higher prices. See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Timothy J. Muris in Support of Appellee at 5-6, 12-
14, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (2019) (No. 19-
16122), 2019 WL 6683006, at *5-6, 12-14.  
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Frequently neither simple injunctions nor breakups will be good 
solutions for platform monopoly.  Injunctions may be inadequate to 
restore competition.  Breakups may impair efficient operation, 
harming consumers in the process.  
The case for a breakup is strongest when noncompetitive 
performance or conduct seems to be inherent and thus unavoidable in 
the market’s structure. Even then, however, there is no guarantee that 
the firm, once dismantled, will perform any better than before. For 
example, how do we break up Facebook without harming the 
constituencies that it serves? 
The approaches discussed briefly in this Section do not require the 
breakup of assets or the spinoff of divisions or subsidiaries. Rather, 
they alter the nature of ownership, managerial decision-making, 
contracts, intellectual property licenses, or information management. 
Instead of attempting to force greater competition between a dominant 
platform and its rivals, we might do better to leave the firm intact but 
encourage more competition within it. Alternatively, we might 
increase interoperability by requiring more extensive sharing of 
information or other inputs. While the current antitrust statutes grant 
the courts equitable power sufficient to accomplish such remedies,256 
they are novel and could provoke resistance. 
 Because these remedies are nonstructural, they can be applied 
to entities other than structural monopolies, and for offenses under 
both §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act.  While less intrusive than asset 
breakups, however, they can be more intrusive than simple conduct 
injunctions.  As a result they should be limited to situations where 
prohibitory injunctions alone are unlikely to be adequate.  Occasional 
uses of unlawful exclusive dealing, most-favored-nation 
 
256 See 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2018).  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
The subsequent section, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2018), offers equally broad remedies 
for private parties, provided that the “threatened conduct . . . will cause loss 
or damage . . . .” 
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agreements, 257  or other anticompetitive contract practices should 
justify an injunction against continuation of the practice, but ordinarily 
not a breakup of the entire firm or fundamental alteration of its 
management structure. 
The traditional way that antitrust law applies structural relief is to 
break up firms’ various physical assets, through such devices as 
forcing sell-offs (divestiture) of plants, products, or subsidiaries.258 To 
the extent these breakups interfere with a firm’s production and 
distribution, they can produce harmful results such as increased costs 
or loss of coordination. This is particularly true of integrated 
production units, such as single digital platforms. The D.C. Circuit 
cited this concern in Microsoft when it refused the government’s 
request for a breakup.259  
In the recent past, divestiture decrees of this type have been 
reserved mainly for the undoing of relatively recent mergers. Even 
merger policy, however, shows a strong preference for avoiding 
breakups. For example, under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, most 
mergers today are challenged before they occur.260 It is far less costly 
to both the firms and society to prevent a merger before it occurs rather 
than to “unscramble the eggs” later. 
 
 
257  A most-favored-nation clause (MFN) gives the dominant 
contracting firm better terms than those offered to any rival. See AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 7Error! Bookmark not defined., ¶ 1807(b)(1). 
For a discussion of large digital platforms’ use of MFNs, see Jonathan B. 
Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs, 
127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2181-86 (2018). 
258  For a comprehensive survey of Supreme Court antitrust 
divestiture decisions, see E. Thomas Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust 
Divestiture: The Path Less Traveled, 86 MINN. L. REV. 565, 568-69 & n.15 
(2002). 
259 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105-06 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (noting Microsoft’s testimony that the company was neither the 
product of mergers nor organized along product lines, and that the company 
operated out of a single integrated facility). 
260  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 
U.S.C. § 18a (2018) (setting forth merger pre-notification regime). 
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a. Enabling Competitive Management 
 
In the case of digital platforms, one alternative to divestiture is to 
leave the firm’s physical assets intact but change the structure of 
ownership or management so as to make it more competitive. A 
platform or other organization can itself be a “market” within which 
competition can occur.261 If that is so, antitrust law can be applied to 
its internal decision making. 
Ordinarily, agreements among subsidiaries or other agents within 
a firm are counted as unilateral and so are attributed to the firm itself.262 
That rule is a direct consequence of the separation of ownership and 
control. The all-important premise, however, is that the firm’s central 
management is the only relevant economic decision maker. When that 
is not the case, the antitrust analysis changes. Even agreements among 
the various constituents within the firm can be treated as cartels. 
There is plenty of precedent on this issue. The history of antitrust 
law is replete with examples of incorporated firms that are owned or 
managed by distinct and often competing entities. The courts have 
treated these firms as cartels or joint ventures, even for practices that, 
from a corporate law perspective, appeared to be those of a single firm. 
 
261  For a different approach, see Tat-How Teh, Platform 
Governance, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521026 [https://perma.cc/87ES-
SU25] (arguing that a firm like Amazon can encourage more or less 
competition among its third-party sellers by altering its fee structure so as to 
control the prices that retailers charge rather than permitting them to set their 
own prices). 
262 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
771 (1984) (“[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 
of the Sherman Act.”); Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 
1125, 1135-37 (3d Cir. 1995) (firm could not conspire with its own 
employee, even if employee had an equity interest in a competing firm); 
Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 
499 (E.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1228 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that, for 
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act, a firm is incapable of conspiring with its 
employees). The voluminous caselaw is discussed in AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1463-74. 
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If properly managed, the result can be to force entities within the same 
incorporated organization to behave competitively vis-à-vis one 
another. 
Firms whose ownership is reorganized in this fashion can still be 
very large and retain most of the attributes of large firms. On the one 
hand, this will satisfy those concerned that the breakup of large firms 
can result in loss of economies or other synergies that generally lead 
to high output and lower prices. On the other hand, it will not satisfy 
those who believe that bigness is bad for its own sake.263 
Joint management of unified productive assets has a storied history 
that goes back to the Middle Ages. Farmers, ranchers, and fishermen 
produced cattle, sheep, and fish on various “commons,” or facilities 
that were shared among a large number of owners and subjected to 
management rules.264 Many of these operated on a mixed model that 
involved individual production for stationary products such as crops, 
but a commons for grazing cattle or other livestock. 
The rationale seems clear: the economies of scale for growing 
crops were different from the economies of raising cattle. Production 
of stationary grains or vegetables functioned very well on small 
individual parcels, but cattle or fish required something much bigger. 
The result was that these medieval farmers grew their crops 
unilaterally but grazed their cattle collaboratively. 
For products such as cattle or fish, the costs of shared management 
were lower than the cost of creating or maintaining boundaries. That 
was not the case for radishes or wheat. So rather than cutting a large 
pasture or bay into 100 fenced off plots, participating property owners 
operated it as a single economic unit, substituting management costs 
for fencing costs. Just as for any firm, size and shape are determined 
 
263 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
264  See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61-65 (1990) 
(discussing how residents in Törbel, Switzerland designed governing 
institutions to manage communal property). 
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by comparing the costs and payoffs of alternative forms of 
organization.265 
So while a commons can be a very large firm, it can be operated 
by a collaboration of competing entities rather than a single one. 
Output reductions and price setting by a single firm are almost always 
out of reach of the federal antitrust laws. On the other hand, if a market 
is operated by a joint venture of active business participants, their 
pricing is subject to the laws against collusion. Their exclusions also 
operate under the more aggressive standards that antitrust applies to 
concerted, as opposed to unilateral, refusals to deal.266  The fact that 
this joint venture is a corporation organized under state law, as many 
are, does not make any difference.  It is still a collaboration as far as 
antitrust law is concerned. 
The classic antitrust example of such a collaborative structure is 
the 1918 Chicago Board of Trade case, which first articulated the 
modern rule of reason for antitrust cases.267 As Justice Holmes had 
described the Board thirteen years previously,268  it was an Illinois 
state-chartered corporation whose 1800 members were themselves 
 
265  See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMIA 386, 390-98 (1937) (explaining the market forces that motivate 
the formation of firms). For a competitive analysis of the governance choices 
for a commons, see CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN 
INNOVATION 327-338 (2014) 
266  For an extensive discussion of the law governing such 
arrangements, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 2220-24. 
267 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918) (stating formulation of rule of reason). 
268 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 
236, 247 (1905) (“[The Board is] a great market, where, through its eighteen 
hundred members, is transacted a large part of the grain and provision 
business of the world.”). Justice Holmes observed that the Board “was 
incorporated by special charter of the State of Illinois.” Id. at 245. The Board 
having a special charter means that it was created by the state legislature 
rather than through a general incorporation statute. In the 1918 decision, 
Justice Brandeis relied on Justice Holmes’s earlier decision to describe the 
Board’s corporate structure and operations. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United 
States, 246 U.S. at 235. 
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traders for their own individual accounts, and with individual 
exclusive rights to do business on the Board’s trading floor.269 The 
“call rule,” which prevented collaborative price making among the 
members except during exchange hours, could not have been 
challenged under the antitrust laws as unilateral conduct. A single firm 
may set any nonpredatory price it wishes. Further, all of the relevant 
participants were inside the firm. Nevertheless, they were regarded as 
independent actors for the purpose of trading among themselves, and 
thus the call rule was challenged as price fixing among competitors.270 
Not only is the substantive law against such collaborative activity 
more aggressive than for unilateral actions, the remedial problems are 
less formidable. If a firm acting unilaterally should set an unlawful 
price, the court must order it to charge a different price, placing it in 
the position of a utility regulator. By contrast, price fixing by multiple 
independent actors operating in concert is remedied by a simple order 
against price fixing, requiring each participant to set its price 
individually. In Chicago Board of Trade, the Court ultimately found 
the call rule to be lawful. If it had not, however, the remedy would 
have been an injunction against enforcement of the rule, leaving the 
members free to set their own price. In fact, the United States’ 
requested relief was precisely that.271 
The same thing applies to refusals to deal. If a firm is acting 
unilaterally, its refusal to deal is governed by a strict standard under 
which liability is difficult to establish, particularly if there has not been 
an established history of dealing.272 Further, in many circumstances 
the court can enforce a dealing order only by setting the price and other 
terms. By contrast, if the entity that refuses to deal is operated by a 
 
269 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. at 235, 236. 
270 See id. at 237 (noting that under the call rule “members were 
prohibited from purchasing or offering to purchase” at any price other than 
the closing price when the market was closed). 
271 Id. at 237 (describing the suit “to enjoin the enforcement of the 
Call rule, alleging it to be in violation of the Anti-Trust law . . . .”). 
272 See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 
¶ 772(d)(3). 
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group of active business participants, its collective refusal to deal is 
governed by section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court usually need do 
no more than issue an injunction against the agreement not to deal. 
This is true even if the actors have incorporated themselves into a 
single business entity. This is what happened in the Associated Press 
wire service case, which involved a New York corporation whose 
members were 1200 newspapers 273  The Government charged the 
publications with “combining cooperatively” to prohibit news sales to 
nonmembers or making it more difficult for a newspaper to enter 
competition with an existing newspaper. The Court upheld the 
injunction against the restrictive rules under the Sherman Act.274 
The modern business world provides many analogies to this 
structural situation. For example, each of the 1200 member schools of 
the NCAA operates as a single entity in the management of education, 
student housing and discipline, and financing of its own operations, 
including athletic departments. By contrast, the rules for recruiting and 
maintaining athletic teams, their compensation, as well as the 
scheduling, operation, and playing rules of games, are controlled 
through rulemaking by the collective group. 275  While the schools 
compete with one another in recruiting athletes and coaches, in 
obtaining both live and television audiences, and in the licensing of 
intellectual property, all of these things fall within NCAA rulemaking 
and are reachable by antitrust law. Specifically, decisions to restrict 
the number of televised games; 276  to limit the compensation of 
 
273 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1945). 
274 Id. at 23.  The same thing occurred under §5 of the FTC Act in 
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), which 
involved a New York corporation with 15 members.  Once again, the Court 
affirmed an injunction against a concerted refusal to deal.  On the 
corporation’s structure, see Brief for the FTC, Fashion Originator’s Guild of 
Am. V. FTC, No. 537, 1941 WL 76666 (Supreme Court Feb. 1941), *4. 
275  Membership, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (NCAA), 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership 
[https://perma.cc/DU6H-SBAM]. 
276 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984). 
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coaches 277  or players; 278  or to limit licensing of students’ names, 
images, and likenesses279 all fall within section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
When a violation is found, the antitrust remedy is an injunction 
permitting each team to determine its choices individually. By 
contrast, if the NCAA were a single entity owning all of its various 
teams and IP rights, these decisions would be unilateral and largely 
unreachable under the antitrust laws.280 
The same analysis drove the American Needle litigation, a 
refusal to deal case that involved the National Football League 
(NFL).281 The NFL is an unincorporated association controlled by the 
thirty-two individual NFL football teams, each of which is separately 
owned. NFL Properties (NFLP) is a separate, incorporated LLC in 
New York, controlled by the NFL. The individual teams are members, 
and they also collectively control the licensing of the teams’ 
substantial and individually owned intellectual property rights. In this 
case, the team members voted to authorize NFLP to grant an exclusive 
license to Reebok to sell NFL logoed headwear (i.e., helmets and caps) 
for all thirty-two teams. 282  The plaintiff, American Needle, was a 
competing manufacturer that the agreement excluded.283 
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether NFLP’s grant of 
an exclusive license should be addressed as a “unilateral” act of NFLP 
 
277 Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 5 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933-
34 (D. Kan. 1998) (condemning wage-fixing of lower-level basketball 
coaches). 
278  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 
1052-53 (9th Cir. 2015) (condemning restraints on student athlete 
compensation); Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (In re NCAA), 958 
F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2020) (condemning “rules that restrict the 
education-related benefits” member institutions can offer student athletes). 
279 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 
37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
280  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 
(1984) (“The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is 
unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.”).  
281 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League (NFL), 560 U.S. 183, 
189-97 (2010). 
282 Id. at 187-88. 
283 Id. at 187. 
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or as a concerted act by the thirty-two teams acting together, and the 
Court unanimously decided the latter. As a matter of corporate law, the 
refusal to deal appeared to be unilateral. NFLP, the licensing party, 
was an incorporated single entity. The lower court had relied on earlier 
Seventh Circuit decisions holding that professional sports leagues 
should be treated as single entities under these circumstances.284 The 
Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary was consistent with earlier 
cases Sealy285 and Topco.286 Both of those courts held that even if an 
entity is incorporated, it can be addressed as a collaboration of its 
competing and actively participating shareholders.  In Sealy, each 
member was a shareholder, and collectively they owned all of Sealy’s 
stock.287  In Topco, each of the 25 members owned an equal share of 
the common stock, which had voting rights.  They also owned all of 
the preferred stock, which was nonvoting, in proportion to their 
sales.288 
The jurisprudence of Copperweld, which precludes claims of 
an antitrust conspiracy between a corporation and its various 
subsidiaries, officers, shareholders, or employees, is an essential 
corollary to the proposition that a corporation is a single entity for most 
legal purposes and not simply a cartel of its shareholders or other 
 
284 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National 
Basketball Association, 95 F.3d 593, 597-600 (7th Cir.1996)). 
285 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353-58 (1967) (finding 
territorial restraints and price fixing illegal in a member-owned but 
incorporated joint venture). 
286 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 598, 612 
(1972) (finding illegal territorial restraints in a cooperative buying 
association). 
287 Sealy, 388 U.S. at 352. 
288 See the district court’s opinion.  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 
F.Supp. 1031, 1033-1034 (N.D.Il. 1970). 
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constituent parts.289 This is how corporate law preserves the boundary 
between firms and markets.290 
But important exceptions exist. While a corporation is a single 
entity for most antitrust purposes, if it is operated by its shareholders 
for the benefit of their own separate businesses, its conduct is 
reachable under section 1 of the Sherman Act. A cartel is still a cartel 
even if it organizes itself into a corporation. The antitrust fix would be 
an injunction leaving each member free to make decisions about sales 
of its own property for itself. Such a fix need not require dissolution of 
the firm, and none of the decisions discussed above required that. Nor 
would we expect it to require ongoing regulation by the court. 
Agreements among the active members or shareholders in 
incorporated real-estate boards are treated in the same way. Acting as 
a single entity, the board organizes the listing of properties for sale, 
formulates listing rules, promulgates standardized listing forms and 
sales agreements, and controls much of the conduct of individual 
brokers. Acting individually, the shareholder-brokers show properties 
to clients and obtain commissions from sales. Each real-estate office 
acts as not only a shareholder or partner in the overall organization, 
but also a manager of its own separate business. 
Without discussing the question of single entity status, in 1950 
the Supreme Court held that price fixing among real estate agents who 
were members of an incorporated board was an unlawful 
conspiracy.291 A leading subsequent decision involved Realty Multi-
List, a Georgia corporation organized and owned by individual real-
 
289 See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-
69 (1984). On the manifold contexts in which Copperweld issues arise, see 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1462-78. 
290 On this point, see Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an 
Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 505-19 (1992). 
291 United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 
(1950); see id. at 487 n.1, 494 (noting that the Washington Real Estate Board 
was incorporated). 
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estate brokers. 292  Under the corporation’s arrangement, one 
shareholder member could show properties listed by a different 
shareholder member.293 The court concluded that both the agreements 
among the members fixing commission rates and the rules that 
excluded or disciplined brokers who deviated from these rates were 
unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
In the 2000s, the government and private plaintiffs sued several 
multiple-listing services, challenging their decisions to exclude real-
estate sellers. 294  The Fourth Circuit eventually applied American 
Needle, rejecting the contention that concerted action was lacking 
because the parties making the decision were acting as “agents of a 
single corporation.”295 Several other decisions have reached similar 
results reaching both price fixing and concerted exclusion.296 
 
292 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1357 (5th. 
Cir. 1980). Under the defendant’s bylaws each member had to purchase at 
least one share of stock in the corporation. Id. at 1358. 
293 Id. at 1355-56. 
294 See, e.g., United States v. Consol. Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 
No. 3:08-cv-01786-SB, 2009 WL 3150388, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009). 
295 Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 285-86 
(4th Cir. 2012). 
296 See Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 
1144-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the agreement of group of real-estate 
to require a fixed, uniform fee for services constituted price fixing); 
Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1579-82 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (finding that a real-estate board’s subsidiary’s restrictive 
membership policies constituted an illegal group boycott if the subsidiary had 
sufficient market power); Park v. El Paso Bd. of Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053, 
1062-63 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
realty companies were participants in a boycott conspiracy on the basis of 
evidence that they kept certain listings at the back of their listings books and 
would show them “only as a last resort”); Klickads, Inc. v. Real Estate Bd. 
of New York, Inc., 2007 WL 2254721 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (finding that 
exclusionary conduct of brokers acting through a real-estate board may 
constitute concerted action); cf. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 
Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241-47 (1980) (assuming the validity of a price fixing 
issue in a Commerce Clause challenge); Logue v. West Penn Multi-List, Inc., 
No. 10-cv-0451, 2010 WL 2720787, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2010) (denying 
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Hospital staff privileges boards also provide an analogy.  
Hospitals regularly use such boards to decide which physicians can be 
authorized to practice at the hospital.  If physician board members with 
independent practices deny staff privileges to someone, they may be 
treated as a conspiracy rather than a single actor.297  
Even an incorporated natural monopoly can be subject to 
section 1 of the Sherman Act if it is controlled by its shareholders for 
their separate business interests. That issue arose already in the 1912 
Terminal Railroad decision. 298  The railroad bridge across the 
Mississippi and adjoining terminal were very likely a natural 
monopoly, in this case a bottleneck through which all traffic across the 
river had to pass.299 However, the facility was owned by a group of 
 
a motion to dismiss and not challenging the premise of concerted action). On 
the status of state-law corporations controlled by active participants as 
cartels, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel 
Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 824-25 (2011). 
297E.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 
1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding conspiratorial capacity between the 
hospital and its individual admitting physicians); Bolt v. Halifax Med. Ctr., 
891 F.2d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), as recognized in Williamson Oil 
Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1319 (2003); Vakharia v. Swedish 
Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 779 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that a 
hospital and physicians with separate practices could conspire).  Some courts 
have qualified this, however, by concluding that while the admitting 
physicians had conspiratorial capacity because of their separate business 
interests, the hospital itself could not be counted as a conspirator if the 
resulting decision was contrary to the hospital’s interests.  See Weiss v. York 
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 828 (3d Cir. 1984).  For a good overview of the issues, 
see Peter J. Hammer and William M. Sage, Antitrust, health Care Quality, 
and the Courts, 102 COL. L. REV. 545 (2002). 
298 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 
(1912). For a fuller statement of the facts, see the district court’s opinion, 148 
F. 486, 486-88 (E.D. Mo. 1906). 
299 As the Court stated the facts 
Though twenty-four lines of railway converge at St. Louis, 
not one of them passes through. About one-half of these lines have 
their termini on the Illinois side of the river. The others, coming from 
the west and north, have their termini either in the city or on its 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 91 
 
thirty-eight firms organized by railroad financier Jay Gould.300 The 
venture constituted a single corporation under Missouri law, but it was 
actively managed by its shareholder participants, all of whom had 
separate businesses. They were mainly individual railroads, a ferry 
company, the Merchants’ bridge, and a “system of terminals.”301 The 
venture thus controlled an extensive collection of railroad 
transportation, transfer and storage facilities at a point at which all 
east-west traffic in that part of the country had to cross the Mississippi 
River.302 
The Court’s order is both interesting and pertinent to platforms. 
It rejected the government’s request for dissolution. It noted that 
dissolving the corporation would do nothing to eliminate the 
bottleneck, given that there was only one bridge.303 Rather, it ordered 
the district court to fashion a “plan of reorganization” that permitted 
all shippers, whether or not they were members of the organization, to 
have access on fair and reasonable terms, with the goal of “plac[ing] 
every such company upon as nearly an equal plane as may be with 
 
northern edge. To the river the city owes its origin, and for a century 
and more its river commerce was predominant. It is now the great 
obstacle to connection between the termini of lines on opposite sides 
of the river and any entry into the city by eastern lines. The cost of 
construction and maintenance of railroad bridges over so great a river 
makes it impracticable for every road desiring to enter or pass 
through the city to have its own bridge. The obvious solution is the 
maintenance of toll bridges open to the use of any and all lines, upon 
identical terms. 
Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 395. 
300 Id. at 391. On Jay Gould’s role in financing railroad associations, 
see EDWARD J. RENEHAN, JR., DARK GENIUS OF WALL STREET: THE 
MISUNDERSTOOD LIFE OF JAY GOULD, KING OF THE ROBBER BARONS 215-
27 (2006). 
301 Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 391-92. 
302 Id. at 392. 
303 Id. at 409-10. 
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respect to expenses and charges as that occupied by the proprietary 
companies.”304 
These decisions, particularly the Terminal Railroad decree, 
suggest a way to remedy anticompetitive behavior by large digital 
platforms representing several sellers without sacrificing operational 
efficiencies. Rather than requiring divestiture of productive assets, 
which almost always leads to higher prices, we could restructure 
ownership and management. A large firm such as Amazon can attain 
economies of scale and scope that rivals cannot match. Further, 
Amazon benefits consumers, most suppliers, and labor by selling its 
own house brands and the brands of third-party merchants on the same 
website. This is how a seller of house brands can break down the power 
of large name-brand sellers.305 The problem is not that selling them on 
the same site is inherently anticompetitive, because it is not. Rather, 
the problem is that Amazon’s ownership and management make it 
profitable for Amazon to discriminate in favor of its own products and 
against those of third-party sellers, or to enter other anticompetitive 
agreements with independent sellers. Breaking up Amazon or forcing 
a physical separation of own-product and third-party sales would mean 
giving up a great deal of brand rivalry that benefits consumers. 
But suppose a court required Amazon to turn important 
management decisions over to a group of actively participating 
stakeholders who made their own sales on the platform.  
Collaboratively they could control product selection, distribution and 
customer agreements, advertising, internal product development and 
pricing of Amazon’s own products.  Their decisions would be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
304  Id. at 411. Justice Douglas’ concurring opinion in Associated 
Press v. United States compared the remedy there—to enjoin Associated 
Press’s restrictive membership agreements—with the Terminal Railroad 
remedy to provide “for equality of treatment of all railroads.” 326 U.S. 1, 25 
(1945) (Douglas, J., concurring); see supra notes 273-274 and accompanying 
text. 
305 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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Such an approach could be particularly useful in situations 
involving refusals to deal.  To illustrate, an important focus of the EU’s 
Nov., 2020 Statement of Objections against Amazon is claims that 
Amazon “artificially favour[s] its own retail offers” in product areas 
where it sells both its own and third-party merchandise.306  Under 
current United States antitrust law a firm acting unilaterally would not 
be prevented from discriminating between its own and third-party 
sales.  Indeed, that was the very issue in Trinko – namely, that 
undisputed monopolist Verizon discriminated against third party 
carriers and favored its own.307  If decision making in this area were 
entrusted to a consortium of active sellers, including both Amazon 
itself and third parties, the §1 standard would reach the conduct. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s Trinko opinion observed that the 
Supreme Court had imposed nondiscrimination obligations under 
similar circumstances, but only when the government was attacking 
concerted rather than unilateral conduct. 308   Further, when such 
conduct is concerted it is “amenable to a remedy that does not require 
judicial estimation of free-market forces: simply requiring that the 
outsider be granted nondiscriminatory admission to the club.”309 
The number and diversity of participants could vary, but they 
should be sufficiently numerous and diverse to make anticompetitive 
collusion unlikely.  That could include individual merchants who sell 
on Amazon, Amazon itself, customers, and perhaps others.  Production 
participation rule making should be public to the extent possible, and 
 
306See the press release, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077.  On the basic 
issue of platform separation, see discussion supra, text at notes __. 
307 Verizon Commun., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
404 (2004) (allegation that Verizon filled orders “on a discriminatory basis” as part 
of a scheme to discourage customers from using competing carriers). 
308See id. at 410 n. 3: 
Respondent also relies upon United States v. Terminal Railroad 
Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), and Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). These cases involved 
concerted action, which presents greater anticompetitive 
concerns….  
309 Ibid. 
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provide for objective product selection criteria that did not 
discriminate between member and nonmember sellers. 
Numerosity should not interfere with effective operation.  The 
Chicago Board of Trade had 1800 trading members and decision 
makers in 1918, when organizational rules and procedures were still 
being managed with pencil and paper.310 The NCAA has 1200 member 
schools311 and the Associated Press had 1200 member newspapers in 
1945. 312  The Terminal Railroad Association had 38 shareholder 
members, but the decree contemplated nondiscriminatory sharing with 
any non-shareholder who wished to participate. 313  One large real-
estate board, the Chicago Association of Realtors, has 15,500 
members.314 
  The designated decision makers could be shareholders in 
Amazon, Inc., but need not be.  In fact, the details of state corporate 
law or organization would not ordinarily affect the federal antitrust 
issue. For example, in some of these cases such as Terminal 
Railroad, 315  Sealy, 316  and Topco 317  the relevant decision makers 
owned shares in the corporation. In American Needle, the organization 
in question was NFL Properties, an LLC, which does not have 
 
310 See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 
U.S. 236, 246 (1905). 
311  Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership [https://perma.cc/3D8T-JKWG]. 
312 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 3-4. 
313 See Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 390, 411-12. 
314  See About Us, CHI. ASS’N REALTORS, 
https://chicagorealtor.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/YP4N-R7PS]. The 
Board also lists twenty-one Directors, each of whom is associated with a 
particular real-estate brokerage. See Board of Directors, CHI. ASS’N 
REALTORS, https://chicagorealtor.com/about-us/board-of-directors 
[https://perma.cc/FMS9-SUDT]. 
315 Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 396-98. 
316 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1967). 
317  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 598-600 
(1972). 
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shareholders but rather owner-members similar to a partnership.318 
Similarly, in Associated Press, the Court probed a cooperative 
association incorporated under the Membership Corporation Laws of 
New York.319 
Whether the court applies the per se rule or the rule of reason 
in such cases would depend on the offense.  In NCAA the Supreme 
Court concluded that the rule of reason should apply to all restraints 
undertaken by the association because cooperation was necessary to 
the creation of the product, intercollegiate sports. 320   That is not 
obviously the case with product sales on Amazon.  Rather, the 
traditional distinction between naked and ancillary restraints would 
work well.  Price fixing or unjustified limitations on output would be 
strongly suspect.321  Concerted refusals to deal can cover a range of 
practices from naked boycotts (per se unlawful) 322  to reasonable 
standard setting (rule of reason), 323  and should be addressed 
accordingly. 
Such an approach would not address bigness per se. An 
Amazon with competitively restructured management could be just as 
large as it is now. Indeed, it could be even larger. Cartels function by 
restricting output, and facilitating internal competition should serve to 
increase it. Amazon would likely retain the efficiencies that flow from 
its size and scope. It still might be in a position to undersell smaller 
businesses or to exclude products that its members and rules 
disapprove, provided that they did not do so anticompetitively. If it did 
 
318  NFL Properties LLC, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0425424D:US 
[https://perma.cc/WJ72-TSUK]. 
319 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 3-4. 
320Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (rule of reason essential in case where “horizontal 
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at 
all”). 
321 See 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶2004-
2006 (4th ed. 2019). 
322 13 Id., ¶2203. 
323 Id., ¶¶2230-2233. 
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so in an anticompetitive manner, however, section 1 of the Sherman 
Act could be applied. 
 
b. Mandatory Interoperability or Pooling 
 
Restructuring management is not the only way to open a digital 
platform to more competition. This Section briefly discusses forced 
interoperability or pooling, which can weaken dominant positions 
while actually improving performance. “Interoperability” occurs when 
the technology or systems of multiple firms are compatible, so that 
users can process instructions for all of them. “Pooling” means 
something similar, although with greater emphasis on the sharing of 
information.324 
While a breakup frequently increases costs or reduces quality by 
denying firms economies of scale or scope, interoperability or pooling 
can make a firm effectively larger, although in a more competitive 
environment.  To illustrate, if three incompatible telephone systems 
with 500, 300, and 200 subscribers made their technologies 
interoperable and combined their customer information, the resulting 
system would be worth more than the sum of its parts. Given network 
effects, the 1000 subscriber system is worth more than the sum of the 
three systems that are unable to interconnect.  Further, none would 
have a customer base advantage over the other two.  They could focus 
their competition on other areas of service quality, price, or sale of 
devices.  That is, in fact, the phone system that we have, except that it 
involves the joint participation of dozens of companies instead of 
three. 
 
324  Pooling can also refer to technology sharing, however. For 
example, patent pooling occurs when multiple parties cross license their 
patents into a common pool that all participants can access. See, e.g., Josh 
Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 
(2004). 
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Interoperability remedies need not require any spinoffs of assets. 
While some sharing remedies might be complex, others need not be.325 
They may consist of little more than compelled pooling of data in a 
common format. When it is mutually profitable and the market is 
functioning properly, sharing of systems or data is often achieved by 
voluntary agreement. One example of voluntary sharing of both 
technology and information is email, where a large number of 
programs, called clients, receive, display, store, and send messages. 
Different clients such as Microsoft Outlook and Google’s Gmail 
function with one another seamlessly. In order to interconnect they 
need a shared set of technical protocols, as well as information about 
senders’ and recipients’ email addresses and servers. 
Another example that is technically much different is Insurance 
Services Office (ISO), which aggregates actuarial data from 
participating casualty insurers. The result is a larger pool of statistical 
data about the expected cost of insured losses that enables insurers who 
share it to calculate premiums more accurately.326 Another is JSTOR, 
or Journal Storage, which aggregates the full text of licensed articles 
from some 2000 academic journals and makes them available to 
licensees, who can then search all of them simultaneously.327 Finally, 
a sharing agreement that began voluntarily but was later modified by 
antitrust consent decrees is blanket licensing of digitized music.328 
 
325For a good study of the role of data interoperability in EU competition law, see 
Jörg Hoffmann and Begoña González Otero, Demystifying the Role of Data 
Interoperability in the Access and Sharing Debate (Max Planck Institute Res. Paper 
No. 20-16, 2020), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3705217.  
326 The Supreme Court described ISO and its processes in an antitrust 
case, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772-73 (1993).  See 
also https://www.verisk.com/insurance/brands/iso/.  
327  See About JSTOR, JSTOR (2020), https://about.jstor.org 
[https://perma.cc/VB9H-8W86]. 
328 Blanket licensing of digitized music involves consent decrees that 
made the licenses nonexclusive and compelled distribution on 
nondiscriminatory terms. See Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 349, 350-51 (2001). 
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Blanket licensing provides licensees with indemnified, immediate, and 
very broad access to recorded music from thousands of rights holders 
via organizations such as Broadcast Music, Inc. and ASCAP.329 This 
system eventually led to music sharing sites such as Spotify or Apple 
Music, which are large blanket licensees that sublicense to users. 
As these illustrations indicate, interoperability or pooling can take 
many forms, depending on the industry’s technology and the kind of 
sharing that will improve the participants’ performance. Sharing can 
increase the aggregate value of assets by enlarging the range of both 
direct and indirect positive network effects. As a result, in a well-
functioning market, competitive firms can be expected to achieve 
sharing voluntarily, as in most of the above examples. By contrast, 
dominant firms often have an incentive not to share in order to protect 
their position.330 That was AT&T’s position when it was the dominant 
carrier.  Fiona Scott Morton and David Dinielli note that Facebook 
invited a significant amount of interoperability before it became 
dominant, but stopped doing so later.331 The ability to break down 
dominant positions makes forced interoperability a promising remedy 
against dominant firms that have engaged in unlawful exclusionary 
practices. 
Interoperability and pooling are not the same thing as multi-
homing. With multi-homing and low switching costs a user can switch 
from one firm to another easily and cheaply, such as switching among 
ride-hailing services or internet search engines.332 While switching is 
easy, the user still accesses one service at a time. For example, without 
 
329 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 
1, 5-6 (1979). 
330  See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425 (1985) 
(“[F]irms with good reputations or large existing networks will tend to be 
against compatibility, even when welfare is increased by the move to 
compatibility. In contrast, firms with small networks or weak reputations will 
tend to favor product compatibility.”). 
331  See Scott Morton & Dinielli, Roadmap for an Antitrust Case 
Against Facebook, supra note 192, at 2, 17.  
332 See discussion supra Section I.C.1.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
2020 Platform Monopoly 99 
 
interoperability, a person could have both Gmail and Outlook apps on 
her computer, but she would need to use Gmail to communicate with 
other Gmail users, and Outlook for other Outlook users. 
Interoperability and pooling also differ from data portability such 
as encouraged by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which not only protects data but also gives consumers a right 
to their data in a portable, or shareable format. 333   The principal 
purpose of the GDPR is to protect consumer privacy, although it also 
is intended to make it easier to for a consumer to transfer his or her 
data among service platforms.  By contrast, interoperability aggregates 
data so as to enlarge the range of positive network effects and in the 
process level out the competitive playing field. 
Social networking sites generally have multi-homing and low 
switching costs, but not interoperability. A user can switch among 
several sites on the same device—say, from Facebook to LinkedIn to 
Flickr. But if the customer is searching for images on, say, Snapchat, 
the search will not turn up hits for Facebook, or vice-versa. By 
contrast, with interoperability the relevant data for all of them would 
be aggregated for search on one site. On ride-hailing services, an app 
could aggregate all drivers from Uber, Lyft, and perhaps other 
services. This would create a platform with a much larger group of 
riders and also of drivers. All participating firms would have the 
advantages that accrue from a larger database. They would compete on 
the qualities of their individual services, not on the size of the database.  
The one operational difference is that users would have to select a car, 
based on price, location, or anything else the customer wishes. 
For technologies such as search engines that depend on large 
amounts of user data, pooling as an antitrust remedy would place the 
data into a common database equally accessible by all participating 
 
333 See Paul de Hert, et al, The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Toward 
User-Centric Interoperability of Digital Services, 34 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 
193 (2018).  On ways that the GDPR could be used by competition law authorities 
to implement greater interoperability, see Oscar Borgogna & Giuseppe Colangelo, 
Data Sharing and Interoperability: Fostering Innovation and Competition Through 
API’s, 35 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 1 (2019), available at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364918304503.  
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search firms. That would improve search results for everyone, and thus 
consumer welfare. Search engines could continue to compete in search 
algorithms, in price competition for advertising or search placement, 
privacy guarantees, or other features. 
One successful example of interoperability achieved by an antitrust 
decree is the U.S. phone system. Prior to the advent of wireless 
technology, it was widely regarded as a natural monopoly, distinct 
from over-the-air broadcasting, which was not.334 Indeed, the phone 
system was operated as a regulated monopoly for many decades before 
an antitrust consent order that imposed both a structural breakup and 
interoperability requirements.335  Eventually that system was replaced 
by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which broadly compelled 
interconnection and enforced it through compelled private agreement 
or arbitration supervised by the FCC and state agencies.336 
Even though the U.S. telephone system is now owned and operated 
by hundreds of firms, it still remains a unitary network. It enjoys all of 
the network externalities that result from having a single, very large 
network. You can own a Samsung phone on Verizon Wireless in 
 
334 See, e.g., GTE Serv. Corp. v. Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, 474 F.2d 
724, 735 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that the FCC concluded the telephone system 
is a natural monopoly); Gen. Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 856, 
859 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting telephone companies’ argument that it was a 
natural monopoly, and also the government position that over-the-air 
broadcasting was not a natural monopoly); Nat’l Assn. of Theatre Owners v. 
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 420 F.2d 194, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that 
telephone systems are a natural monopoly but not commercial broadcasting); 
see also Stephen R. Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 221, 240 (1970) (making the same distinction—except 
concluding that cable television, unlike over-the-air broadcasting, is probably 
a natural monopoly). 
335 See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-
27 (D.D.C. 1982). 
336  E.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) 
(2018); see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004) (discussing incumbent carriers’ obligations 
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to share telephone networks with 
competitors). 
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Oregon and call someone who owns a Vtech phone on a Frontier 
landline system in North Carolina.337 
The Stigler Center’s 2019 Final Report on Digital Platforms 
briefly discusses forced interoperability as a solution to firm 
dominance problems in networked markets.338 The Report cites social-
networking platforms and particularly Facebook as candidates for 
interoperability. It notes that Facebook has litigated against at least one 
firm that was trying to create de facto interoperability by putting links 
and messages for its own site into Facebook pages.339 If firms such as 
Facebook or Google, which depended on large quantities of user data 
were forced to place it into a common pool, then any positive 
externalities that the data generated would be enlarged rather than 
diminished. Privacy could still be protected. For example, users who 
opted out of data sharing would effectively opt out across all services 
that accessed their data.  Individual firms could still compete along 
many other avenues, but not on the size of their consumer information 
base. 
The Stigler Center Final Report also mentions messaging as a 
market where compelled interoperability could increase social value 
by increasing the range of people who could communicate. Today the 
system for voice calls permits virtually any device to contact any other 
 
337 This regulatory regime is described in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 405-406 (2004).  
338 See STIGLER COMM. ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT 16 
(2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-
/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-
center.pdf [https://perma.cc/C96V-75KF]. 
339 See id.; see also Order Denying (1) Motion to Dismiss and (2) 
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for More Definitive Statement 
at 2, 4-9, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-05780-LHK, 
2009 WL 1299698 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss 
Facebook’s claim against Power Ventures, Inc. for collecting user 
information from Facebook’s website in violation of federal law). The Ninth 
Circuit eventually found that Power Ventures, Inc. had trespassed on 
Facebook computers violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Facebook, 
Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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device. By contrast, even though the technology is available, text 
messaging is still tied to multiple incompatible formats.340 
One possibility that must be accounted for is increased 
opportunities for free riding. Laggard services with small investments 
could still have their messages posted on the market leaders. The very 
fact that commons exist and prosper shows that these problems are not 
insurmountable, but they do require effective governance rules.341 
 
340 See Tejas N. Narechania, The Secret Life of a Text Message, COL. 
L. REV. FORUM (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526997 
[https://perma.cc/HAK7-5PMX]; see also JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-
ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER, EUROPENA 
COMMISSION: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 58-60, 83-85 
(2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3K5-QSG9] (discussing interoperability’s role in 
fostering multi-homing and competition); JASON FURMAN, DIANE COYLE, 
AMELIA FLETCHER, DEREK MCAULEY & PHILIP MARSDEN, UNLOCKING 
DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT 
PANEL 5, 71-73 (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upload
s/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_revi
ew_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB5Y-NNV5] (recommending a new UK 
digital markets unit, which would be charged with enabling “’systems with 
open standards”); Joseph Gratz & Mark A. Lemley, Platforms and 
Interoperability in Oracle v. Google, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 603, 612-13 
(2018) (explaining the importance of interoperability for connecting a “wide 
array of devices”); Wolfgang Kerber & Heike Schweitzer, Interoperability 
in the Digital Economy, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 39, 
44, 54 (2017) (describing the use of a single standard that facilities products 
being used on different platforms); Chris Riley, Unpacking Interoperability 
in Competition, 5 J. CYBER POL’Y 94 (2020) (examining “how 
interoperability fits within the existing landscape for competition law,” and 
how it may apply to internet data exchanges); Michael Kades, A Consistent 
if Not Unified Vision: A Summary of the Stigler, UK Competition and EC 
Competition Reports, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Nov. 19, 
2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Michael-
Kades-A-Consistent-if-not-Unified-Vision.pdf [https://perma.cc/R77S-
HQT6] (summarizing and largely agreeing with these views). 
341 See OSTROM, supra note 264, at 58-61. For one version of these 
proposed rules, see Michael Kades & Fiona Scott Morton, Interoperability 
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Free riding is less likely in a market that monetizes each individual 
transaction. For example, suppose ride-hailing services Uber and Lyft 
became interoperable through a single “UberLyft” App that revealed 
the availability and prices for cars from both services on one side, and 
the pool of potential riders on the other side.  Under interoperability 
the user would have to select a particular car, and the transaction would 
occur at that point. Interoperability very similar to this already occurs 
in merchant terminal and online payment systems. For example, a 
single terminal at the checkout counter or a single app on a smartphone 
can take credit and debit cards from a variety of issuers. However, the 
transaction is monetized only after the customer selects a particular 
card.342 
Because network effects can be a formidable barriers to entry, 
interoperability can facilitate the entry and survival of small firms. To 
take a simple illustration, a ride-hailing platform must be large enough 
to supply ample drivers and passengers to make a functioning system. 
Under interoperability, however, all passengers and drivers would be 
aggregated, as in the telephone system. Theoretically a single 
individual with a single automobile could participate in that system, 
getting her share of rides. In the insurance-risk data-sharing example 
of ISO, mentioned above, even a small insurer can obtain access to 
high-quality risk data to the extent it is shared among all participating 
insurers. 343  Individual self-recording artists can license their 
 
as a Competition Remedy for Digital Networks (Wash. Ctr. For Equitable 
Growth, Working Paper), https://equitablegrowth.org/working-
papers/interoperability-as-a-competition-remedy-for-digital-networks 
[https://perma.cc/MXR3-4KN7]. 
342  See also Filip Caron, The Evolving Payments Landscape: 
Technological Innovation in Payment Systems, 20 IT PROF’L 53 (Mar.-Apr. 
2018) (providing an overview of technological innovations and new 
challenges in the payments market). For a description of regulatory obstacles, 
see Yesha Yadav, Fintech and International Financial Regulation, 53 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1109, 1135-42 (2020). 
343 See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farhar, No. 05-cv-00162-REB-
MJW, 2006 WL 8454578, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2006) (noting that some 
small insurers depended on ISO for risk data); Daniel Schwarcz, Ending 
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performances to ASCAP.344 In sum, effective interoperability operates 
as a substitute for scale economies or positive network effects and can 
greatly increase the number of competing participants. 
Interoperability concerns are also relevant to some vertical 
exclusion arrangements, particularly in media markets. The principal 
problems involve IP rights. Consider, for example, commercial video 
content such as movies and television. The marginal cost of licensing 
access to a digitized movie is very low. Further, digital video content 
is nonrivalrous, which means that it can be licensed out an indefinite 
number of times with no depletion of what is left over. That creates a 
fairly robust strategy for a firm that owns video content and nothing 
else: license to every customer willing to pay more than the cost of 
licensing. In that case, access to a popular film does not depend on 
which cable company or satellite service you subscribe to. 
 The principal threat to widespread dissemination here is 
vertical exclusivity, which can result from either exclusive dealing 
agreements or vertical mergers. For example, suppose the video-
content owner is acquired by (or acquires) a video-distribution firm 
such as a satellite television company. Now video content can become 
a lever that the satellite company, such as DirecTV, uses to attract 
customers to its network. It may have an incentive to deny access to 
those who watch the video on a different distributor or else charge 
higher prices, inducing some of those customers to switch.345 Here, the 
 
Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J. REG. 941, 968-
72 (2018). 
344See https://www.ascap.com/help/royalties-and-payment/payment/registering.  
345 The government alleged as much in its unsuccessful challenge to 
the AT&T/Time-Warner merger. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
290 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2-3, 5 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). The antitrust enforcement agencies recently issued new vertical-
merger guidelines, which addressed this incentive problem. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (June 30, 
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-
justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-
guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y5BS-M4NN]; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
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best solution is an injunction against the anticompetitive exclusive deal 
or merger. 
 
3. Conclusion: Compelling Network Competition Without 
Sacrificing Structural Efficiency 
 
One reason divestiture has performed so poorly as an antitrust 
remedy is that it has been overly focused on the dismantling of assets, 
whose effects can be harmful but are often difficult to foresee. We 
should be paying more attention to remedies that permit firms to 
perform better rather than worse. One possibility is to transfer firms’ 
internal decision making to groups of participants that can be subjected 
to antitrust control under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As markets 
become more competitive their aggregate output increases. Another is 
to administer interconnection rules that serve to increase rather than 
diminish the positive network effects that are ubiquitous in digital 
platforms.  The first of these might work best in a platform such as 
Amazon, in which competitive sales of traditional physical products 
are made on the same platform.  The second is more appropriate for 
platforms such as Google or Facebook, which place a premium on 
large databases of digitized information. 
Finally, can antitrust courts bring about these remedies, or would 
we need statutory regulation?  One possible disadvantage of using 
antitrust is that it can be applied judicially only to firms over which it 
has jurisdiction.  Legislation can be as wide as legislative jurisdiction 
permits.  This difference need not be important, however, when 
sharing is to everyone’s advantage.  For example, if Google should be 
ordered to share its customer information, that obligation should run 
 
note 7Error! Bookmark not defined., at ¶ 1000(d) (discussing the 
etymology and significant features of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines); 
see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitive Harm from Vertical 
Mergers, REV. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683386 [https://perma.cc/P8RR-TTTA] 
(examining the Vertical Merger Guidelines against section 7 of the Clayton 
Act’s requirements).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3639142
106 Platform Monopoly Nov. 2020 
 
only to competitors who agree to share in return.  And making 
Amazon’s internal commercial structure more competitive would not 
likely place it at a disadvantage against competitors.  Indeed, increased 
internal competition would yield higher output and lower prices. 
 
III. PLATFORM ACQUISITIONS 
 
A.  Acquisitions of Nascent Firms Generally 
 
Given that most digital platforms are not natural monopolies, they 
must engage in strategic exclusionary behavior in order to maintain 
dominant positions. One of the biggest threats to the major digital 
platforms is from small firms that resemble the dominant platforms 
themselves in their earlier years. The history shows dominant 
platforms rolled over by new firms with new approaches, such as Alta 
Vista by Google Search, or Myspace by Facebook. It also shows that 
new firms with new technologies, such as Google, can become 
formidable competitors against established rivals such as Microsoft 
and Apple. 
All of the major platforms started out in someone’s garage. They 
were all tiny companies with smart and resourceful owners, a good 
idea and significant but undeveloped growth potential. An all-too-
common phenomenon today is that one of the dominant platforms 
acquires a young startup before it has a chance to emerge as a viable 
competitor 346  Indeed, many startup entrepreneurs today are not 
motivated nearly as much by the prospect of developing a new 
business as by the opportunity to sell out to a major platform at a high 
 
346 Cf. STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., 
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 23 (Comm. Rep. 
2020) (canvassing Amazon’s major acquisitions); id. at 25, 150 (noting 
Facebook’s acquisitions of at least 63 companies since 2004); id. at 175 (“In 
a span of 20 years, Google purchased well over 260 companies—a figure that 
likely understates the full breadth of Google’s acquisitions, given that many 
of the firm’s purchases have gone unreported.”). 
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price, even if their business will be shut down as a result.347 Capital 
markets reflect this phenomenon. It is easier to get capital for a new 
firm that is highly likely to be acquired rather than a firm with a 
technology that is promising on its own terms.348 
This situation has produced an unhealthy equilibrium. New entry 
is important in any market, particularly one in which technology 
moves fast. Something must be done to make it more likely that 
startups will develop into viable independent firms rather than 
disappear into one of the large digital platforms. One possibility is the 
antitrust merger laws. However, this may require new legislation 
governing platform acquisitions, given that the acquired firms are 
often very small and do not sell competing products. 
I say that the area “may” require new legislation because the need 
is not clear from the statutory language. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
is very broad, reaching all acquisitions whose effect may be 
substantially to lessen competition.349 Its coverage is not limited to 
firms of any particular size, market share, or with any particular 
competitive relationship. It reaches horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate acquisitions. Nor does the statute itself restrict the 
mechanisms by which competition might be lessened. Finally, the 
courts have repeatedly observed that section 7 has a “prophylactic” 
purpose, which is to police acquisitions when their competitive threats 
are still in their “incipiency.” 350  However, years of restrictive 
 
347 See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy 7-8, 54-
56 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, No. 542, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506919 [https://perma.cc/5ZC8-HKTB]. 
348 E.g., id. at 24-41 (documenting venture capital markets’ heavy 
orientation toward new entrants’ selloff possibilities); Armin Schwienbacher, 
Innovation and Venture Capital Exits, 118 ECON. J. 1888, 1890 (2008). 
349 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). 
350 See Brunswick Crop. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 
485 (1977); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 
597 (1957); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 
HASTINGS L.J. 45, 51-55 (2018) (discussing applications of the incipiency 
test). 
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interpretation have added a judicial gloss that reads the statute much 
more narrowly.351 
Most of the harms of dominant-platform acquisitions of nascent 
firms are not easily addressed by current merger policy. Agency 
merger enforcement under the Merger Guidelines is directed almost 
exclusively to the threat of higher prices or reduced innovation in the 
relatively short run. Some platform acquisitions do raise these 
concerns, warranting challenge on more traditional grounds. One 
possibility that was eventually approved was Amazon’s acquisition of 
Whole Foods, with its chain of just under 500 physical stores. If that 
acquisition had been challenged, it would very likely have been on 
conventional, price-increasing theories of merger harm. That is, it 
seems less likely that a well-established organic grocer such as Whole 
Foods would have merged into a full-fledged internet merchandiser in 
competition with Amazon. Another is Google’s 2011 acquisition of 
ITA software, a firm that facilitated flight search through back-end 
services. The acquisition made it more difficult for competing flight 
search firms to achieve scale economies.352 
The threat raised by systematic platform acquisitions of tech 
startups is more akin to an exclusionary practice. Most of these 
acquisitions are not reasonably calculated to produce price increases 
or innovation reductions in the short run, but rather to prevent the 
emergence of substantial rivals. There is legal authority for treating 
 
351 E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.Cir. 1990) 
(refusing to condemn merger in concentrated market); New York v. Deutsche 
Telekom AG, 439 F.Supp.3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (similar).  
352 See Complaint at 4-5, United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-
00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/497686/download [https://perma.cc/CJ9G-Y6Z7]. The 
merger was eventually approved with conditions. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Requires Google Inc. to Develop and 
License Travel Software in Order to Proceed with Its Acquisition of ITA 
Software Inc. (Apr. 8, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-requires-google-inc-develop-and-license-travel-software-order-
proceed-its [https://perma.cc/A89C-UPDW]. For further discussion, see 
Scott Morton & Dinielli, Roadmap for a Digital Advertising Monopolization 
Case Against Google, supra note 178, at 31. 
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mergers as exclusionary practices, but very little recent enforcement 
history.353 
Most of the threat from nascent firms is not from head-to-head 
competitors. Given the significant scale and network economies that 
the large platforms enjoy, a startup who simply offers an identical 
product is unlikely to be a significant threat. The more likely threat is 
from a startup that offers a differentiated version, a complement or 
some novel innovation that has distinctive appeal. As a result, many of 
these acquisitions are only partially horizontal or not horizontal at all. 
Merger law today is heavily focused on horizontal mergers, which get 
its closest scrutiny. Vertical mergers, between buyers and sellers, are 
challenged far less frequently.354 So-called “conglomerate” mergers, 
between firms whose relationship is neither horizontal nor vertical, are 
rarely challenged. Unfortunately, this is where the startup-acquisition 
threat is most pronounced. 
Small tech firms with good ideas and management can grow very 
quickly. Nevertheless, antitrust enforcement against these acquisitions 
raises formidable obstacles. First, causation as to any particular 
acquisition is difficult to prove. While a nascent digital firm with a 
promising technology might turn into a platform juggernaut, at the 
time of these acquisitions few show more than speculative promise. In 
fact, many of them have market shares of zero or at least very small. 
Predicting at the time of a contemplated transaction which ones will 
yield such a threat could be impossible. As a result, a more categorical 
approach is required. 
 
353 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 701-702. 
354 The government’s challenge of the AT&T/Time Warner merger 
is a recent exception and generated great attention for challenging a vertical 
merger. E.g., Alissa H. Gardenswartz & Allen P. Grunes, Vertical Mergers 
Receive Increased Attention from Federal and State Antitrust Authorities, 
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2fe17eb3-8ebf-4df3-8a6e-
a14349ae3098 [https://perma.cc/FX8E-JS22] (“The AT&T/Time Warner 
case was the first vertical merger case litigated by one of the federal agencies 
in almost 40 years.”). 
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In general, monopolization actions fall under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which requires proof of dominance. Under current 
doctrine this typically requires a large market share of a properly 
defined relevant market. 355  For large internet platforms, market 
definition is often untrustworthy. For example, it requires the answer 
to questions such as whether online product sales and advertising 
compete with more traditional alternatives, or whether customer 
ability to switch undermines any inference of market power drawn 
from market share. In a few markets, such as search, the answer seems 
clear. For example, Google Search has had a relatively stable market 
share that has exceeded 85% for at least ten years. Under the 
conventional theory, that would certainly be sufficient to condemn a 
horizontal Alphabet acquisition in the search market, but perhaps not 
in many of the other markets where it has made acquisitions. By 
contrast, if “digital advertising” is a relevant market, Alphabet (around 
36-38%) and Facebook (around 19%) have significant but not 
monopolistic market shares. Further, digital advertising accounts for 
only about half of all advertising, although its share is growing. While 
Amazon is very large, in most product markets other than eBooks, it 
lacks a dominant market share. It does control roughly 67% of the 
eBook market, but eBooks themselves account for a declining or at 
best level market share of about 20% of the overall book market. In 
sum, few of the large platform acquisitions of nascent firms would 
constitute a section 2 violation. 
New entry ordinarily undermines monopoly. Consumers benefit 
because the combined output of the dominant firm plus the new entrant 
will be larger that that of the dominant firm alone prior to the new 
entrant’s appearance. In fact, once the new entrant becomes a 
competitive force it will gradually push output and prices down toward 
the competitive level. In the case of systematic platform acquisitions, 
 
355 See supra Section I.A. Thanks to substantial progress in economic 
measurement tools, market power is often best measured directly for 
mergers, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 913-914. By contrast, 
section 2 cases continue to require a market definition. See Spectrum Sports, 
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1993). 
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however, the opposite can be true. New firms form and are soon 
acquired, in the process entrenching the dominant firms who buy them 
out. Systematic acquisitions of nascent firms thus serve to undermine 
the traditional argument that new entry breaks down monopoly and 
promotes competition.356 
Two firms in a bargaining relationship will move toward their joint 
maximizing position.357 An acquisition offers the dominant firm the 
value of integration and improvement of its own product offerings, but 
also of exclusion because after an acquisition the small firm can neither 
be acquired by someone else nor grow into a formidable competitor. 
As a result, the dominant firm’s willingness to pay is driven by both 
the production value of the acquired assets and their exclusion value. 
These two values can be quite independent of one another. Indeed, 
often the acquired firm is valuable to the acquirer even if does not 
intend to use the acquired assets at all.358  
Considered by itself, the integration value is typically a social 
good. Further, if the firms are not competitors no competition between 
them is being eliminated. The exclusion value is another story. The 
threats to the larger firm are, first, that someone else might acquire the 
young firm, and second, that the young firm would expand into a 
formidable rival. 
The task for policy makers is to find ways to manage acquisitions 
so as to permit socially positive integration values while minimizing 
the harm caused by exclusion. The most important acquired assets in 
most platform merger cases involving nascent digital firms are 
intellectual property rights. The more typical acquisition is of a 
relatively young tech firm whose principal assets are intellectual 
property rights and perhaps some human capital. Growth for these 
firms could go in many different directions. 
 
356 See Kevin A. Bryan and Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, 
Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334-38 (2020). 
357 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-6 
(1960). 
358 See discussion infra Section III.B on killer acquisitions. 
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One promising remedy is to limit any acquisition to a nonexclusive 
license. An alternative is to permit the acquisition only on the 
condition that the acquiring firm license the acquired technology to 
others on fair and reasonable terms.359 The difference is that the first 
alternative leaves the smaller firm as a viable alternative on the market. 
By contrast, requiring compulsory licensing preserves the IP assets to 
the public, but extinguishes the acquired firm.360 Any growth potential 
contained in the acquired firm’s intellectual property rights will be 
available to others. 
These remedies are feasible because intellectual property rights are 
both nonrivalrous and divisible. It would be unwieldy to say the least 
to condition a firm’s acquisition of a production plant on its sharing 
the plant’s space with a third-party competitor. Plants are tangible 
assets, typically not readily subdivided, and a judicially managed 
sharing agreement would confront a host of practical problems. Not 
so, however, with most intellectual property rights. If a firm acquires 
a nonexclusive right in a patent, other firms can practice that patent as 
well, and without any need to coordinate output with the primary 
owner. Indeed, coordination among licensees of the same patent is 
usually unlawful unless the licensees are engaged in a common 
enterprise such as a joint venture.361 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is broad enough to support such a 
remedy.  If not, however, Congress should step in, even at the risk of 
some overdeterrence.  Large digital platforms, defined by size rather 
than market share, should simply be forbidden from making any 
acquisition of another firm other than one of unconditioned 
nonexclusive rights to intellectual property. 
 
359 See Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on 
Startup Acquisitions, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 615, 623-29 (2020); Bryan & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 356, at 339-42. 
360 Bryan and Hovenkamp, supra note 356, at 353-355. They argue 
for the compulsory-licensing alternative. 
361  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A 
Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 524, 540 (2015). 
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Such a limitation would reduce the value of the acquired firm, 
perhaps considerably. The acquiring firm is obtaining the right to 
integrate, or use, but not the power to exclude. Depending on the 
circumstances, these two rights can have very different values. At one 
extreme, consider the firm that purchases a firm with a competing 
patent and then simply shuts that technology down. In that case the 
value of the integration right is zero. The thing that makes the asset 
valuable to the acquiring firm is the exclusion right. This was the case 
in both the Supreme Court’s Paper Bag decision in 1908,362 and the 
Federal Circuit’s more recent Trebro decision. 363  Neither decision 
raised antitrust issues. As a matter of competition policy, however, 
both reached the wrong result by approving transactions that facilitated 
competitor exclusion, while doing nothing to promote innovation or 
improve the productive capacity or efficiency of the acquirer. 
Indeed, this is one particular use of a patent that actually deters 
rather than promotes innovation. If no patent had ever issued, others 
would still be able to develop the technology for themselves. By 
buying up a patent, shutting it down, and bringing infringement suits 
against others, however, the acquiring firm is not only obtaining no 
integration value from the patent, but it is also denying others the right 
to develop that technology, even if independently. 
Limiting the dominant firm’s acquisition to a nonexclusive license 
of all relevant intellectual property rights essentially permits the firm 
to acquire the integration value of the target, but not the exclusion 
value. If the acquiring firm intends to use the acquired technology, the 
nonexclusive license gives it everything that it needs. For example, if 
 
362 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 
(1908) (“As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use 
of the new patent, we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been 
of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege 
of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”) 
363 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1172 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); see Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive 
Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871, 875 (2016). 
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Facebook wishes to acquire WhatsApp, as it actually did in 2014,364 it 
would be permitted to acquire a nonexclusive license in WhatsApp’s 
technology. This would give Facebook all it needs to make the 
contemplated improvements in its own messaging technology. 
WhatsApp would then be free to continue to use its technology or to 
grant nonexclusive rights to others. Alternatively, if Facebook were 
permitted to acquire WhatsApp but compelled to license out any 
acquired technology, it would also be able to capture the full value of 
any integration that the acquisition facilitated, but not the right to 
exclude others from the technology.365 
 
B.  Killer Acquisitions 
 
A killer acquisition occurs when a firm buys another firm in 
order to remove its productive assets from the market.366 The problem 
 
364 Chelsey Dulaney, Facebook Completes Acquisition of WhatsApp, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:58 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-completes-acquisition-of-whatsapp-
1412603898 [https://perma.cc/S62Y-SU4M]. 
365 The consent decree permitting the previously discussed 
Google-ITA software merger in flight search required Google to 
license the relevant information to rivals. See Press Release, supra note 
352 (noting that Google would be required to license the acquired firm’s 
“software to airfare websites on commercially reasonable terms”). 
366  See Igor Letina, Armin Schmutzler & Regina Seibel, Killer 
Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on Innovation Strategies 1 (Ctr. for 
Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. DP15167, 2020), 
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15167 
[https://perma.cc/5GAS-2QSP]; see, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and 
Other Equitable Relief at 2, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Mallinckrodt Ard Inc., 
No. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170118mallinckrodt_co
mplaint_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/F43Y-BUDX]; see also Colleen 
Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, J. POL. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1 & n.2) (giving several examples of killer 
acquisitions, mostly from the pharmaceutical industry); Amy C. Madl, 
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is not new. Already in 1916 American Can was condemned of 
monopolization for buying up rival can-making firms and promptly 
dismantling their assets in order to keep them off the market. 367 
American Can acquired rivals who used older or less efficient 
technology. Today the opposite is likely to be true: a firm may acquire 
a startup’s superior technology and shut it down, simply to protect its 
own turf. 368  In the process, it denies society the benefits of the 
improvements. 
A variation of the same problem occurs when a firm acquires 
exclusive rights in a patent and declines to practice it but then sues 
rivals for infringement. 369  In other cases, a firm acquires a small 
research firm in an area such as pharmaceuticals with promising 
research projects in the works, and then shuts them down. Often the 
acquired firm has a market share of zero because the acquired research 
projects have not yet been marketed.370 For example, the assets of an 
acquired pharmaceutical-research firm may include drugs that are in 
development but not yet tested or brought to market.371 
In its simple form the problem of killer acquisitions should be 
easy. Any failure of the legal system to take a more aggressive position 
 
Killing Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of Killer Acquisitions, 38 YALE 
J. ON REG. BULL. 28, 34-35 (2020) (defending some killer acquisitions in the 
pharamaceuticals industry). 
367 United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 875 (D. Md. 1916) 
(noting the defendant’s practice of shutting down rivals’ plants almost 
immediately after acquisition whereby “[t]wo-thirds of the plants bought 
were abandoned within two years of their purchase. Many of them were never 
operated by the defendant at all . . . .”). For a discussion of market entrants’ 
ability to disrupt incumbent industry rivals, see TIM WU, THE MASTER 
SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 20 (2010). 
368 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 
100 B.U. L. REV. 71, 74-76 (2020). 
369 See supra notes 362-365 and accompanying text. 
370 Cunningham et al., supra note 366, at 2 (modeling acquisitions 
when the target firm’s assets are still under development and project success 
is uncertain). 
371 See Nils Behnke & Norbert Hültenschmidt, New Path to Profits 
in Biotech: Taking the Acquisition Exit, 13 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 78, 84 
(2007). 
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is largely a result of classification myopia. Rather than treating them 
like mergers, we should treat them more like cartels. In that case we 
need not be deterred by lack of evidence that they lead to higher prices 
in the short run, because that rarely occurs. 
The reason we permit most mergers rather than making them 
unlawful per se is because of their potential to generate efficiencies.372 
But a killer acquisition yields no efficiencies because the acquiring 
firm never puts the acquired assets to any use. Economically a merger-
plus-shutdown is no different than the output reduction that attends a 
cartel.373 Indeed, the only reason these acquisitions occur is because 
the alternative of agreeing with a firm to shut down a plant in exchange 
for a payment of money would be unlawful per se. 374  If a firm 
purchases a rival for $1 million and then shuts it down, the transaction 
 
372 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶¶ 970-76; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 
704 (2017). 
373 Cf. Jonathan Cave & Stephen W. Salant, Cartel Quotas Under 
Majority Rule, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 94 & n.18 (1995) (noting monopolists 
tend to shut down the least efficient plants in order to reduce output while 
cartels rarely do). 
374  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 
(1940) (holding that an agreement to reduce output is per se unlawful); 
Shubha Ghosh, Relaxing Antitrust During Economic Downturns: A Real 
Options Analysis of Appalachian Coals and the Failing Firm Defense, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 111 (2000). For a discussion of the European Commission’s 
selective allowance of output restrictions, see Andre Fiebig, Crisis Cartels 
and the Triumph of Industrial Policy over Competition Law in Europe, 25 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 607, 608 (1999), which discusses “crisis cartels”—or 
permissible agreements “between most or all competitors in a particular 
market to systematically restrict output and/or reduce capacity in response to 
a crisis in that particular industry.” For a historically similar approach, see 
National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263 
U.S. 403 (1923), which upheld an agreement to shut down production during 
wartime in alternating periods negotiated between manufacturers and labor. 
Such agreements were unenforceable under common law. See, e.g., Clemons 
v. Meadows, 94 S.W. 13, 14 (1906) (holding that an agreement between two 
hoteliers where one would shut down for a period of three years contravened 
public policy). 
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is treated as a merger. However, if the firm pays a rival $1 million to 
shut down its own plant, the transaction would be treated as a cartel. 
Two qualifiers are important. One has to do with the acquiring 
firm’s intentions at the time of the acquisition. The easy case is the one 
like American Can, where the purchasing firm acquired rivals for the 
purpose of removing their productive assets from the market and 
closed them immediately without ever operating them.375 But other 
cases are harder to classify. Not all mergers work out.376 An acquiring 
firm may make its best efforts to employ an acquired firm’s assets but 
later determine that the acquisition is a failure. Antitrust policy should 
not have a per se rule against such shutdowns. 377 
Another qualifier is the possibility of partial shut downs. For 
example, a firm may acquire another firm in order to integrate and use 
some of its assets but not others. Such cases require an inquiry into 
relative substantiality.378 The assets that are kept in production may be 
small or may be complements to the acquiring firm’s production, 
indicating that the merger would not be challengeable if one looked 
only at those. However, the assets that are shut down may have posed 
a significant competitive threat if they were brought to production. 
Here one admonition is that significant harms in one market cannot be 
 
375 United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 875 (D. Md. 1916); see 
supra notes 367-368 and accompanying text. 
376See Wendy B. E. Davis, Importance of Due Diligence Investigations: Failed 
Mergers and Acquisitions of the United States' Companies, 2 ANKARA B. REV. 5 
(2009). 
377 See, e.g., Madl, supra note 366, at 35 (arguing that the acquisition 
of an alternative drug might give the acquiring firm a backup). Madl also 
argues that acquiring a firm would allow the acquirer to obtain testing data 
of a drug in clinical trials. Id. at 36 But in that case, sharing of the data would 
be a superior alternative. 
378 For example, Disney, after it acquired 21st Century Fox in 2019, 
closed down Fox 2000, one of the acquired studios, while retaining 20th 
Century Fox and Fox Searchlight. Brent Lang, Disney Retiring Fox 2000 
Label, VARIETY (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:35 PM PT), 
https://variety.com/2019/film/news/disney-retiring-fox-2000-label-
1203169597 [https://perma.cc/77E2-BRXF]. 
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offset by benefits in a different market379—and certainly not in cases 
where the threat is substantial and the efficiencies in the integrated 
market are not merger specific. Further, enforcers and courts should 
consider whether a spinoff of the threatening assets is a plausible 
solution. While research projects typically include a significant 
intellectual property component, they also include employee talent and 
perhaps other assets.380 As a result, a viable transfer may be difficult. 
The externally acquired but later unpracticed patent is a 
variation on the killer-acquisition story, which dates back to the 
Supreme Court’s 1908 Paper Bag decision.381  The dominant firm 
purchased a patent on technology that was different from its own, and 
then shelved the technology rather than practicing it.382 Subsequently, 
the firm brought a successful infringement suit against a rival who 
entered the market with technology that infringed the unused patent.383 
The resolution in that decision effectively used the patent system to 
harm competition in both the short and the long run. 384  First, it 
 
379 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 972. 
380 Sometimes such acquisitions occur so that the acquiring firm can 
hire the target firm’s employees, rather than other productive assets. See John 
F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 287-301 
(2013); see also Peter Lee, Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2018) (arguing that many such acquisitions are 
efforts to obtain both talented workers and the acquired technologies). 
381 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-26 
(1908). For further discussion of Paper Bag’s implications, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 263, 287-89 (2016). 
382 Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 406. 
383 The defendant’s use of the patent did not literally infringe the 
plaintiff’s patent, but the Supreme Court found infringement by expanding 
the patent law doctrine of equivalents. Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 415. On the 
relevance of this holding in the development of the doctrine of equivalents, 
see Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
379, 392 (2012). 
384 This was also the case in Trebro Manufactuing., Inc. v. FireFly 
Equipment, LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]s to the public 
interest, there is scant evidence on this record showing that an injunction 
would harm the public. The patent deals with sod harvesting and covers a 
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removed the possibility of price competition between the dominant 
firm and a prospective new entrant. Second, it restrained rather than 
furthered innovation, using patent law to deprive the market of new 
technology.  
Limiting the dominant firm to a nonexclusive license solves the 
killer-acquisition problem to the extent that the acquired assets are 
intellectual property rights. Indeed, if the acquirer does not intend to 
use the acquired assets at all, then acquisition of a nonexclusive right 
has no value in the short run. Of course, the acquisition of a non-
exclusive right might be part of a firm’s longer-run plan for technology 
that it hopes to use, and antitrust policy should not stand in the way. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 A common complaint about antitrust is that it is costly and 
slow. While both claims are valid, the social cost of fact intensive 
decision making is likely much less than the social cost of making 
incorrect decisions that can affect millions. Antitrust is a litigation-
driven enterprise that requires decision makers to focus on the specific 
assets and practices before them. Unlike legislative regulation, 
antitrust does not group classes of industries together for common 
treatment, but it is also not as susceptible to short-run interest group 
pressures. 
 Nevertheless, antitrust can be subject to strong decision biases. 
Consumer welfare is a public good. Consumers are numerous, 
heterogenous, and for the most part, poorly organized. By contrast, 
firms who profit from underenforcement are much fewer and more 
unitary in their goals. Individually, the stakes firms have in the 
preservation of monopoly are far higher than the individual gains that 
 
small market that may not have a broad-reaching effect.”); see Hovenkamp 
& Cotter, supra note 363, at 889-93. 
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accrue from competition, even though consumers’ aggregate gains are 
much larger.385 
As a result, antitrust litigation produces too many false 
negatives. Antitrust today suffers from an anti-enforcement bias that is 
scientifically obsolete. This will hopefully pass as courts become more 
familiar with the economics of digital platforms and networks. 
Decisions such as Amex in the Supreme Court and Qualcomm in the 
Ninth Circuit indicate that development still has far to go. 
 Antitrust’s fact-specific, individual approach to intervention is 
superior to regulation when failures of competition are specific to the 
firm rather than inherent in the market. As a result, calls for categorical 
treatment often amount to regulation by another name. An example is 
categorical statements of the nature that the big digital platforms must 
be broken up. It is easy to speak universally about these markets as 
winner-take-all, as having high barriers to entry, or as unnecessarily 
harmful to competitors or consumers. These overly generalized 
conclusions frustrate rather than further reasonable competitive 
analysis of digital platforms. Platforms differ by almost as wide a 
range as firms generally differ. 
 Antitrust’s fact-specific approach is also essential for the 
construction of appropriate remedies. The goal of a remedy should be 
consistent with the output-expanding goals of the antitrust laws 
themselves. The optimal remedy will vary with the nature and 
technology of the market as well as the individual firm and its conduct. 
Simple injunctions should always be considered. Often they can 
remedy discrete problems while doing little to no damage to the 
efficiency and integrity of the firm or the market in which it operates. 
As the long history of antitrust shows, breaking apart assets is 
dangerous because it threatens losses of beneficial economies of scale 
or scope. Other approaches with more promise include the 
restructuring of management rather than assets, or else mandated 
 
385 See Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in 
Antitrust Litigation 4, (USC CLASS Research Papers Series, No. CLASS20-
12, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3563843 [https://perma.cc/H4EF-
SU99]. 
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interoperability or pooling. Restructuring management can enable 
firms to function more competitively by treating their internal decision 
making as a market that is itself reachable under the antitrust laws. 
Where it works, interoperability can expand the range of beneficial 
network effects while doing no harm to the firm’s internal efficiencies. 
Competition problems in digital platforms present some novel 
challenges, but most are within reach of existing antitrust law’s 
capacity to handle them. The courts and other antitrust policy makers 
should treat digital platforms for what they are, which is business firms 
that have unique features but not very much that requires us to abandon 
what we know about competition in high-technology, product-
differentiated markets. 
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